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Preface 
This study is based on a more comprehensive, confidential report drawn 
up by the author for the German Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (BMZ) and submitted in May 2004. The report was 
prepared while the BMZ was holding discussions on coherence with the 
German Foreign Office and the Federal Ministries of Economic Affairs, 
Finance, Agriculture and the Environment, most of which were attended 
by the GDI. While those discussions considered aspects of coherence rele-
vant to the government departments concerned, the task of the parallel 
report was to examine the goal of enhancing policy coherence for devel-
opment and its achievement from a general perspective, taking account of 
international experience. 
Besides analysing the discussions on coherence and a wide range of other 
material, the author had numerous discussions at the BMZ, the Chancel-
lor’s Office, the Permanent Mission of Germany to the EU, the Develop-
ment Cooperation Directorate of the OECD (DAC Secretariat), the British 
Department for International Development (DFID), the Netherlands For-
eign Ministry and the Swedish Foreign Ministry. I would again like to 
express my thanks to all those interviewed for being so cooperative. I am 
also grateful to my colleague Imme Scholz for Box 11. 
This study considers the justification for, the recognition and scope of and 
the limits to the goal of enhancing policy coherence for development and 
then, against the background of international experience, explains that, if 
that goal is to be achieved, complex “coherence management” will be 
needed. Questions of ministerial competence do not form part of this 
study. The following text essentially reflects the level of information in 
May 2004. More accurate or up-to-date information has been added in 
some few places. 
 
 
Bonn, September 2005 Guido Ashoff 
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Summary 
1 The concept of “policy coherence for development” 
Policy coherence for development means, as a first definition, the absence 
of incoherences, which occur when other policies deliberately or acciden-
tally impair the effects of development policy or run counter to its inten-
tions. A second, more ambitious definition sees policy coherence as the 
interaction of all policies that are relevant in the given context with a view 
to the achievement of overriding development objectives. 
2 Justifying the goal of enhancing policy coherence  
for development 
The goal of enhancing policy coherence for development can be justified 
in three ways. The “negative” justification is based on a number of inco-
herences observed in past years (owing, for example, to the EU’s trade, 
agricultural and fisheries policies). The strategic justification sees policy 
coherence as a task for global governance, i.e. efforts actively to shape 
globalization. The substantive-programmatic justification results from the 
demand for sustainable development as the supreme guiding concept of 
global governance, which was defined in more precise terms through the 
specification of important objectives at the world conferences of the 1990s 
and in the Millennium Declaration adopted by the international commu-
nity in September 2000 and calls for all policies to share responsibility. 
The most concrete objectives formulated are to be found in the section of 
the Millennium Declaration entitled “Development and poverty eradica-
tion” in the form of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The goal of enhancing policy coherence for development is thus a legiti-
mate one and indeed ranks as an overriding objective. Nonetheless, it is 
subject to certain limits. Firstly, development policy is but one part, albeit 
an important part, of global structural policy, which is committed to the 
fundamental development goals reaffirmed in the Millennium Declaration. 
Other policies, too, must contribute and provide appropriate conceptual 
answers. Secondly, for several reasons (see Chapter 4) development policy  
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does not by any means already have all the answers to the question: when 
do other policies act coherently with development policy? Thirdly, other 
policies, too, pursue overriding objectives, such as consumer protection, 
environmental protection or security interests, which must be taken into 
account by all policies, including therefore development policy. There is, 
however, no preordained hierarchy of the various overriding objectives. In 
this context it is necessary rather to spell out the various systems of objec-
tives and to bring about a consensus on the priorities in each specific case. 
3 The German Government’s recognition of  
the goal of enhancing policy coherence for  
development at national and international level 
The goal of enhancing policy coherence for development has been en-
dorsed not only by the BMZ: the Federal German Government, too, has 
explicitly recognized it at national level, primarily in its Programme of 
Action 2015 for Poverty Reduction (AP 2015), at EU level (policy coher-
ence for development is demanded in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Trea-
ties, of which Germany is a co-signatory), in the OECD (statements to this 
effect by the Council of Ministers and the Development Assistance Com-
mittee/DAC) and in the UN context (the Millennium Declaration, the 
WTO Ministerial Declaration in Doha in 2001, the Monterrey Consensus 
in 2002, the Declaration of the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment held in Johannesburg in 2002). 
4 Causes of policy incoherences and plea for a realistic 
understanding of coherence 
Policy incoherences have a number of causes, which can be assigned to 
four areas: (i) the area of societal and political norms, (ii) the area of po-
litical decision-making (divergences of political interests at national and 
EU level, added complexity of political decision-making processes as a 
consequence of globalization and decentralization, weakness of develop-
ment policy in the play of political forces), (iii) the area of policy formula-
tion and coordination (shortcomings in policy formulation and in the struc-
ture and process of policy coordination, shortages of information), (iv) the 
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conceptual area (increasing complexity of the development agenda, 
knowledge gaps, complexity of the development process per se). Perfect 
policy coherence is therefore possible neither in theory nor in practice. 
Against this background, the goal – feasible in principle, though possibly 
difficult to achieve politically in specific cases – should be both to over-
come manifest incoherences and progressively to improve coherence by 
means of a more accurate analysis of the interaction among different poli-
cies that influence development in partner countries and globally, through 
the increased integration of aspects of coherence for development into 
other policies and through the mobilization of political support for greater 
coherence with a view to the achievement of such overriding objectives as 
that of halving poverty by 2015. Efforts to enhance coherence are not po-
litically immune to setbacks. If coherence cannot be enhanced, it is all the 
more important to recognize incoherences and to minimize their costs as 
far as possible. This calls for careful analysis and information. 
5 Institutional approaches to enhancing policy  
coherence: general frame of reference 
The general question, i.e. one not related to specific incoherences, about 
ways to improve policy coherence has been slow to attract attention in the 
debate on coherence for development. In the mid-1990s the OECD drew 
from its member countries’ experience in the field of policy coherence a 
number of conclusions which were published as “Building Policy Coher-
ence. Tools and Tensions” and remain the most detailed frame of refer-
ence to date. Although it was established without any explicit reference to 
the debate on policy coherence for development, it can certainly be used in 
that context. It identifies numerous starting-points for improving coher-
ence at different levels (political leadership, strategy formulation, analysis 
and information, structure and process of policy coordination, administra-
tive culture). 
The OECD frame of reference, which was developed from the perspective 
of public administration, must, however, include the political arena in 
which government action is taken, i.e. such actors as parliaments, interest 
groups, non-governmental organizations and the media, which have, or 
seek to have, a major influence on a government’s political will. 
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6 Other OECD countries’ efforts to enhance policy  
coherence 
According to information obtained from the DAC Secretariat, efforts to 
improve policy coherence for development are comparatively advanced in 
four OECD countries. Besides Germany, they are the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. The coherence efforts of the latter three coun-
tries are characterized by several basic elements: 
(i) a marked commitment of the ministers responsible for development 
policy to greater coherence, (ii) cabinet ranking of development policy, 
(iii) strategic competence (detailed conceptual justification of the goal of 
enhancing policy coherence for development and identification of specific 
needs with regard to individual policies), (iv) limited importance attached 
to the question of which government departments have or need to have 
formal responsibility in areas under discussion in work on coherence for 
development, (v) proactive work on coherence by the ministries or divi-
sions responsible for development policy, (vi) interministerial networking 
and joint analysis of coherence issues, especially at desk-officer level, (vii) 
intensive analytical work and dissemination of information. These findings 
are confirmed by an appraisal of the recommendations addressed to nine 
other OECD countries by the DAC in 2002 and 2003 as part of its aid re-
views with a view to their increasing their efforts to improve coherence for 
development. 
7 Germany’s efforts to enhance policy coherence:  
progress in recent years and assessment by the DAC 
In recent years there have been a number of institutional and substantive 
initiatives to achieve greater coherence. The BMZ became a member of 
the Federal Security Council in 1998, took charge of the EU’s develop-
ment policy and of the TRANSFORM programme in the same year and, as 
a result of the amendment of the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal 
Ministries (2000), was granted an extended right to scrutinize other de-
partments’ draft legislation for compliance with development policy. The 
substantive initiatives include the debt relief initiative launched at the 1999 
G8 summit, the amendment of the arms export principles (2000), the 
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Comprehensive Concept and Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, 
Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (2000 and 2004 
respectively), the Programme of Action 2015 for Poverty Reduction 
(2001), the guidelines on the consideration of development aspects in the 
allocation of export credit insurance (2001) and the commitment entered 
into at the European Council in March 2002 to increase the German 
ODA/GNI ratio to 0.33 % by 2006. 
The DAC’s most recent peer review of German development cooperation, 
in 2001, acknowledged in particular the explicit political commitment not 
only by the BMZ but by the German Government as a whole to the need 
for improved policy coherence for development, the justification and en-
shrinement of the goal of enhancing coherence for development in strategy 
documents (especially the AP 2015), Germany’s commitment at interna-
tional level to the promotion of policy coherence (e.g. the HIPC initiative, 
liberalization of access to the EU market for LLDCs), the fact that Ger-
many has a separate development cooperation ministry and a development 
cooperation minister in the cabinet, the BMZ’s increased involvement in 
the Hermes Export Guarantee Committee since 1998 and (for the first 
time) in the Federal Security Council and the BMZ’s awareness of the 
importance of political support from actors outside the government (e.g. 
NGOs) for the efforts to enhance coherence. 
However, the peer review also pointed out that, in view of divergent inter-
ests, influential interest groups, domestic constraints and the BMZ’s lim-
ited political base, the improvement of coherence would require sustained 
political commitment. The other recommendations concerned the follow-
ing issues: submission of the implementation plan announced in the AP 
2015 and operationalization of the programme, development of the ana-
lytical capacity needed by the BMZ to carry out the mandate associated 
with the programme of action (including the provision and training of the 
staff required for this purpose), evaluation of the application of the guide-
lines on the granting of export guarantees, which were amended in 2001 
inter alia to reflect development aspects, and intensive public relations 
work to generate the support needed for the implementation of the Pro-
gramme of Action 2015. 
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8 Conclusions and recommendations for German  
development cooperation 
8.1 Policy coherence as a complex management task 
Improving policy coherence for development is a complex (i.e. political, 
conceptual/strategic, substantive/analytical, structural, procedural and ad-
ministrative) management task subject to special restrictions (limited in-
fluence of development policy compared to other policies, considerable 
need for information in view of the wide range of subjects covered by the 
coherence agenda and the BMZ’s shortage of staff while its tasks multi-
ply). 
8.2 Starting position for further steps to improve coherence 
The comparison with other donor countries, the DAC’s assessment of 
Germany’s efforts to enhance coherence and the positive experience re-
ferred to by those interviewed in the BMZ show that quite some progress 
has already been made towards enhanced coherence. Despite the problems 
that exist, the starting conditions for further improvements are therefore 
favourable. 
The favourable starting conditions include: the Federal Government’s rec-
ognition of the goal of enhancing coherence for development, the exist-
ence of an independent BMZ represented at cabinet level, the awareness at 
the BMZ’s executive and working levels of the need for improved policy 
coherence, a conceptual framework that sets the direction to be followed in 
enhancing coherence for development and explicitly refers to the shared 
responsibility of other policies, and practical experience in work to en-
hance coherence at the various levels. Advantage must be taken of these 
starting conditions in the efforts to further enhance coherence for devel-
opment. 
8.3 The importance of political will and leadership 
The experience of the forerunners in efforts to enhance coherence (the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden) and Germany’s experience 
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in recent years show that progress towards coherence for development 
depends to a considerable extent on the political weight carried by and the 
commitment of the member of the cabinet responsible for development 
policy. If the political will needed for progress in enhancing coherence for 
development is to be generated, the Federal Chancellor’s support must 
also be obtained when important issues with a tendency to be controversial 
arise. This requires both the right feel for situations in which such support 
seems promising and prudent political management which, for example, 
takes advantage of a favourable moment (such as a prominent international 
conference), wins allies in the cabinet and possibly at EU level and, not 
least, also makes it clear that the BMZ will actively support progress to-
wards coherence. 
8.4 Increasing the political weight carried by development 
policy and improving coherence by means of a law on 
development policy? 
Like half the DAC members, Germany does not have a law on develop-
ment policy as such. It has repeatedly been urged to increase the political 
weight carried by development policy, to expand its role as a cross-section 
task of all policies and thus to step up the call to enhance coherence for 
development by passing a separate law on development policy. 
Development policy would, however, be strengthened by a law only if it 
did not otherwise have any long-term political foundations and its funda-
mental objectives were in danger of being repeatedly altered or made sub-
ject to other objectives when governments changed or coalitions were 
formed. A law might, moreover, facilitate efforts to enhance coherence for 
development if the cross-cutting nature of the development policy and the 
responsibility shared by other policies were not yet politically established 
elsewhere. Neither assumption is true, however. 
Although a law might still reaffirm the goal of enhancing coherence for 
development, it could not prescribe implementation since that requires 
substantive reasoning and political negotiation. For practical progress to-
wards coherence, a separate law for development policy is not therefore a 
prerequisite. 
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8.5 Increasing strategic competence and the capacity for 
active coherence work 
Sustained progress towards coherence calls for an increase in the BMZ’s 
strategic competence and capacity for active coherence work. To this end, 
the study proposes measures in six areas: (i) further specification of the 
concepts of development policy from the viewpoint of coherence (elabora-
tion of a concept for the German contribution to the achievement of the 
MDGs; further specification of the areas of action of the AP 2015; reflec-
tion of coherence aspects in the BMZ’s sectoral, cross-sectoral and coun-
try concepts); (ii) definition of a priority coherence agenda (criteria: rele-
vance of the issues, political feasibility, temporal prioritization) with an 
indication of the objective (intended effect), result (output) and necessary 
approach; (iii) monitoring of other policies (the subject of various proce-
dural proposals); (iv) improvement of the conditions for effective coher-
ence work in the BMZ (ensuring adequate professional competence, time, 
staff continuity and manpower capacity; coherence management appropri-
ate to the definition and processing of the priority coherence agenda and 
ongoing monitoring of other policies); (v) mobilization outside the BMZ 
of the necessary expertise on the impact of other policies on development 
and effective processing of this expertise in the BMZ; (vi) formation of a 
task force for the systematic preparation, support and appraisal of coher-
ence work. 
8.6 Arranging policy coordination and interdepartmental 
agreement 
In the debate on German development policy it has repeatedly been pro-
posed that coherence for development should be improved by means of 
new structures (a “development cabinet” or a special committee of state 
secretaries to consider global issues). There is, however, no lack of fora 
for interdepartmental coordination and agreement (besides the Federal 
Security Council and the Hermes Export Guarantee Committee, regular 
meetings of permanent and parliamentary secretaries and at lower levels). 
It is more a question of optimizing the process of policy coordination and 
interministerial agreement. 
Important elements of process optimization are: (i) continuation of the 
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BMZ’s coherence discussions with other departments, (ii) definition of a 
priority agenda on coherence for development, (iii) ongoing monitoring of 
other policies from the viewpoint of coherence for development, (iv) con-
sideration of coherence problems identified by the previous three steps 
with the departments concerned with the aim of finding a solution that is 
as coherent as possible with development policy, (v) promotion of a cul-
ture of cooperation rather than insistence on strictly defined areas of com-
petence, (vi) use by the BMZ of the monitoring function of the Chancel-
lor’s Office with respect to the implementation of the AP 2015, since the 
AP 2015 was adopted by the cabinet. 
According to those interviewed, the BMZ can make a major contribution 
to progress towards coherence if it (i) acts competently, (ii) offers other 
government departments expertise and sound arguments, (iii) not only 
backs up but also actively emphasizes its concerns, (iv) has the support of 
the BMZ’s minister and her deputies in this, i.e. raises coherence issues at 
political level with commitment, and (v) where possible and necessary, 
mobilizes political support. This assessment is confirmed by the experi-
ence of coherence work in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
8.7 Mobilizing domestic support 
Possible allies in work to enhance coherence for development are parlia-
ment, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the public. Contacts 
with them should therefore be nurtured and used. Parliament is being made 
aware of coherence for development (e.g. Commission of Inquiry into the 
Globalization of the World Economy, the reports to the Bundestag on the 
Federal Government’s development policy, statements by the BMZ minis-
ter in parliamentary debates), but this is an ongoing task. Important targets 
are the parliamentary committees, the working parties on development 
cooperation of the political parties represented in the Bundestag and, not 
least, the rapporteurs on the BMZ budget in the budget committee. 
Development NGOs have repeatedly voiced constructive criticism of the 
BMZ’s efforts to enhance coherence. It is therefore important for the BMZ 
to examine and use the information provided by NGOs, to address coher-
ence issues in the dialogue with NGOs and, not least, to use and support 
the significant role played by NGOs in public relations work in the devel-
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opment field by providing information (e.g. the BMZ’s participation in 
debates and discussion circles organized by NGOs). Cooperating with 
NGOs in this way does, however, have transaction costs, which must be 
borne in mind. They can be reduced by fostering the sometimes well-
established cooperation with reputable NGOs, i.e. those with sound argu-
ments, and by involving the proposed coherence task force in the man-
agement of NGO-related coherence work. Informing and educating the 
public about development and coherence issues is an important aspect of 
the efforts to enhance coherence. The BMZ has already taken numerous 
steps in this direction, not least as part of the AP 2015 campaign (e.g. by 
setting up the 2015 Dialogue Forum). Similarly, if Germany is to contrib-
ute to the achievement of the MDGs, the public must be made more aware 
of them. 
8.8 International cooperation 
A considerable amount of coherence work concerns policies and measures 
on which decisions are taken at EU or international level, where, in other 
words, the BMZ or the Federal Government is not the sole actor. Interna-
tional cooperation with like-minded countries is therefore important. The 
BMZ has already engaged in such cooperation on many occasions, some-
times with the support of implementing institutions, and should continue 
to do so. 
Possible levels are the governments in EU Councils of Ministers or at in-
ternational negotiations (e.g. G8, UN, international financial institutions, 
OECD), ministers responsible for development policy (EU, DAC High 
Level Meetings, Utstein Group), directors-general (EU, DAC Senior Level 
Meetings), directors, division heads and desk officers (networking), coher-
ence commissioners (where they exist) and, not least, academic advisory 
groups and research institutes. 
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1 The concept of “policy coherence for development” 
The term “policy coherence” is used in two senses in the following.1 On 
the negative side, it means the absence of incoherences, i.e. of inconsisten-
cies between and the mutual impairment of different policies.2 On the 
positive side, it means the interaction of policies with a view to achieving 
overriding objectives.3 
Policy coherence is considered desirable for government action because 
deficient coherence may lead to ineffectiveness (failure to achieve objec-
tives), inefficiency (waste of scarce resources) and the loss of credibility of 
policies. Despite its desirability, policy coherence is, however, subject to 
limits (explained in Chapter 4), which call for a realistic understanding of 
coherence. 
In the present development policy context the term is defined as follows:4 
• The subject-matter is the relationship between development policy 
and other policies pursued by Germany or the industrialized countries 
which also influence development in the partner countries and global 
development (external or horizontal coherence). Thus it is not a ques-
tion either of coherence within development policy, i.e. the consist-
ency of its objectives, conceptions, instruments, programmes and  
projects (internal or vertical coherence) or of coherence among the 
donor countries’ development policies (a task for donor coordina-
tion)5 or of coherence between development policy and the partner 
                                                          
1  There is no uniform definition of policy coherence either in the academic or in the de-
velopment debate. For various definitions see inter alia Forster / Stokke (1999a, 2–3 
and 1999b, 19–24); Hydén (1999, 58–63); Hoebink (1999, 329–336); Picciotto (2005, 
10). 
2  Sometimes known as policy consistency: “Policy consistency means (…) avoiding poli-
cies that conflict with reaching for a given policy objective, in this case international 
poverty reduction.” OECD/DAC (2001a, 104). 
3  In some cases only this dimension is known as policy coherence: “Policy coherence 
goes further [than policy consistency; G.A.]; it involves the systematic promotion of mu-
tually reinforcing policy action across government departments and agencies creating 
synergies towards achieving the defined objective.” OECD/DAC (2001a, 104). 
4  See Ashoff (1999, 129). 
5  Donor coordination is a separate item on the international agenda. Important signposts 
in this context are the 2003 DAC recommendations “Harmonising Donor Practices for 
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countries’ policies (a matter for policy dialogue or for alignment, i.e. 
the integration of donor contributions into the partners’ priorities and 
strategies).6 
• The aim is greater development orientation7 of all relevant policies. In 
the international debate this is referred to as “policy coherence for 
development”.8 The goal of enhancing coherence is formulated from 
the viewpoint of development policy or overriding development ob-
jectives; it is not determined by the agendas of other policies to which 
development policy should subordinate itself. This goal is justified in 
Chapter 2. 
• Definition: In line with the explanation given above, policy coherence 
from the development viewpoint means, as a first definition, the ab-
sence of incoherences, which occur when other policies deliberately 
or accidentally impair the effects of development policy or run 
counter to its intentions. A second and more ambitious definition sees 
policy coherence as support for development policy from other poli-
cies or as the interaction of all policies that are relevant in the given 
context with a view to achieving overriding development objectives.9 
• Further explanation: Policy coherence is not synonymous with policy 
coordination. Incoherence is not bound to be present where coordina-
                                                                                                                         
Effective Aid Delivery”, see OECD/DAC (2003a), and the 2003 Rome Declaration on 
Harmonisation. For an overview of the subject of donor coordination see Ashoff (2004). 
6  The need for alignment follows from the principles of “helping developing countries to 
help themselves” (or in more up-to-date language: “putting the partner country in the 
driver's seat”) and the partners’ ownership. Accordingly, development cooperation can 
only ever comprise donors’ contributions to the partners’ own efforts. See the 2005 Par-
is Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and 
Mutual Accountability. 
7  Other terms used in this context are “development-friendliness” and “commitment to 
development”. A current example is the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) de-
veloped by the Center for Global Development (Washington). See Birdsall / Roodman 
(2003). 
8  See, for example, OECD/DAC (2002, Chapter II). Other terms used are “developmental 
coherence”, as in OECD (1999, Part II), and “development coherence of rich countries’ 
policies”, as in OECD Development Centre (2003, 1). 
9  Similarly, McLean Hilker (2004, 5): “Policy Coherence for Development means work-
ing to ensure that the objectives and results of a government's (or institution's) devel-
opment policies are not undermined by other policies of that government (or institu-
tion), which impact on developing countries, and that these other policies support de-
velopment objectives where feasible.” 
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tion is absent or coordination problems occur, these often being due 
to differences of opinion on substance or responsibilities.10 A lack of 
coordination may or may not lead to policy incoherence. What is de-
cisive is whether the effects of development policy are impaired by 
other policies owing to the lack of account taken of development pol-
icy objectives.11 Although a lack of coordination among different 
policies often leads to inefficiencies (losses of information, delays, 
duplication of effort, waste of resources), it does not automatically 
endanger the effects of development policy. A decision on whether 
the absence of coordination actually leads to policy incoherence is 
possible in the final analysis only after an examination of each case, 
since the boundaries may be fluid in practice. Conversely, decisions 
which are intended to facilitate policy coherence may raise additional 
coordination problems.12 
It should also be pointed out that the terms “development policy” and “de-
velopment cooperation” are not synonymous. Development cooperation is 
a level of action of development policy. This is discussed in greater depth 
in Chapter 2.4 and Box 1. 
                                                          
10  There have been a number of coordination issues or problems between the BMZ and 
other government departments. In the relationship with the German Foreign Office they 
have included the following in recent years: the leadership of delegations to negotiations 
abroad or to international conferences, responsibility where commitments have been 
made to the security sector in developing countries, the division of labour between dis-
aster relief provided by the Foreign Office and reconstruction aid provided by the BMZ, 
different assessments of the German position on certain countries (e.g. Iran, Cuba and 
North Korea). Between the BMZ and the Federal Finance Ministry (BMF) views differ, 
or have differed, for example, over the Tobin Tax, international insolvency law, German 
participation in budget financing and the threshold values for the BMF’s participation in 
decisions on financial and technical cooperation. The BMZ also sees a greater need for 
coordination as a result of the proliferation of operational development cooperation ac-
tivities of other government departments (e.g. the Foreign Office and the Defence Min-
istry). 
11  For examples of such incoherences see Chapter 2.1. 
12  An example is the Netherlands’ incorporation of the previously separate office of the 
Minister for Development Cooperation into the Foreign Ministry in 1996. See Chapter 
6.3.5 and footnote 136. 
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2 Justifying the goal of enhancing policy coherence for 
development 
2.1 The “negative” justification: incoherences between 
development policy and other policies 
The call for greater policy coherence for development has long been 
voiced and has its origins in numerous incoherences which mar, or have 
marred, the success of development cooperation. Other policies may im-
pair the effects of development policy in two ways: 
• In the first case, development objectives are eclipsed by the interests 
of other policies, with the result that inconsistencies may occur be-
tween the declared objectives and development cooperation in prac-
tice.13 The special feature here is the direct influence of other policies 
on development cooperation. Examples: eclipse of development co-
operation by foreign policy, export promotion and/or labour market 
interests with repercussions, for instance, for the country allocation of 
development aid, the selection of projects or the conditions attached 
to aid (e.g. tying). 
• In the second case, development cooperation is undertaken in accord-
ance with its declared objectives, while other policies either directly 
impair its effects or run counter to its intentions. Examples:14 import 
restrictions particularly on agricultural but also on industrial products 
from developing countries; distortion of world agricultural markets 
due to the industrialized countries’ price support and export subsidy 
policies, with the result that world market prices are depressed and 
agriculture in many partner countries has to accept reduced export 
earnings and/or unfair competition from imports;15 fishery agreements 
that threaten coastal fishing in partner countries; approval of arms ex-
ports to developing countries where their domestic situation is 
marked by conflict or regional stability is at risk. These are, as it 
                                                          
13  At first glance this is a lack of internal coherence within development policy in the 
above sense. As, however, it is due to the influence of other policies, it is covered by the 
term used here, “external coherence”. See Ashoff (1999, 129 and 2002, 1 f.). 
14  For a more detailed discussion see Ashoff (2002, 1–2). 
15  The only developing countries to benefit from the industrialized countries’ export sub-
sidy policies are those which, for structural reasons (climate, water shortages), continue 
to be net importers of agricultural products even at undistorted world market prices. 
Enhancing Policy Coherence for Development 
German Development Institute  15
were, the classic and most frequently discussed types of incoherence 
from which development policy suffers.16 
Various attempts have been made to quantify the costs or magnitude of 
policy incoherence. They either estimate the benefits lost to developing 
countries (owing, for example, to aid-tying17 or the industrialized coun-
tries’ failure to liberalize imports18) or compare spending on a policy 
classed as incoherent (e.g. agricultural subsidies in the donor countries) 
with the level of development aid payments.19 Even though model calcula-
tions of, say, the cost of the failure to liberalize trade are based on assump-
tions which are worthy of consideration and therefore arrive, in some 
cases, at different conclusions, they are still useful for increasing aware-
ness of the considerable relevance of policy incoherence. 
The criticism levelled by the development community at the incoherences 
referred to above also grew in the 1990s because the substantial relative 
and, in some cases, absolute decline in official development assistance 
(ODA)20 increased the pressure to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of development cooperation and, to this end, to ensure greater policy co-
                                                          
16  Other areas of policy requiring attention from the viewpoint of coherence for develop-
ment include foreign investment rules, science and technology transfer and migration. 
See OECD (2003). 
17  The OECD refers to estimates according to which aid-tying increases the cost of goods 
and services provided in the context of development cooperation by 15 to 30 %. See 
OECD (2001). 
18  The World Bank estimates the gain in the developing countries’ earnings from complete 
import liberalization by the industrialized countries at US$ 75bn and, with induced pro-
ductivity increases included, at US$ 124bn. See World Bank (2001, 167, 171). For ear-
lier studies see OECD/DAC (1992, 45). An up-to-date overview of various studies of 
the effects of the OECD countries’ agricultural policies on the developing countries is 
given by Matthews (2004). 
19  The OECD countries paid their agricultural producers subsidies totalling US$ 231bn in 
2001. See OECD (2002a, 158). By comparison, the net ODA of the OECD countries in 
the same year amounted to US$ 52.3bn. See OECD/DAC (2003b, 86). 
20  Germany: decline in the ODA/GDP ratio from 0.41 % in 1990 to 0.26 % in 1999. See 
the BMZ’s statistics at: http://www.bmz.de/infothek. All DAC countries: decline in the 
ODA/GDP ratio from 0.33 % in 1990/91 to 0.22 % in 2000. See OECD/DAC (2003b, 
259). 
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herence in order to reduce the impairment of development policy due to 
the adverse effects of other policies.21 
2.2 The strategic justification: policy coherence as a 
response to globalization challenges and as a 
requirement of global governance 
The call for greater policy coherence has acquired a new justification in 
view of globalization. Globalization, meaning “rapid increase and intensi-
fication of cross-frontier societal interactions, linking national societies 
ever closer together in terms of space and time”,22 presents opportunities, 
but also poses risks, and entails major challenges in both respects. Coping 
with them calls for efforts to achieve the political shaping of globalization, 
i.e. global governance.23 An essential (though not the only) factor in this 
context is that the various domestic policies must interact more closely 
than they have done in the past. 
The reason is that under the conditions of globalization virtually all poli-
cies, even those which originally were primarily inward-oriented, are in-
creasingly acquiring an international dimension.24 The traditional distinc-
tion between domestic and foreign policy, which has long been blurred, 
                                                          
21  See Ashoff (2002, 2). 
22  Nohlen (2002, 181). In this a distinction is made between various dimensions and espe-
cially the economic, ecological, social, cultural and political dimensions. 
23  For further consideration of the term “global governance” see Deutscher Bundestag 
(2002, 415–455). 
24  “Currently the federal ministries have 336 divisions occupied with international tasks, 
281 of them with issues that also extend beyond ‘European domestic policy’. By compar-
ison, the Foreign Office has 74 divisions. It should also be noted that international tasks 
are performed at higher levels of the hierarchy (directorates-general, directorates). The 
line ministries take on many operational tasks relating to international cooperation: 
they include involvement in international organizations, bodies and regimes, attendance 
of international conferences and close relations with equivalent departments in other 
countries. For the world conferences of the 1990s the Foreign Office headed the Ger-
man delegation on only one occasion (the Human Rights Conference in Vienna, 1993), 
the various line ministries performing this task in all other cases. Each line ministry has 
thus in fact become the ‘foreign ministry’ for the area of policy in which it operates.” 
Messner (2002, 10 f.). 
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especially in the course of European integration, has continued to lose its 
legitimacy. 
Against this background, the Commission of Inquiry on the Globalization 
of the World Economy set up by the German Parliament (Bundestag) in 
December 1999 put forward the following recommendation in its final 
report of May 2002:25 
“The Federal Government’s ability to take action at international level 
is an essential prerequisite for the active shaping of globalization. It is 
closely linked to a high degree of coherence of all policies concerned 
with international issues. The Commission of Inquiry recommends the 
Federal Government to strengthen existing concepts for the achieve-
ment of greater coherence and to identify and implement more ambi-
tious approaches.” 
2.3 The substantive-programmatic justification: the 
guiding concept of sustainable development and  
the Millennium Declaration 
Strictly speaking, the previous two justifications of the call for greater 
policy coherence give no indication of the direction which the goal of co-
herence will take. Although the incoherences that have been mentioned are 
regrettable in development terms, they are not necessarily so from the 
viewpoint of other policies, for which the cost-benefit ratio of incoherent 
policies may appear different. Nor does greater policy coherence as a re-
quirement of global governance give any indication of the general direc-
tion to be taken or, therefore, of the contributions to be made  by the vari-
ous policies. 
What right does the development policy have to demand greater develop-
ment orientation of other policies? True to the motto that “coherence is not 
a one-way street”, it might conversely be expected of the development 
policy that it take account of other political objectives and so, for example, 
help to promote German exports and employment. The development pol-
icy is, after all, subject to cabinet discipline and, like all policies, to the 
                                                          
25  Recommendation 10–2; see Deutscher Bundestag (2002, 421). 
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requirement of the Constitution that it serve German interests.26 In calling 
for greater coherence, is the development policy thus falling into a trap? 
This is not the case if there are overriding objectives able to serve as a 
guideline for determining the contributions to be made by various policies 
to coherence. Considerable progress has been made in this respect. 
• Globalization and the increasing cross-frontier, regional and global 
effects of economic, societal and political action which are associated 
with it have raised the fundamental question as to the ability of world 
society to survive in the future. Sustainable development, which is 
meant to ensure just this ability, has therefore become the supreme 
guiding principle of global governance,27 from which a global shared 
responsibility of all policies ensues. 
• The world conferences of the 1990s, such as the Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the World 
Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993, the World Social 
Summit in Copenhagen in 1995 and the various follow-up confer-
ences, specified the guiding principle of sustainable development and 
set internationally recognized objectives for the shaping of global de-
velopment (e.g. ecological sustainability, respect for human rights) 
which all policies must take into account. 
• The Millennium Declaration adopted by 189 States at the United Na-
tions Millennium Summit in September 2000 sees the positive shap-
ing of globalization as the main challenge for the international com-
munity28 and, to this end, reaffirms or emphasizes for a number of 
important policy areas objectives previously adopted within the UN 
framework,29 including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),30 
                                                          
26  Oath of office taken by every minister pursuant to Articles 64 and 56 of the Constitu-
tion. 
27  “The most important programmatic objective of a global governance policy is to give 
practical shape to social, ecological and economic sustainability (…).” Deutscher Bun-
destag (2002, 419). 
28  “We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization 
becomes a positive force for all the world’s people.” United Nations (2000, 2). 
29  These policy areas are: “peace, security, and disarmament”, “development and poverty 
reduction”, “protecting our common environment”, “human rights, democracy and 
good governance”, “protecting the vulnerable”, “meeting the special needs of Africa” 
and “strengthening the United Nations”. See United Nations (2000). 
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which are the most detailed of objectives in terms of the situation 
sought, the time horizon, operationalization with the aid of indicators 
and the monitoring of goal achievement. The goals signify a joint, 
though differing responsibility for developing and industrialized 
countries. According to the Declaration, this includes shaping the 
global environment in such a way that it meets the needs of the de-
veloping countries and the countries in transition, a task primarily for 
the industrialized countries. MDG 8, “Develop a global partnership 
for development”, is more specific and provides, among other things, 
for better market access for the developing countries’ agricultural and 
industrial exports in the OECD countries, i.e. for trade and agricul-
tural policies that are more coherent from the development viewpoint. 
2.4 The system of objectives underlying the goal of 
enhancing coherence for development and its place  
in that system 
The call for greater policy coherence for development thus has its legiti-
macy. To enable the scope of and limits to the goal of coherence for de-
velopment to be more accurately defined, the system of objectives from 
which it is derived and in which it has its place must be explained. This 
system can be described with the aid of the Millennium Declaration and 
the basic statements on the German development policy made in the Elev-
enth Report on the Federal Government’s Development Policy, and is 
shown in Box 1. From this the following conclusions can be drawn: 
• Development policy is part of global governance or global structural 
policy, which is committed to the overriding objective of safeguard-
ing the global future and ensuring sustainable development. Accord-
ing to the Millennium Declaration, this overriding objective is multi-
dimensional. It embraces, in particular, peace and security, develop-
ment and poverty reduction, protection of the environment, human 
rights, democracy and good governance. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
30  The MDGs are set out in the chapter of the Millennium Declaration entitled “Develop-
ment and poverty eradication” and were operationalized in the report of the UN Secre-
tariat on the implementation of the Declaration. See United Nations (2001). 
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• Accordingly, the pursuit of the overriding objective is a task not only 
for development policy but also for security policy, for global envi-
ronment policy and for human rights policy and the promotion of 
democracy. Here development policy has its place at the same level 
as the other policies. 
• The overriding objective common to the four policy areas gives rise 
to reciprocal calls for coherence. From its understanding of the over-
riding objective, its contribution to the achievement of that objective 
and its experience, development policy can, and does, demand coher-
ence from the other three policy areas, such as security policy.31 The 
Federal Government’s “enlarged security concept”, for example, also 
has an inherently development policy dimension.32 At the same time, 
however, development policy must face up to the demands for coher-
ence from the other three policy areas. This calls for an agreement on 
the precise substance of the overriding objective, which is not only a 
conceptual matter but, in the final analysis, a question of defining in-
terests and so a process of political negotiation. 
• Examples of the integration of development policy into the complex 
system of objectives of security and development are the Federal 
Government’s Comprehensive Concept on Civilian Crisis Prevention, 
Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building of 7 April 
2000,33 the Federal Government’s Action Plan for Civilian Crisis 
Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building of 
12 May 2004,34 which is based on the Comprehensive Concept, and 
the European Security Strategy (“Solana Strategy”) adopted by the 
European Council on 13 December 2003.35 The basic idea is “no de-
                                                          
31  In the logic of the hierarchy of objectives presented here this is, so to speak, the “first 
level” of the need for enhancing coherence for development. 
32  See, for example, the Federal Government’s Comprehensive Concept on Civilian Crisis 
Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building of 7 April 2000: “The 
starting point for crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict consolidation 
measures is an enlarged security concept that includes political, economic, ecological 
and social stability. This is founded on the respect of human rights, social justice, the 
rule of law, participatory decision-making, the protection of natural resources, devel-
opment opportunities in all regions of the world and the use of peaceful conflict-
resolution mechanisms.” Bundesregierung (2000). 
33  See Bundesregierung (2000). 
34  See Bundesregierung (2004). 
35  See European Council (2003). 
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velopment without security – no security without development.”36 
From this it follows that, to achieve security, development coopera-
tion must interact with other civil and military instruments.37 
• The overarching task of development policy is the reduction of pov-
erty. This objective has four basic dimensions (social justice, eco-
nomic efficiency, political stability and ecological balance). In each 
of these dimensions development policy is, on the one hand, depend-
ent on the other three policies referred to in the Millennium Declara-
tion (e.g. no development without security) and, on the other hand,  
contributes to their efforts (e.g. contributions to conflict prevention 
and thus security). 
• Although poverty reduction is the overarching task of development 
policy, it cannot be achieved, or can be achieved to only a limited de-
gree, if other policies run counter to that objective. Just as poverty has 
multiple causes, other policies (e.g. trade, agricultural or migration 
policy) can contribute to an increase in poverty or to its reduction. 
Other policies accordingly have a shared responsibility which ensues, 
in the final analysis, from the overriding objective of safeguarding the 
global future. Poverty reduction is not therefore an obligation solely 
of development policy, but a cross-section task of many policies.38 
• Development policy has three levels of action: the international level 
(shaping of the global environment), the level of the partner countries 
(improvement of their structures through development cooperation) 
and the domestic level (educational and coherence work). Develop-
                                                          
36  “Peace and security are prerequisites for development and prosperity. Conversely, 
peace and stability cannot be enduring without development.” Bundesregierung 2004, 1. 
“In much of the Third World, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to 
pressing security problems. (…) Security is a precondition of development. (…) A num-
ber of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.” 
European Council (2003, 2). 
37  “Civilian crisis and conflict management requires a comprehensive political strategy 
which is coordinated at national and international level and tailor-made for each indi-
vidual situation. This strategy has to dovetail instruments from foreign, security, devel-
opment, financial, economic, environment, cultural and legal policy fields.” Bundesre-
gierung 2000. “The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and ca-
pabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, mil-
itary and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments.” European 
Council (2003, 13). 
38  In the hierarchy of objectives this is the “second level” of the need for enhancing coher-
ence for development. 
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ment cooperation is not, then, synonymous with development policy, 
but one part of it and is understood as such in the present study. 
• Responsibility for development policy in the Federal Government is 
not restricted to the BMZ. The overriding objective of safeguarding 
the global future in any case defines a general responsibility of the 
Federal Government, and especially of the four policy areas referred 
to in Box 1. But even development policy, as part of global structural 
policy, is, as mentioned above, dependent on coherent contributions 
from other policies. However, within the Federal Government BMZ 
is in charge of development policy.39 Merely to complete the picture, 
it should be pointed out that development cooperation as defined 
above is not undertaken by the BMZ alone: various other departments 
and the Länder too make contributions to development cooperation in 
the form recognized as ODA by the OECD’s Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC). 
• The BMZ’s core competence lies in the area of development policy in 
line with the place that policy occupies in the system of objectives of 
global structural policy, as shown in Box 1, its overarching task of 
poverty reduction, the four dimensions of its objectives and its three 
levels of action. 
2.5 Development policy’s limits in justifying its goal of 
enhancing policy coherence 
From the system of objectives described above it follows, on the one hand, 
that development policy has two grounds for calling on other policies to 
improve coherence: in relation to the substantive definition of the overrid-
ing objective of safeguarding the global future and ensuring sustainable 
development and practical efforts to achieve that objective and in relation 
to the definition and achievement of its own overarching objective of re-
ducing poverty. On the other hand, the definition and achievement of the 
overriding objective are not incumbent solely on development policy since 
at this level it is integrated into the efforts of the other policies. Although 
                                                          
39  This is evident, for example, from the fact that the Reports to the Bundestag on the 
Federal Government’s Development Policy and the Programme of Action 2015, as 
adopted by the Federal Cabinet, were drawn up by the BMZ and then agreed with the 
other government departments. 
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poverty reduction, too, is a priority, it is not a task solely for development 
policy: other policies can and must contribute. 
The goal of enhancing policy coherence for development thus does not 
mean, for example, that development policy rises to the position of sole 
standard-setter for all other policies. Other grounds can be cited for this: 
• As development policy does not have sole responsibility with respect 
either to the overriding objective or to its own overarching objective 
of reducing poverty, it does not have sole conceptual competence or 
even the power of definition when it comes to the achievement of the 
overriding objective or even of the poverty objective (or of the more 
precisely formulated MDGs). In line with their shared responsibility, 
other policies must also provide conceptual answers. However, given 
its explicit mission, particularly with regard to poverty reduction, and 
its experience, development policy has a special programmatic role to 
play in increasing the awareness of other policies of the need for 
greater coherence for development. 
• Development policy does not by any means already have all the an-
swers to whether, when and to what extent other policies are coherent 
with development policy. While, for reasons which are discussed in 
Chapter 4, this is not the case, it does mean for development policy 
the task of paying particular attention to the effects of other policies 
on development in partner countries and on global development with 
a view to demanding with substantive justification greater coherence 
from other policies. This is sometimes a difficult task. 
• Every policy pursues its own objectives, which in democratically 
constituted, pluralist societies are the expression of different interests, 
all competing for a political majority. Hence the importance of the 
contention that the call for coherence for development is derived not 
only from objectives pursued by development policy as one of many 
policies, but from overriding development objectives. However, two 
aspects must be borne in mind in this context: 
 – The overriding development objectives, as set out or reaffirmed in 
the Millennium Declaration, have not been formulated and opera-
tionalized to such an extent as to permit the deduction from them 
in each case of precise instructions for action under development 
policy, let alone precise demands for coherence addressed to other 
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policies.40 If, however, development policy sees itself as the 
champion of the overriding development objectives and endeav-
ours to formulate and operationalize them, it will surely tend to be 
perceived as one policy among others, in the face of which other 
policies may describe their respective objectives as being in prin-
ciple just as legitimate. 
 – In some cases, other policies similarly put forward overriding 
objectives, such as environmental or consumer protection inter-
ests, which are to be borne in mind by all policies, even those 
which concern the developing countries, including, then, devel-
opment policy.41 There is, however, no preordained hierarchy of 
the various overriding objectives. What rather needs to be done 
here is to spell out the respective systems of objectives and, in 
specific cases, to bring about a substantive and political consensus 
on the priorities. 
For both reasons it should come as no surprise if other policies declare that 
their objectives cannot be simply subsumed under the development pol-
icy’s objectives. In this case other policies need to be made more aware of 
the justification for and substance of the goal of enhancing coherence for 
development. What can and must be expected is that other policies see the 
                                                          
40  This is evident from the MDGs. While MDG 8 (“Develop a global partnership for de-
velopment”) lays down in Target 13 (tariff- and quota-free access for LLDC exports to 
the industrialized countries’ markets) a precise prescription for trade policy, MDG 1 
(halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015) does not include 
corresponding prescriptions for other policies. 
41  Two examples can be given of this:   
• The Federal Government’s Consumer Protection Action Plan submitted in April 
2003 under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food 
and Agriculture (BMVEL) states in the introduction: “With the Consumer Protection 
Action Plan the Federal Government systematically includes consumer policy as-
pects in all policy areas. (…) Consumer policy also has a global dimension. Policy 
is called upon here to create at all levels – national, EU-wide and international – an 
environment for a trend that takes due account of consumer interests.” BMVEL 
(2003, 1, 2). 
• According to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Articles III-119 and 
III-120 of the consolidated version of 29 October 2004), environmental protection 
requirements and consumer protection requirements must be integrated (shall be tak-
en into account) in(to) the definition and implementation of all policies of the Euro-
pean Union. See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States (2004). 
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partner countries’ development opportunities and global development ob-
jectives as their shared responsibility and, in view of the many incoher-
ences, take greater account of them than in the past. This calls for substan-
tive persuasion and, ultimately, political negotiation. On the other hand, 
development policy must be prepared to consider claims of the validity of 
rival overriding objectives. One-sided demands for coherence by devel-
opment policy would not be devoid of moral and political arrogance at this 
level.42 
3 The German Government’s recognition of the goal 
of enhancing policy coherence for development at 
national and international level 
The goal of enhancing policy coherence for development is not only justi-
fied, as has been explained: the German Government has also explicitly 
recognized it, at both national and international level.43 What is important 
here is the recognition of this goal not only by the BMZ, even though it is 
part of the Federal Government, but by the Federal Government as a 
whole, i.e. at cabinet level, which concerns all policies. The emphasis is on 
this level in the following.44 
                                                          
42  See Siebold (1998, 13). 
43  Where the goal of enhancing policy coherence for development is enshrined in legal 
acts requiring ratification, such as the Treaty on the European Union, it has also been 
recognized by the German Parliament. 
44  Under Article 65 of the German Constitution (“Basic Law”), each Federal Minister 
conducts the affairs of his own department independently and on his own responsibility 
(department principle). He does so, however, within the limits of the guidelines of poli-
cy laid down by the Federal Chancellor (Chancellor principle) and as a member of the 
Federal Government (cabinet principle; Article 62 of the Basic Law). Under section 
19(1) of the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries, “in matters affecting the 
remits of more than one Ministry, those Ministries will work together to ensure that the 
Federal Government speaks and acts consistently” (BMI 2000). In the present context 
this means that, to the extent that the goal of enhancing policy coherence for develop-
ment is pursued by the BMZ, it initially reflects the BMZ’s departmental view and 
responsibility. On the other hand, the BMZ acts as part of the Federal Government and, 
especially in the case of decisions and statements at international level (as in the EU 
Council of Ministers responsible for development policy, in the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee or in the UN framework), first comes to an agreement with the  
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3.1 National framework 
The goal of enhancing policy coherence for development is endorsed not 
only by the BMZ in many ways, e.g. in interdepartmental discussions, 
statements by the BMZ’s minister and her deputies, in parliamentary de-
bates and in basic documents:45 it has also been repeatedly and publicly 
reaffirmed by the Federal Government, particularly in: 
• the Tenth Report to the Parliament (Bundestag) on the Federal Gov-
ernment’s Development Policy, 1995,46 
• the Eleventh Report to the Bundestag on the Federal Government’s 
Development Policy, 2001,47 
• the Federal Government’s Programme of Action 2015 for Poverty 
Reduction (AP 2015) of 4 April 2001,48 
                                                                                                                         
other departments. The BMZ’s calls for policy coherence, particularly where they form 
part of international decisions and declarations relating to development, therefore reflect 
not only the BMZ’s own view but also the opinion of the departments with which 
agreement has been reached. As, however, the subject of coherence concerns the incon-
sistencies that sometimes exist between development policy and other policies, the Fed-
eral Chancellor’s or Federal Government’s explicit recognition of the demand for policy 
coherence for development carries particular weight politically. 
45  An example of a basic document is the BMZ’s 1996 Development Policy Conception, 
which states in reference to development cooperation: “As part of an overall policy, its 
success depends on its coherent interaction with other policies, such as the foreign pol-
icy, the external economic and trade policy, the finance policy and the environment and 
agricultural policy.” BMZ (1996, 2). 
46  “Self-help [by the developing countries] is very strongly encouraged in many areas by a 
consistent, coherent overall policy pursued by the industrialized countries. (…) Parallel 
efforts in all policy areas that affect the developing countries are therefore needed. This 
is true, for example, of the security policy, the international economic and finance poli-
cy and the agricultural and environment policy.” BMZ (1995, 47). 
47  The Eleventh Report on the Federal Government’s Development Policy devoted two 
sections to the subject of policy coherence (section 2.1.2.3: “Improving domestic struc-
tures through educational and coherence work”, and section 2.2.12, “Domestic efforts to 
strengthen policy coherence for development”), stating inter alia: “But the economic and 
societal situation and policies at home must also make sustainable development possi-
ble here and in the partner countries. The Federal Government is therefore committed 
to and is implementing an overall policy that is coherent with development policy.” 
BMZ (2001a, 67 f.). 
48  “The German government advocates coherence between all policy fields with regard to 
the objective of poverty reduction and will work towards that goal at the European 
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• the Federal Government’s Sustainability Strategy for Germany, 
2002.49 
It should also be pointed out that the agreement of 16 October 2002 on 
which the present ruling coalition is based sets out in the section entitled 
“Global justice and development cooperation” the Federal Government’s 
intention to support the implementation of a number of reforms long de-
manded by development policy-makers with a view to enhancing policy 
coherence.50 
3.2 EU framework 
The call for policy coherence for development was first set out in law in 
the Treaties of  Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) on European 
Union:51 
                                                                                                                         
level, within the framework of the OECD and elsewhere.” BMZ (2001b, II). “The Ger-
man government will continue to be a strong advocate in the OECD of tackling the 
central task of poverty reduction as part of a coherent, and thus comprehensive, politi-
cal approach which creates synergies, in particular, between the areas of environmen-
tal and agricultural policy, trade, science and technology and economic and financial 
policy. Within the EU, too, the German government is striving for Community trade and 
agricultural policies to be designed in a way that is conducive to development. It will 
call for coherence of all EU policy fields.” ibid., 7. 
49  “For the Federal Government, fighting poverty therefore constitutes an important part 
of its overall policy, which is directed towards world peace and future security.” Bun-
desregierung (2002, 303). 
50  Examples: improved market access for developing countries and elimination of unfair 
competition due to the industrialized countries’ subsidization of exports to the countries 
of the South. Although the present coalition agreement, unlike its predecessor of 20 Oc-
tober 1998, does not contain an explicit declaration of intent to ensure policy coherence 
for development with other government departments, it does emphasize the need to re-
form the international economic order in many respects in order “to increase the devel-
opment opportunities of all countries in the context of globalization and to reduce the 
risks of instability, social tensions and the waste of natural resources.” See Koalitions-
vertrag (2002) and Koalitionsvereinbarung (1998). 
51  According to the Treaty of Maastricht (amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) the EU is 
based on three pillars: the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC), the provi-
sions of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the Union (contained in the 
EU Treaty) and the provisions on cooperation on justice and home affairs policy (also 
contained in the EU Treaty). The Treaty of Nice of December 2000 (entered into force 
on 1 February 2003) does not affect development policy. 
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“The Community shall take account of the objectives [of its develop-
ment policy] in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries.” (Article 178 of the EC Treaty of Amsterdam) 
This article formally applies only to the relationship between the develop-
ment policy and other policies of the Community and not analogously to 
the EU’s Member States (which are, however, required by Article 10 of 
the EC Treaty to act in the Community’s best interests). Its wording is also 
rather reserved52 and not entirely unequivocal in the context of the EU 
Treaty since, besides the requirement of policy coherence for development 
under Article 178 of the EC Treaty, there is a general requirement of co-
herence for foreign policy under Article 3 of the EU Treaty, which also 
extends to development policy.53 Nonetheless, Article 178 represents an 
important reference base, since a number of policies which are inconsist-
ent with development policy are the Community’s formal responsibility 
(common commercial, agricultural and fisheries policies).54 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe55 (European Constitu-
tion) retains or indirectly further reinforces the requirement of policy co-
herence for development set out in the Treaty of Maastricht/Amsterdam. 
This is partly due to a position paper which, in May 2003, the develop-
ment ministers of seven EU Member States, including Germany, ad-
dressed to the European Convention commissioned to draft the Constitu-
                                                          
52  Article 6 of the EC Treaty of Amsterdam calls for policy coherence for the environment 
in clearer terms: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities (…), in particu-
lar with a view to promoting sustainable development.” This provision has been incor-
porated unchanged into the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Article III-
119). See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
(2004). 
53  “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a 
whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development poli-
cies.” Article 3 of the EU Treaty of Amsterdam. 
54  The Council of Development Ministers and the EU Commission  have repeatedly reaf-
firmed the requirement of policy coherence for development, an example being a  
joint statement issued in November 2000. See press release on the 2304th meeting of 
the EU Council of Ministers for Development of 20 November 2000, paragraph 39; 
http://www.ue. eu.int/ Newsroom. 
55  Consolidated version of 29 October 2004; Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States (2004). 
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tion.56 The paper emphasized the important role of development policy in 
the Union’s foreign relations and called inter alia for the explicit inclusion 
in the text of the Constitution, as in the Treaties of Maastricht and Amster-
dam, of the requirement of policy coherence for development. 
Article III-316(1) of the European Constitution includes the following 
statement: 
“Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary ob-
jective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. 
The Union shall take account of the objectives of development coopera-
tion in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect develop-
ing countries.” 
This corresponds to the current Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Like the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Constitution contains a gen-
eral requirement of policy coherence57 and a requirement of policy coher-
ence in the area of the Union’s external action.58 What is new, on the other 
hand, is the provision of the Constitution which states that “Union policy 
in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the 
framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action.” 
(Article III-316(1)).  
                                                          
56  European Convention (2003). 
57  Article 3 of the EU Treaty of Amsterdam: “The Union shall be served by a single insti-
tutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activi-
ties carried out in order to attain its objectives (…).”  Article III-115 of the European 
Constitution: “The Union shall ensure consistency between the policies and activities 
referred to in this Part (…).” 
58  “The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action 
and between these and its other policies.” (Article III-292(3)). The term “the Union’s 
external action” in the Constitution is new. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not have a 
single title for the Union’s external action. The common foreign and security policy 
formed part of the EU Treaty, the common development policy part of the EC Treaty. 
The new Title V, “The Union’s external action”, which forms part of Part III of the Eu-
ropean Constitution, covers inter alia the common foreign and security policy (Chapter 
II), the common commercial policy (Chapter III) and cooperation with third countries 
and humanitarian aid (Chapter IV, Section 1 of which covers development cooperation) 
and sets out common objectives for the various areas of external action (Chapter I). 
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At first glance, this looks like a weakening of development cooperation 
from the viewpoint of policy coherence for development.59 What should be 
borne in mind, however, is that, under the Constitution, unlike the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, the Union’s external action would be subject to accurately 
defined objectives, including genuine development objectives.60 In addi-
tion, the Constitution, unlike the Treaty of Maastricht/Amsterdam, in-
cludes development aspects among the Union’s fundamental objectives.61 
This means two things: 
• The latent tension between Article 178 of the EC Treaty and Article 3 
of the EU Treaty of Amsterdam acquires a more pronounced devel-
opment connotation in the draft Constitution: although development 
policy forms part of the Union’s external action, which is to be organ-
ized coherently, the definition of objectives of that external action has 
a distinct development slant. 
• Development policy thus has in Article III-292(2) a reference base for 
demanding of the other areas of external action policy coherence to its 
advantage. It is not therefore a question of shielding development pol-
icy but, since it forms part of external action, of gearing the latter on 
the whole to development as far as possible. For this the draft Consti-
                                                          
59  Analogous to the abolition of the Council of Development Ministers decided at the EU 
summit in Seville in 2002 and its integration into the Council for General Affairs and 
External Relations. 
60  According to Article III-292(2), the objectives of the Union’s external action include the 
following: 
• “consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the princi-
ples of international law” (paragraph 2(b)), 
• “foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of develop-
ing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty”  (paragraph 2(d)), 
• “encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade” (paragraph 
2(e)), 
• “assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disas-
ters” (paragraph 2(g)). 
61  Article I-3(4) (The Union’s objectives) states: “In its relations with the wider world, the 
Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights 
(…).” 
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tution provides a better basis than the Treaty of Amsterdam. Taking 
advantage of it, however, is a political task. 
3.3 OECD framework 
The Federal Government has also endorsed the requirement of policy co-
herence for development in the OECD framework: 
• in declarations by the OECD Council, which, at a whole series of 
annual meetings, has explicitly emphasized the need for greater co-
herence between the member countries’ development and other poli-
cies,62 
• in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC),63 where the mem-
ber countries have been considering the subject in depth since the 
early 1990s and have explicitly reaffirmed the goal of policy coher-
ence for development on many occasions, and especially: 
 – at the High Level Meeting in December 1991,64 
 – in the 1996 document entitled “Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Cooperation”, which describes pol-
icy coherence as a major responsibility of the donor countries,65 
 – in the DAC’s 2001 Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, which con-
tain a detailed section entitled “Towards Policy Coherence for 
Poverty Reduction” and in another subsection discuss institutional 
requirements for improving policy coherence.66 
                                                          
62  See the communiqués on the annual meetings of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002. The 2002 
communiqué contains a declaration entitled “OECD Action for a Shared Development 
Agenda”, which includes a section devoted to “Encouraging policy coherence for devel-
opment.” OECD (2002b, 7). 
63  Germany is represented in the DAC by the BMZ. However, as the documents and  
guidelines adopted at the DAC’s High Level Meetings (minister or state secretary level) 
are previously agreed at meetings of the relevant government departments, they reflect 
more than just the BMZ’s views. 
64  The state of the discussion in the DAC at that time is described in detail in the 1992 
annual report of the DAC Chairman. See OECD/DAC (1992, 5–6, 31–51). 
65  See OECD/DAC (1996, 15). 
66  See OECD/DAC (2001a, 74–93 and 108–109). 
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It should be noted that the member countries’ implementation of the decla-
rations of principles and guidelines adopted in the DAC is examined dur-
ing the DAC’s peer reviews.67 The resulting reports have usually devoted 
one of the main chapters to the subject of policy coherence in recent years. 
3.4 UN framework 
Last but not least, the Federal Government has also endorsed the require-
ment of policy coherence for development in the UN framework in a num-
ber of important declarations, including: 
• the Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
18 September 2000, in which the UN members commit themselves to 
creating at both national and global level an environment geared to 
development and poverty reduction,68 
• the declaration adopted at the ministerial meeting of the World Trade 
Organization held in Doha in November 2001, which reaffirms that 
international trade can play a major role in promoting development 
and reducing poverty,69 
                                                          
67  In regime theory terms the DAC may appear to be a weak actor because, although it sets 
standards (in the form of guidelines and the like) and reviews their implementation, it 
does not take any legally binding decisions or have any means of imposing sanctions to 
ensure compliance with its rules. The DAC is, however, the only organization to review 
all the member countries’ development policies regularly and comprehensively. See al-
so Forster / Stokke (1999b, 50). The term “regime” or “international regime” signifies 
an “institutionalized form of standard- and rule-led conduct in the political management 
of conflicts or interdependence problems”; a regime is constituted by principles, stand-
ards, rules, decision-making procedures and compliance with the rules. See Wolf (1994, 
423) and Sprinz (2003). 
68  “We resolve therefore to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike 
– which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.” United Nations 
(2000, paragraph III.12). This general statement is then applied to such areas as the mul-
tilateral trade and financial system: “We are committed to an open, equitable, rule-
based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trade and financial system.”  
ibid, paragraph III.13. 
69  See World Trade Organization (2001, paragraph 2). 
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• the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financ-
ing for Development of 2002, which devotes a separate chapter to the 
subject of policy coherence,70 
• the declarations of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
held in Johannesburg in 2002.71 
4 Causes of policy incoherences and plea for a realistic 
understanding of coherence 
There are many possible causes of policy incoherence, some having a par-
ticular impact on development policy. They can be assigned to four areas: 
the area of societal and political norms, the area of political decision-
making, the area of policy formulation and coordination and the concep-
tual area.72 
4.1 Causes in the area of societal and political norms 
At the beginning of this study it was said that policy coherence is desirable 
for government action to ensure the efficiency, effectiveness and credibil-
ity of policies. While this is true, it is not absolutely so, since there are 
competing values, respecting which may make policy coherence difficult. 
“However, every country represents combinations and delicate bal-
ances of different interests, standards or norms. These norms include 
coherence, efficiency and effectiveness but also public participation, 
rights to local decision-making, moral beliefs, diversity, representation 
and competition etc. These norms are not necessarily integrated with 
the standard of coherence. And it is not preordained that coherence 
should be seen as the most important norm at all times. Therefore, the 
                                                          
70  Chapter F: “Addressing systemic issues: enhancing the coherence and consistency of the 
international monetary, financial and trading systems in support of development.” Unit-
ed Nations (2002a). 
71  The Political Declaration states: “We undertake to strengthen and improve governance 
at all levels for the effective implementation of Agenda 21, the Millennium development 
goals and the Plan of Implementation of the Summit.” United Nations (2002b, 4, para-
graph 30). 
72  See Ashoff (1999, 131–134); OECD/PUMA (1996) and (2000); Mkandawire (2001). 
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pursuit of coherence should be recognised as only one quest among 
others, though a very important one.”73 
4.2 Causes in the area of political decision-making 
• Divergences of political interests at national level: Such divergences 
are a fact of life in any state, especially democracies, which are char-
acterized inter alia by the free articulation of interests and rivalry 
among interest groups for influence over political majority decision-
making.74 The consequence is often policy incoherences as a result of 
divergent interests and political compromises. At a theoretical level 
the impossibility of perfect policy coherence is attributed inter alia to 
the Arrow paradox75 and the dilemmas of collective action.76 
                                                          
73  OECD/PUMA (2000, 3). 
74 Dictatorships only appear to have an advantage in this respect. Although they may 
enforce a greater degree of policy coherence by suppressing the articulation of pluralist 
interests, such coherence reflects only the interests of the dictator or the ruling group 
(coherence is not an end in itself!) and does not comply with the guiding principle of 
development, which is to enlarge people’s choices. Experience shows that most dicta-
torships have seriously impaired their countries’ development opportunities. Thus, even 
if the articulation of pluralist interests is accompanied by certain policy incoherences, it 
is an important corrective in the political process. This is also reflected in the fact that 
not even conceptually perfect policy coherence is possible and that the way to greater 
coherence is, to some extent, a process of trial and error. 
75  According to the Arrow paradox, it is impossible, given plausible assumptions, to ag-
gregate the preferences of individuals or groups in society to form a totally consistent 
social welfare function. This would be possible only in a dictatorship which prescribed 
the social welfare function (the social ranking would then be identical to an individual 
preference, namely that of the dictator, which is inconsistent with the assumption of dif-
ferent individual preferences). 
76  As consensus-building, avoidance of free-riding and effectiveness are major challenges 
for large organizations, a way out is sought in the formation of suborganizations or 
smaller organizations. Similarly, governments that have complex problems to deal with 
tend to make the complexity easier to handle by forming specialized decision-making 
bodies. “Hence, the rationale of committees or departments with jurisdictions over spe-
cialized domains. But breaking out complex issues into manageable segments encourag-
es a ‘silo’ approach to policy-making. As a result, coherence within a specialized group 
may be secured at the expense of incoherence across groups. This is such a frequent oc-
currence that policy coherence is often equated with a ‘whole of government’ ap-
proach.” Picciotto (2005, 8). 
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• More complex political decision-making processes as a consequence 
of globalization and decentralization: Efforts to enhance policy co-
herence are made more difficult both by globalization, in the course 
of which developments in other countries or at international level im-
pact on nation-states more rapidly and more directly than in the past 
and exert additional pressure on them for political action,77 and by the 
fragmentation of political decision-making processes in federally 
structured states, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, or in cen-
trally governed states that grant subnational levels (e.g. regions) more 
powers as they decentralize. National governments therefore need to 
take account of several levels when pursuing their political agendas 
and considering demands for policy coherence.78 
• Divergent political interests at EU level: The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the EU is formally responsible for some 
policies, such as the foreign trade, agricultural and fisheries policies, 
i.e. they cannot be adjusted by an individual EU Member State, which 
may be well aware of a certain incoherence. The call for greater pol-
icy coherence therefore means that the governments of the EU Mem-
ber States must bear in mind not only their national policies but also 
EU policies, for which they share responsibility. 
• Weakness of development policy in the political play of forces: The 
above factors and the resulting possibility of incoherences occurring 
affect, in principle, all or, where the EU is concerned, the communitar-
ized policies. An added factor relating specifically to development 
policy is that it tends to be weak in the political play of forces com-
pared to other policies, since it is not backed by any powerful domes-
tic interest groups. Development policy is therefore more likely to be 
confronted with incoherences than other policies because its objec-
tives frequently do not correspond to short-term or immediate inter-
ests of the donor countries and in the domestic debate it may soon be 
forgotten that development cooperation is very much in the donors’ 
overriding and long-term interests. Greater policy coherence from a 
development perspective therefore requires particular efforts to raise 
public awareness and to mobilize political support. 
                                                          
77  This is the mirror image of the process mentioned above of primarily inward-oriented 
policies increasingly taking on an international dimension. 
78  “These developments compel governments to find better ways to manage multiple layers 
of policy making without losing sight of their own national policy agendas.” OECD/ 
PUMA (1996, 7). 
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• Failure of partner countries to take countermeasures: It is often as-
sumed that partner countries are merely the victims of incoherent 
policies pursued by the industrialized countries, that, in other words, 
the latter are solely responsible for policy incoherence. However, pol-
icy incoherence has its equivalent in the partner countries in many 
cases. Some of these countries are well able to defend themselves 
against the donors’ incoherent policies, for example, by protecting 
their agriculture against subsidized agricultural exports from the EU 
or the USA with countervailing duties..79 This is obviously a question 
of different interests within the partner countries (in this case, the in-
terest of the urban population in cheap foodstuffs as against the de-
velopment opportunities of the rural population). Development pol-
icy-makers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the donor 
countries should therefore raise the subject of policy coherence not 
only at home but also in the dialogue with the partner countries. 
4.3 Causes in the area of policy formulation and 
coordination 
• Shortcomings in policy formulation: Policies can be coherent only in 
respect of common overriding objectives which are the guide and 
yardstick for the interaction that is sought and themselves require 
longer-term, strategic perspectives and priorities for government ac-
tion. The more the objectives of development policy form part of the 
strategic perspectives, the sooner it can demand coherence. The less 
concrete the perspectives, the more difficult it becomes to encourage 
and demand policy coherence for development. 
• Shortcomings in the structure and process of policy coordination: 
The pursuit of as coherent an overall policy as possible is, in princi-
ple, the task of interdepartmental coordination under the responsibil-
ity of the head of government (in the German system of government, 
the Chancellor’s right to set the broad lines of policy). The structure 
of policy coordination (e.g. the distribution of formal responsibilities, 
opportunities for the various government departments to participate, 
the coordinating role of the government’s centre, or the Chancellor’s 
                                                          
79  In the 1990s the West African countries reacted to the EU’s subsidized beef exports in 
different ways. Senegal, for instance, imposed high tariffs on imports of frozen meat, 
while the Ivory Coast pursued a far more liberal import policy. See Brandt (1995, IV, 
53). 
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Office in the German system, the number and powers of interdepart-
mental committees), the process of policy coordination (e.g. nature 
and intensity of interdepartmental coordination, exchange of informa-
tion and/or staff between departments, monitoring of the effects of 
different policies) and the weight carried by and action taken under 
the development policy in this context may facilitate or impede policy 
coherence. 
• Information shortages: Policy incoherence is partly due to the fact 
that available information on the substance and effects of different 
policies is not, not adequately or not promptly absorbed and pro-
cessed by those concerned for the decisions that have to be taken.80 
An example of this is the earlier incoherence between the promotion 
by development policy of good governance in partner countries and 
the possibility that existed under German tax law until 1999 of de-
ducting from tax bribes paid to foreign officials. This incoherence 
was long known to only a few insiders and was not disclosed to the 
public by non-governmental organizations until 1995.81 The procure-
ment of information and the systematic use of available, but often 
scattered, information are therefore necessary preconditions of greater 
policy coherence. 
4.4 Causes at conceptual level 
• Increasing complexity of the development agenda:82 Today, in con-
trast to previous development decades, development policy pursues a 
whole range of objectives and amended strategies. The 2001 Eleventh 
Report on the Federal Government’s Development Policy refers, for 
example, to four target dimensions of sustainable development: social 
justice, economic efficiency, political stability and ecological equilib-
rium.83 With the proliferation of objectives, however, the possibility 
                                                          
80  This concerns information already available. There are also information shortages in the 
sense of a lack of analysis of the effects of other policies. This point is discussed under 
the heading of “knowledge gaps” in Chapter 4.4. The boundaries between the thus de-
signated information shortages and knowledge gaps may be fluid. 
81  See Ashoff (1999, 142–145). 
82  See also Mkandawire (2001, 8 f.). 
83  See BMZ (2001a, 62). The internationally recognized overriding objective of develop-
ment cooperation (poverty reduction) has been specified as a consequence of the 
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of inconsistencies not only within development policy but also among 
the various policies also grows, because other policies can now have 
an impact not only on one development objective but on many objec-
tives. Thus import liberalization by the industrialized countries may 
help to improve the partner countries’ export opportunities and eco-
nomic efficiency but worsen the ecological situation (through an in-
crease in monocultures for export, for example) unless appropriate 
counteraction is taken. Equally, once coherent policies may later turn 
out to be incoherent when strategies are changed in development co-
operation.84 
• Knowledge gaps: Incoherences such as that between development 
policy on the one hand and agricultural and fisheries policies on the 
other may be obvious. But often the effects of other policies on the 
development process (and vice versa) in the partner countries and at 
global level are far less visible and identifiable only with considerable 
effort. An example is immigration, the assessment of which is not so 
obvious from a development viewpoint and calls for a differentiated 
view to be taken.85 Furthermore, industrialized countries’ policies do 
not have a positive or negative impact on all developing countries 
alike, as can be seen from the current reform of the EU’s sugar pol-
icy, which will be advantageous for big exporters like Brazil and dis-
advantageous for ACP countries that enjoy preferences under the cur-
rent sugar policy. The monitoring of other policies and impact analy-
ses in cases of supposed incoherence are therefore essential. 
                                                                                                                         
Millennium Declaration in the form of the eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
84  A simple example: if, as in the 1950s and 1960s, a development strategy geared primar-
ily to promoting the urban industrial and service sector inter alia by means of low agri-
cultural prices (intersectoral transfer of incomes to the detriment of agriculture) is pur-
sued, world market prices of agricultural products kept artificially low and subsidized 
agricultural exports from the industrialized countries which enable the developing coun-
tries to import cheap agricultural products are nothing less than desirable in devel-
opment terms. If, on the other hand, development cooperation promotes the improve-
ment of food security in the partner countries by their own efforts, the same agricultural 
policy pursued by the industrialized countries proves to lack coherence for develop-
ment. 
85  See the analysis in Wiemann (2001) of the advantages and disadvantages for the devel-
oping countries and the countries in transition of the emigration of highly skilled work-
ers encouraged by the Federal Government’s Green Card initiative. 
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• Complexity of the development process: Even where the effects of 
other policies are consistently monitored, the main problem continues 
to be the complexity of socio-economic and political development, 
which frequently allows of no more than partial findings on the links 
between cause and effect, especially in the case of forecasts. What 
appears to be coherence or incoherence today may turn out differently 
in the future. 
4.5 Conclusion: plea for a realistic understanding of 
coherence 
The outline of the various possible causes of policy incoherence shows 
that efforts to improve coherence between development policy and other 
policies should not be based on the idea that perfect coherence can be 
achieved. It is not possible either in theory or in practice. This being the 
case, the goal – feasible in principle, though possibly difficult to achieve 
politically in specific cases – should be both to overcome manifest inco-
herences and progressively to improve coherence 
• by means of a more accurate analysis of the interaction among differ-
ent policies that influence development in partner countries and glob-
ally, 
• through the increased integration of aspects of coherence for devel-
opment into the formulation and implementation of other policies, 
• through the mobilization of political support for greater coherence 
with a view to the achievement of overriding objectives such as the 
halving of poverty by 2015 and global environmental targets. 
Efforts to improve coherence are undertaken against a background of ten-
sion between possibly competing societal and political norms (e.g. coher-
ence versus participation) and competing overriding objectives;86 viewed 
conceptually, they remain a process of trial and error and are not immune 
to setbacks in the political clash of differing interests. If perfect coherence 
cannot be achieved, it is all the more important to discuss the competing 
normative and political claims and interests, to disclose unavoidable inco-
                                                          
86  See Chapter 2.5. 
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herences and to minimize their costs as far as possible. This calls for care-
ful analysis and information.87 
5 Institutional approaches to enhancing policy 
coherence: general frame of reference 
5.1 State of the debate 
The debate on policy coherence for development has long focused on the 
substance, i.e. the effects of concrete incoherences, coupled with the de-
mand that incoherent policies be adjusted and made more development-
friendly. In contrast, the general question, i.e. one not related to specific 
incoherences, about ways to improve coherence long attracted barely any 
attention.88 
It is only in recent years that this has changed, as awareness of the need for 
coherent policies for the reasons given in Chapter 2 has grown, the donor 
countries have stepped up their efforts to improve coherence and, against 
the background of these two factors, interest in basic guidelines and gener-
ally applicable experience has risen. Comparisons have been made of 
various donors’ attempts to improve coherence.89 The OECD and DAC in 
particular have played a major role in distilling lessons learned and ap-
proaches to enhancing policy coherence. 
• In the mid-1990s the OECD drew from its member countries’ experi-
ence in the field of policy coherence a number of conclusions which 
                                                          
87  “(...) what matters most is not simply whether contrasted policies are being pursued, 
but whether they are being pursued knowingly, or unwittingly. If contradictory deci-
sions must be made, the key concern is that they be made lucidly, deliberately, and on 
the basis of information and analysis that enable the decision takers to mitigate the 
costs of incoherence, as well as to explain their course of action in the context of the dif-
ficult choices they are confronted with. A high premium is therefore put on developing 
information systems and analytical capacities.” OECD/PUMA (1996, 9). 
88  One exception is the 1992 annual report of the DAC chairman, which contains a brief 
chapter entitled “The Politics of Policy Coherence” with a few indications of ways to 
improve coherence. See OECD/DAC (1992, 46–48). 
89  See Forster / Stokke (1999a, 5–12); OECD/DAC (2001a, 93–94); McLean Hilker 
(2004); Nicod (2004). For a comparison of different proposals in the German debate see 
Ashoff (1999, 165–173). 
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were published as “Building Policy Coherence. Tools and Tensions” 
and remain the most detailed frame of reference to date.90 Although it 
was established without any explicit reference to the debate on coher-
ence for development, it can certainly be used in that context and is 
briefly presented in the following in structured form because of its 
systematic nature. 
• In 2001 the DAC added to its plea for greater coherence for develop-
ment in the aforementioned poverty reduction guidelines brief indica-
tions (including a checklist) of how policy coherence can be im-
proved.91 
• In 2003 the DAC Secretariat launched a process aimed at drawing 
conclusions from DAC peer reviews, followed in 2004 by a work-
shop on institutional approaches to enhancing policy coherence. The 
results have been published under the title “Policy Coherence for De-
velopment. Promoting Institutional Good Practices.”92 
5.2 OECD study “Building Policy Coherence”: 
principal statements 
The OECD study draws five main conclusions from its examination of 
coherence problems and experience in the member countries and then 
identifies basic “tools of coherence” (Box 2). The five conclusions are:93 
• There is a gap between the need for coherence and the capacity to 
achieve it. 
• Governing in a democratic political system necessarily involves a 
degree of incoherence. 
• No policy-making system can guarantee improved coherence. 
                                                          
90  OECD/PUMA (1996). 
91  See OECD/DAC (2001a, 91–92, 104–106) Similarly, the OECD’s Public Management 
Service (PUMA) has pointed to the action needed to improve coherence with a view to the 
achievement of the goal of sustainable development. See OECD/PUMA (2002). They are 
based on a comparative study of experience in five OECD countries. See OECD 
(2002c). 
92  See OECD (2005). 
93  See OECD/PUMA (1996, 8–9). 
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• There are nevertheless good practices and “tools of coherence”. They 
include, in particular, a strong strategic capacity at the centre of gov-
ernment, the need for organizational flexibility and the need for effec-
tive information-gathering and processing systems. 
• The most important instrument is informed political decision-making, 
not least as a means of making the implications and costs of unavoid-
able incoherences transparent. 
 
Box 2: Basic tools of coherence 
“The experience of OECD countries, distilled into a handful of practical les-
sons, has led to the identification of the following basic tools of coherence. 
These are organisational concepts which, translated into appropriate struc-
tures, processes and methods of work, have proved conducive to higher degrees 
of policy coherence in governments from different political and administrative 
traditions. Some may seem, at first glance, deceptively obvious. However, ex-
perience shows that successfully putting them into practice requires painstaking 
experimentation and careful adaptation to the legal, administrative and politi-
cal requirements of each national system. 
• Commitment by the political leadership is a necessary precondition to co-
herence, and a tool to enhance it. 
• Establishing a strategic policy framework helps ensure that individual poli-
cies are consistent with the government’s goals and priorities. 
• Decision makers need advice based on a clear definition and good analysis 
of issues, with explicit indications of possible inconsistencies. 
• The existence of a central overview and co-ordination capacity is essential 
to ensure horizontal consistency among policies. 
• Mechanisms to anticipate, detect and resolve policy conflicts early in the 
process help identify inconsistencies and reduce incoherence. 
• The decision-making process must be organised to achieve an effective 
reconciliation between policy priorities and budgetary imperatives. 
• Implementation procedures and monitoring mechanisms must be designed 
to ensure that policies can be adjusted in the light of progress, new infor-
mation, and changing circumstances. 
• An administrative culture that promotes cross-sectoral cooperation and a 
systematic dialogue between different policy communities contributes to the 
strengthening of policy coherence.” 
Source: OECD/PUMA (1996), 10 
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5.3 Analytical framework for identifying approaches  
at different levels to improving policy coherence 
The OECD study describes the basic tools for coherence in detail by refer-
ring to numerous approaches at various levels to improving policy coher-
ence. The most important aspects are summarized in Box 3. 
 
Box 3: Approaches to improving policy coherence (OECD) 
Level Description 
Political leadership 
and the role of the 
centre 
• Political leadership: balance conflicting interests while 
striving to maintain a consistent line of action based on 
the government's agenda. 
• Role of the centre (administrative leadership): 
– systematically monitor and evaluate the implications 
of new policy proposals for the overall coherence of 
the government agenda, 
– ensure that policy decisions, once made, are commu-
nicated to all concerned players, and implemented as 
intended by decision-makers; 
– the centre cannot impose implementation (principle 
of ministerial autonomy); 
– the centre can partly compensate for its lack of for-
mal power to enforce implementation by carefully 
managing the preparatory phase of decision-making. 
Strategic frame-
work and priori-
ties 
• Strategic planning capacity: The centre must maintain a 
capacity to develop strategic perspectives and options, 
and to bring them to bear on shorter-term decision-
making. 
• Strategic framework: By establishing a comprehensive 
set of goals and priorities, and ensuring that policy pro-
posals come within its parameters, decision-makers are 
better able to pursue their common agenda more coher-
ently. 
Information and 
analysis 
• Informed decision-making – the most important tool of 
coherence: Decision-makers need to know what their 
realistic options are, what inconsistencies result from 
their decisions, how the costs of inconsistencies can be 
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mitigated, and how they can explain the trade-offs they 
have to make. 
• A key test of decision-making: Are contradictory deci-
sions made knowingly or unwittingly? 
• Dealing with the information overload: The policy-
making system must have the capacity to filter, interpret 
and prioritize information. That capacity depends 
largely on the analytical and presentational skills of the 
advisers. 
• Translating information into analysis and options: De-
cision-makers need: 
– a clear definition and a good analysis of the issues, 
with explicit indications of known or possible incon-
sistencies with other policies, 
– an appreciation of what is not known about the is-
sues at hand, and of the risks which the attending un-
certainties might entail, 
– information on the views of actors within and out-
side the government who have an interest in the de-
cision, 
– the assurance that the information and advice have 
been properly tested (e.g. by  involving other inter-
ested actors in the development of policy proposals), 
– realistic options which take into account the objec-
tives of the government of the day, as well as the 
wider and longer-term interests of society. 
Policy coordina-
tion structures 
• Core executive: typically the focal point for policy co-
ordination and issues management; but relying heavily 
on the centre for coordination can create tensions, espe-
cially at a time when the prevailing ethos is decentrali-
zation. 
• Council of ministers: The challenge is to strengthen the 
capacity of the council to deal with cross-cutting issues, 
while preserving ministerial accountability. 
• Committees of the council of ministers: widely used to 
coordinate defined policy fields; but if cross-cutting is-
sues overlap those policy fields, they will overlap the 
boundaries between the committees. 
• Superministries: While it is logical to locate similar 
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programmes within a single ministry, the coordination 
gains may be more apparent than real. There are limits 
to the number of policy conflicts that can be internalized 
in a large multisectoral ministry. Such a ministry can 
help integrate related  policies in a more coherent  
framework, but it risks: 
– reproducing on a smaller scale the coordination 
problems found in the government as a whole, 
– reducing the political accountability for policy mak-
ing, to the extent that conflicts are resolved internally 
by ministry officials, rather than at the political level 
by ministers, 
– depriving the government of the creative tension that 
results from a measured degree of interministry pol-
icy competition. 
• Small, issue-specific ministries: A large number of 
small ministries increases fragmentation and makes co-
ordination problematic. Small ministries nevertheless 
provide flexible structures that can focus on specific 
problem areas or constituencies. They can thus obtain a 
more holistic view of the concerns in their problem 
area, and then help larger ministries adapt policies and 
programmes to their needs. 
• Ministries centred on client groups or geographical 
areas: Ministries of this type seem well suited to deal 
with cross-cutting issues, on the condition that, in addi-
tion to providing services to the target groups or re-
gions, they can also ensure that services provided by 
other ministries are compatible. 
• Lead ministries: Line ministries can be given additional 
responsibilities to lead cross-cutting coordination efforts 
beyond their portfolio mandate. A possible drawback is 
that additional responsibilities can overload an already 
busy ministry. 
• Interministerial committees and temporary task forces: 
a flexible tool to approach cross-cutting issues espe-
cially when government is unsure about how to concep-
tualize a cross-cutting policy area, or when it is contem-
plating important policy reforms. 
• Lateral mechanisms and matrix management: flexible 
cross-linking arrangements that are organized around is-
sues rather than around permanent functions and bring 
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together, from different policy fields, the staff needed to 
address a given issue. 
– Advantages: They bring together an array of skills 
and perspectives to bear on a problem and allow 
managers to recombine staff in different configura-
tions, in order to stimulate creative problem-solving; 
– Costs: The system generates extra organizational 
work for managers, and weakens accountabilities for 
performance. 
• Advisory committees: fora that represent the interests of 
relevant actors from outside government and can help 
bring to light some cross-cutting aspects of policies that 
might otherwise have remained hidden. 
• Coalition governments: tend to magnify the political 
dimension of policy work; when ministers are from dif-
ferent political parties, there might be a need to improve 
interministry communications at the administrative 
level, and to establish special mechanisms at the centre. 
Policy coordina-
tion processes 
• Structures, while important, cannot guarantee success-
ful coordination: To a greater degree than structures, the 
effectiveness of processes depends on the commitment 
of the decision-makers and managers to the goals of co-
ordination. 
• Resisting the temptation to restructure: A common 
temptation, in order to solve policy coordination prob-
lems, is to seek structural solutions, e.g. by creating or 
dismantling ministries. The experience of countries in-
creasingly seems to point to the limitations of those so-
lutions because restructuring is disruptive and policy is-
sues and their interlinkages change too rapidly to allow 
timely structural adaptations. 
• Evaluation of policies: can enhance coordination pro-
vided it is directed at complexes of programmes rather 
than at single programmes. 
• Coordination comments: rules and mechanisms that 
require ministers to circulate for comments any proposal 
they bring to the council of ministers. 
• Using coordination processes to identify unresolved 
conflicts: When a policy coordination system fails to forge 
a consensus among the concerned actors, it has in fact 
fulfilled the second of its key functions, which is to 
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identify issues that cannot be resolved through negotia-
tion and compromise, and which must therefore be arbi-
trated at higher levels. 
• Arbitration of unresolved issues: When contentious 
issues move up the levels of the hierarchy towards arbi-
tration (by a special body, such as a select committee of 
ministers or a coalition council, or by the head of gov-
ernment), it is important to ensure that they are clearly 
defined and that the interests at stake are identified. 
• Enhancing information flow: Regular exchanges of 
information between centre and line, and among line 
ministries is of paramount importance to the achieve-
ment of consistency at every stage of policy develop-
ment. 
• Civil service network: Civil service systems in which 
officials move more often among ministries are more 
likely to produce better policy coordination. Civil ser-
vants who have spent time in a variety of ministries 
have a better perception of the perspectives of other pol-
icy fields. 
• Integrating multiple voices: Powerful interest groups 
can distort the political process, simply because they are 
more vocal than the quieter majority. Governments need 
to mange the disparate pressures of interest groups in a 
way that helps to bring to light the interdependencies 
between different issues. 
Policy-budget co-
ordination 
• The budgetary process is a powerful tool of coherence. 
It affects all sectors of activity, provides a cyclical op-
portunity to set political and strategic directions for the 
future, and plays a determining role in the definition of 
the government’s economic and other policy priorities. 
• Balancing the policy agenda and budgetary impera-
tives: The improvement of policy coherence, especially 
in times of fiscal restraint, requires that the centre and 
the budget ministry collaborate closely in order to man-
age the relationship between policy proposals and their 
resource implications. 
• Need to manage an inherently adversarial process: The 
major interface in resource allocation processes takes 
place between the budget ministry and line ministries. It 
is an adversarial process which underscores the need for 
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mechanisms that systematically link the policy-making 
process to the budgetary process. 
• Using the horizontal dimension of the budget: An in-
creasingly important issue, in the search for coherence, 
is how the budgetary process can be restructured to in-
tegrate the horizontal lines of policies. For example, in 
Australia, the budget was focused around a major policy 
statement on employment. It addressed all the linkages 
relating, for instance, to income support, education and 
training, industrial, trade and regional development 
policies. 
Administrative 
culture 
• Consultation-oriented culture: A predisposition to con-
sult, and a willingness to resolve conflicts before they 
become contentious are essential tools for more coher-
ent policy-making. 
• Cooperative networking: The capacity of officials to 
network can be enhanced through personnel manage-
ment policies, designed, for example, to facilitate the 
movement of officials among ministries. 
• Interdisciplinary meetings: Bringing together officials 
from different policy fields to examine the interconnec-
tions between policies is an important way to foster a 
more cooperative administrative culture. 
• Shared frameworks of understanding: The languages 
used by different policy communities can constitute 
significant barriers to the development of coherent poli-
cies. Creating a shared language and framework of un-
derstanding is central to the development of a more co-
operative administrative culture. 
Source: Compiled from OECD/PUMA (1996) 
5.4 Comments on the OECD’s general frame of reference 
The OECD study has three advantages. Firstly, it is based not only on 
theoretical considerations but also on the member countries’ experience 
and is consequently closer to reality. Secondly, it provides a highly com-
prehensive overview of possible approaches, even if they are by no means 
all new, but are, as the study itself says, “deceptively obvious” in some 
cases. Thirdly, it refers to the advantages and disadvantages of a number 
of approaches, which need to be weighed up. 
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Worth noting is the considerable importance attached to the formulation of 
strategic objectives, the procurement and processing of information and 
the process of policy coordination. Similarly worth noting are the refer-
ences to the fact that the structure of policy coordination (e.g. the calibre 
of government departments, distribution of responsibilities, formalized 
coordinating bodies and procedures), which is often first mentioned in the 
debate on ways to improve policy coherence, does not provide the key to 
greater policy coherence on its own, but depends heavily for its effective-
ness on the political commitment of the decision-makers and on the pro-
cess of policy coordination. 
With regard to further deliberations the OECD study does, however, suffer 
from two major constraints: 
• The recommendations focus on policy coherence primarily from the 
perspective of the centre of government (head of government, office 
of the head of government). This is plausible since the centre is ex of-
ficio responsible for ensuring policy coherence. The call for greater 
policy coherence for development, on the other hand, is usually 
voiced by the department responsible for development policy and not 
by the centre, and other departments and the centre first have to be 
persuaded of its advantages. The references contained in Box 3 must 
therefore be viewed from the perspective of a department responsible 
for development policy. They are no less relevant for this, but they 
tend to be more difficult to put into practice. As emphasized in Chap-
ter 3, this is what makes it so important for the whole of  government 
to recognize the goal of coherence for development. 
• The study drawn up by the OECD’s Public Management Service con-
centrates on policy management within the system of government and 
largely ignores the political arena in which government action is 
taken. Such actors as parliaments, parliamentary committees and po-
litical parties, interest groups, non-governmental organizations and 
the media, which have, or seek to have, a major influence on a gov-
ernment’s political will, are considered no more than marginally, but 
they have to be taken into account because, depending on the context, 
they may be opponents or allies in efforts to achieve greater policy 
coherence. 
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6 Other OECD countries’ efforts to enhance policy  
coherence 
6.1 Preliminary comments 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.3, the DAC has for some years devoted one of 
the main chapters of the reports on the reviews of its member countries’ 
development cooperation to the subject of policy coherence. The DAC 
reports and the DAC Secretariat, which is involved in the reviews and 
draws up the reports, therefore represent important sources of information 
on other donor countries’ efforts and experience in the coherence field. 
These sources have been analysed for this chapter. 
Interviews with DAC Secretariat staff94 have revealed that efforts to im-
prove policy coherence for development are comparatively advanced in 
four countries, these being, in alphabetical order, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The following begins with a de-
scription of the efforts of the last three of these countries to enhance co-
herence (Chapters 6.2 to 6.4).95 Their experience provides possible point-
ers for other countries. 
To place the resulting guide frame on a broader basis, Chapter 6.5 then 
gathers together the recommendations for the improvement of coherence 
which the DAC review reports formulated for a further nine countries re-
viewed in 2003 and 2002.96 The recommendations make it clear where the 
DAC sees the greatest need for action and so which aspects require par-
ticular attention. 
                                                          
94  Interviews conducted by the author on 30 and 31 January 2003. 
95  In the case of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the structure of the description 
is based on important categories of the framework presented in Box 3. As Sweden’s ef-
forts, on the other hand, still largely consist of a programme which has yet to be imple-
mented, the categories of the framework are not yet sufficiently applicable. 
96  The analysis concerns 2003 and 2002 for two reasons: firstly, they give a relatively up-
to-date picture. Secondly, the chapters on coherence became more detailed in the review 
reports drawn up after the adoption of the DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction in  
April 2001, which, as mentioned above, consider the subject of policy coherence in 
some depth and include a checklist. In 2003 Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Ireland 
and Japan were reviewed, in 2002 Greece, Spain, the EU, Canada and the USA. The EU 
is excluded here since the coherence issues in its case are closely linked to the compe-
tence of the EU Member States. 
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Chapter 6.6 then identifies major features common to the United King-
dom, the Netherlands and Sweden and compares them to the DAC’s rec-
ommendations to the other nine countries considered. 
6.2 United Kingdom97 
Since the Labour Party took office in 1997, the British development policy 
has acquired a distinctly reform-oriented profile (e.g. poverty reduction as 
the overriding objective). Efforts to improve coherence between develop-
ment cooperation and other policies play an essential role in this respect. 
6.2.1 Political will 
The Development Cooperation Minister who held office until early May 
2003, Clare Short, gave the British development policy a distinct profile 
and political weight in the cabinet, outwardly (public) and inwardly (de-
velopment cooperation administration). This was due to the strong support 
she enjoyed in the Labour Party, her close relationship with the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, her ability to form political alliances, 
her belief in development as such and, associated with this, her credibility 
in public and at the grass roots of development policy. She also saw her 
own and DFID’s role essentially as that of advocating greater coherence of 
all government policy for development (until she resigned over Prime 
Minister Blair’s policy on Iraq). 
Another major factor was the upgrading of the Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA), previously part of the Foreign Office, to the rank 
of ministry, giving the Development Cooperation Minister a seat in the 
cabinet. 
                                                          
97  The following comments are based on interviews conducted by the author at the De-
partment for International Development (DFID) on 15 May 2003, on the evaluation of 
extensive material available on DFID’s website (http://www.dfid.gov.uk) and on 
OECD/DAC (2001b, I–45; I–51). See also Meyer (2003a). 
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6.2.2 Strategic concept 
Of importance for the conceptual orientation of development cooperation 
and the goal of policy coherence for development were the two White Pa-
pers of 1997 and 2000 with the joint title “Eliminating World Poverty”, 
which were drawn up by DFID and approved by the cabinet.98 In both 
documents the government declared its commitment to greater policy co-
herence and explained what this meant for some important areas of policy. 
The interdepartmental process of drawing up the White Papers helped to 
raise other government departments’ awareness of development issues. 
DFID uses the documents as a reference base for its demands for enhanced 
policy coherence. 
In 2002 the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980 was re-
placed by the International Development Act, which defines poverty re-
duction and the promotion of sustainable development as overriding objec-
tives of British development cooperation. Under the new Act using the 
development cooperation budget for other than these two objectives (e.g. 
for the promotion of British exports) is illegal, and DFID could be sued for 
doing so.99 DFID thus has an instrument for opposing any incoherence 
between its own objectives and the use of funds for other than develop-
ment cooperation. 
For its work DFID has elaborated systematic objectives, which, by anal-
ogy with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), divide the overrid-
ing objective of poverty reduction into five main objectives, each with 
several targets, and include a number of goal achievement indicators. The 
objectives and targets defined by DFID serve not only to create a distinc-
tive image for its own work but also to improve policy coherence, since 
some of them are joint targets of several ministries, which share the re-
sponsibility for their achievement and are required to submit joint re-
ports.100 
                                                          
98  See DFID (1997 and 2000). 
99  “The 2002 Act is drafted in such a way that a policy such as Tied Aid (and the Aid and 
Trade Provision), in which assistance is given for the purpose of promoting UK trade or 
for other commercial or political reasons, would now be challengeable in the courts.” 
DFID (2002). 
100  For further details see Chapter 6.2.5. 
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6.2.3 Information and analysis 
Unlike most other government departments, DFID has considerable ex-
perience and knowledge of developing countries and development policy 
and exploits this advantage to place greater emphasis on development in 
the government’s work. In addition, proceeding from the idea that de-
manding increased policy coherence for development from other depart-
ments first requires a sound information base on the effects of other poli-
cies, DFID has significantly stepped up its research and analysis activity 
(internally and externally by commissioning experts) on relevant policies 
to give itself a solid foundation on which to represent development policy 
interests at departmental level. 
A notable example is trade policy. DFID has set up its own International 
Trade Department, with a staff of about 20, which, with the help of sub-
stantial analyses, has enabled DFID to approach other departments, espe-
cially the trade and industry and the agriculture ministries, with compe-
tence. Other examples are conflict prevention (the staff of the relevant 
DFID division has been increased), intellectual property rights and migra-
tion. 
DFID has also taken a number of initiatives to encourage the private sector 
to behave responsibly in such areas as labour standards, corruption, human 
rights, conflicts and the environment and so to help improve coherence 
between development policy and corporate action. 
The increase in DFID’s staff complement for strategic and coherence is-
sues was possible for three reasons: (i) the change in the understanding of 
DFID’s role (see the next point), (ii) the fact that the development coop-
eration budget rose significantly in 1998 and especially 2000 and (iii) the 
growing orientation towards programme aid and budget financing, which 
has permitted staff cuts at project level. 
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6.2.4 Structure and process of policy coordination 
As mentioned above, the upgrading of the former Overseas Development 
Administration to a ministry of cabinet rank improved DFID’s starting 
position in its efforts to enhance policy coherence.101 With its establish-
ment as a ministry, DFID also became a member of the Ministerial Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and of two cabinet subcommittees 
concerned, respectively, with conflict issues and EU trade policy. 
In addition, an Inter-departmental Working-group on Development 
(IWGD) chaired by DFID was set up. About a dozen government depart-
ments are represented on it, and it is meant to consider the progress made 
towards policy coherence, although it evidently does not meet very often. 
Those interviewed were rather muted in their views on the importance of 
the IWGD for DFID’s work on policy coherence. As they saw it, interde-
partmental networking at desk-officer level (e.g. the work done by the 
interdepartmental Trade Policy Group, which meets every month) is 
highly relevant. 
Remarkably, DFID is not seeking to increase its powers with a view to 
enhancing policy coherence. It clearly attaches less importance to the 
question of which department does what. What appears to be more impor-
tant is that government policy as a whole should become more coherent. 
DFID’s consequent understanding of its role is described in an internal 
evaluation of its involvement in the field of international trade policy as a 
“shift from a position of largely unsuccessful lobbying on behalf of devel-
oping countries to more of a capacity-building role within government.”102 
6.2.5 Budget coordination 
The Public Service Agreements (PSAs) and the joint targets of several 
departments set in the PSAs are an interesting aspect for the work on pol-
icy coherence. In 1998, as part of the budgetary procedure (public spend-
                                                          
101  “DFID itself now takes full part in inter-departmental co-ordination mechanisms at an 
official level, rather than, as in the past, having its views integrated into the position the 
FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] would bring to these fora.” OECD/DAC 
(2001b, I–45). 
102  Pedley (2002), vii. 
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ing review and establishment of the budget), the Labour government in-
troduced PSAs for all departments, requiring them to define targets for 
their work and indicators for monitoring their achievement. Each depart-
ment attaches a Service Delivery Agreement to its PSA. 
DFID has its own PSA (the current one concerning the period 2003–
2006),103 which includes three joint targets: one with the Foreign Office 
and Ministry of Defence relating to conflict prevention, one with the 
Treasury relating to debt relief operations and one with the Department of 
Trade and Industry and the Foreign Office relating to trade policy. 
In the case of the first joint target the initiative was taken by the Treasury, 
which believes that budget resources will be used efficiently and effec-
tively for conflict prevention if the three departments concerned combine 
their respective budget titles for this purpose to form a pool budget. This 
decision now forces the three departments to set joint targets and elaborate 
concepts for their achievement. This approach has meanwhile prompted 
the German Government to consider in the context of its Action Plan for 
Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-
Building of 12 May 2004 the establishment of jointly administered funds 
for crisis prevention from budget resources of the departments for foreign 
policy, defence and development cooperation on the British model.104 
The PSAs are not just non-binding declarations of intent: they play an im-
portant role in budgetary decisions, within government departments and in 
the external presentation of government work. DFID’s PSA, for example, 
is broken down internally into divisions and departments, with clear re-
sponsibilities allocated for the achievement of targets. Reports on 
achievement are published. 
On the other hand, the alignment of government work with verifiable tar-
gets is not without its problems, since the setting of unambitious targets 
facilitates their achievement while the setting of overly ambitious targets 
may lead to frustration (to aid fatigue in the area of development coopera-
tion). After initial target euphoria, the government has reduced the number 
of targets from about 260 to some 120. DFID sees the joint targets as an 
important lever for its work on policy coherence. 
                                                          
103  See DFID (2003). 
104  See Bundesregierung (2004, 62 and 63). 
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6.2.6 Administrative culture 
As mentioned above, DFID is at pains to bring about interdepartmental 
networking at desk-officer level where important coherence issues are 
concerned. This is facilitated by staff exchanges between DFID and other 
departments. 
6.2.7 Supplementary comments 
DFID’s and the government’s efforts to enhance policy coherence are ac-
companied by constructive criticism from NGOs. BOND, the umbrella 
association of some 280 development-oriented NGOs in the United King-
dom, has taken up the issue of policy coherence in recent years and con-
ducted its own studies and held information meetings on the subject.105 
Despite DFID’s efforts to enhance policy coherence, progress towards 
greater coherence of British policy for development has been slow in some 
areas in recent years (as regards corruption, money laundering and arms 
exports, for example),106 which reveals the political influence wielded by 
other interests. Nor is the United Kingdom among the leaders in the 
Commitment to Development Index of 21 donor countries (April 2003), 
taking only eleventh place.107 
As former DFID Minister Clare Short saw it, the UK’s involvement in the 
Iraq war without a UN mandate was a glaring example of incoherence, 
which eventually led her to resign after she had initially voiced her criti-
cism. The DAC’s most recent review of the United Kingdom’s develop-
ment policy in 2001 confirms DFID’s efforts to change the attitude of 
other departments, but warns of the danger of getting too far ahead of 
them.108 
                                                          
105  See the information on BOND’s homepage: http://www.bond.org.uk/ 
106  See OECD/DAC (2001b, I–46). 
107  See Birdsall / Roodman (2003, 26). The index will not be overrated here since it is still 
being improved in terms of content and methodology. It merely indicates that, despite 
DFID’s efforts, there is still a need for greater policy coherence. 
108  “As in the past, the key challenge for DFID continues to be to ensure that the necessary 
change occurs in attitude in other government departments and avoid a situation where 
DFID is too far ahead of the others.” OECD/DAC (2001b, I–46). 
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6.3 Netherlands109 
6.3.1 An overview of the Dutch approach to policy 
coherence 
Great efforts are being made in the Netherlands at both national and inter-
national level to achieve greater coherence between development coopera-
tion and other policies. It is pointed out with some pride in this context110 
that, among the 21 countries included in the Commitment to Development 
Index, the Netherlands takes first place (April 2003).111 The following 
comments, which are structured in much the same way as those on the 
United Kingdom, are preceded by a summary in Box 4 of the Netherlands’ 
own description of its approach to policy coherence. 
 
Box 4: Policy coherence for development – the Dutch approach* 
1. Political impetus from the top 
• coherence as part of government programme (1998) 
• policy memorandum based on DAC Poverty Guidelines (March 2002) 
• political support from successive governments 
• organizational translation: a Policy Coherence Unit in the Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs for impulse and advocacy 
2. Organizing policy coherence: levels of intervention 
2.1 At general level by promoting: 
• whole government approach in the Netherlands (ownership with other 
departments) 
• accountability of NL and EU policies by reports to parliament, coher-
ence indices and MDG-8 reports 
                                                          
109  The following comments are based on interviews conducted by the author in the Nether-
lands Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 28 February 2003, on the analysis of various gov-
ernment documents available on the internet (http://www.minbuza.nl), on the two most 
recent DAC review reports on Dutch development cooperation (OECD/DAC 1997 and 
2001c) and on Bendix (1987) and Meyer (2003b). 
110  This reference is made, for example, in the latest development strategy document “Mu-
tual interests, mutual responsibilities: Dutch development cooperation en route to 
2015” of October 2003. See Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2003a, 13). 
111  See Birdsall / Roodman (2003, 26). 
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• focused policy research on impact of NL, EU and OECD policies 
• international networks 
2.2 Focus on NL positions at EU level - being at the table and alert in: 
• interdepartmental coordination mechanisms and cabinet, preparing in-
structions for EU councils and committees 
• interdepartmental screening mechanism of draft EU proposals in early 
stage 
• instructions for multilateral meetings 
2.3 At specific level: 
Focus on selected coherence dossiers with: 
• proactive approach of international agenda 
• opportunities for alliance-building and direct cooperation with develop-
ing countries 
• concrete objectives: measurable short-term to medium-term results in 
negotiations 
• engaging other stakeholders (NGOs and business sector) 
Project teams within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and where possible 
with other ministries 
• joint preparation, adoption by cabinet and joint implementation where 
possible 
3. Current coherence dossiers 
Agricultural reform 
Policy memorandum on coherence between agriculture and development 
cooperation 
• focus on products and issues of specific interest to developing countries 
(sugar, cotton, export and domestic support, development box, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures) 
• 2-way street: what can aid contribute? 
Intellectual property and development 
• TRIPS & health: follow-up Doha Declaration 
• protection of biodiversity and of traditional knowledge 
Product standards and market access 
• African cut flowers, Peruvian sardines, maximum residue levels (MRLs) 
for pesticides, EU directives on food & hygiene 
• 'best practices' for development of sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures with impact on 
developing countries, tailored transition periods and capacity-building
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Fishery policies 
• EU fisheries agreements, with focus on Mauritania 
• WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies 
4. Advocacy approach to cotton 
• strategy paper for discussion with stakeholders 
• "coherence diplomacy" with West African governments (support in 
WTO dispute settlement and in WTO agricultural negotiations) 
5. Making coherence concrete and operational in EU, OECD and WTO: 
requirements 
• information exchange and like-minded networks on (specific) coherence 
issues 
• better and focused impact research at global, country and thematic level 
• cooperate to influence decision-making: stimulate research/debate in 
DAC/ OECD (in peer reviews, donor impact review at country level, 
OECD substantive committees, preparation MCM 2004) 
• address glaring incoherences first 
• keen eye for political economy and timing 
• challenge Member States for coherent EU policies and positions in mul-
tilateral negotiations 
• well researched cases and advocacy will fail without real political com-
mitment 
• West African cotton proposal acid test for policy coherence and Doha 
development round 
* Description by the head of the Policy Coherence Unit of the Netherlands Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs 
Source: Genee (2003) 
6.3.2 Political will 
Since 1965 political responsibility for development cooperation has rested 
with the Minister for Development Cooperation, who, though a member of 
the cabinet, does not have a ministry of his or her own.112 Despite or be-
                                                          
112  The ministerial apparatus responsible for the conception, planning and control of devel-
opment cooperation forms part of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation 
(DGIS), which is one of the now five directorates-general of the Foreign Ministry. 
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cause of this special status, Development Cooperation Ministers since the 
1970s have claimed the right not only to perform the tasks originally as-
signed to them113 but also to introduce development aspects into discus-
sions in the cabinet of all policies of relevance to developing countries.114 
Advocacy of the coherence of government work for  development has thus 
long formed part of the Dutch Development Cooperation Minister’s un-
derstanding of the role he or she should play. 
Former Development Minister Eveline Herfkens redoubled the efforts to 
enhance policy coherence during her period in office from 1998 to 2002. 
This conformed to her intention not so much to redefine the goals of de-
velopment cooperation (poverty reduction had already been the overriding 
objective before this time) as to improve the effectiveness of development 
cooperation through a number of approaches.115 Herfkens developed con-
siderable political commitment in this respect and very much led the way 
in the shaping of Dutch development cooperation. A number of factors 
played a part in this: her experience as a politician,116 her background in 
development117 and a favourable political environment.118 During her pe-
riod in office Herfkens took a number of initiatives at national, EU, OECD 
and multilateral level to improve policy coherence.119 Her successor, 
                                                          
113  Conception of a consistent development cooperation policy and defence before parlia-
ment of summaries of the development cooperation titles in the various departmental 
budgets; see Bendix (1987, 25).  
114  See Bendix (1987, 25). 
115  Inter alia through closer donor coordination, greater influence on multilateral organiza-
tions, more ownership to be accepted by partners and more sectoral programmes instead 
of individual projects; see Meyer (2003b, 103). 
116  Inter alia as a Labour Party Member of Parliament for many years. 
117  From 1976 to 1981 she was a head of department in the Directorate-General for Interna-
tional Development of the Foreign Ministry, from 1990 to 1996 an executive director of 
the World Bank and from 1996 to 1998 ambassador to the UN and WTO. 
118  This favourable political environment included a Labour-Party-led government open to 
development concerns and the growth of political pressure from NGOs for greater pol-
icy coherence, not least after the failure of the WTO conference in Seattle. 
119  They are described in detail in a communication of 18 March 2002 approved by the 
cabinet from Minister Herfkens to parliament on the subject of policy coherence. See 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2002). 
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Agnes van Ardenne120 of the Christian Democratic Party, has maintained 
the momentum of the efforts to enhance policy coherence (see below). 
6.3.3 Strategic conception 
The need for enhanced policy coherence for development has been empha-
sized since the early 1980s in various documents defining development 
policy principles and strategies, including “Development Cooperation in a 
World Economic Perspective” (1980), “The Quality of Aid” (1989) and 
especially “A World in Dispute” (1993).121 
In March 2002 the then Development Cooperation Minister, Eveline Her-
fkens, submitted to parliament a General Memorandum on Policy Coher-
ence, which had been approved by the cabinet, justified the goal of en-
hancing policy coherence for development and described in detail the gov-
ernment’s approach to the improvement of policy coherence at national 
and international level.122 The current Development Cooperation Minister, 
Agnes van Ardenne, outlined her policy in the policy paper “Mutual Inter-
ests, Mutual Responsibilities: Dutch Development Cooperation en Route 
to 2015”, in which she endorsed the efforts to enhance policy coher-
ence.123 
An up-to-date overview of current efforts to enhance policy coherence is 
provided by the document “Policy Coherence for Development”.124  It 
identifies six areas considered to be particularly important from the coher-
ence viewpoint,125 presents a brief analysis of the coherence problem in 
                                                          
120  After the change of government on 27 July 2002, Agnes van Ardenne was initially State 
Secretary for Development Cooperation in the Foreign Ministry until 27 May 2003. She 
has since been Minister for Development Cooperation in the Foreign Ministry. 
121  See OECD/DAC (2001c, I–27). There have also been other strategy documents, such as 
“A World of Difference” (1990) and “Aid in Progress” (1995). 
122  See Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2002). 
123  See Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2003a), thereof section 5.2 “Coherence”. 
124  See Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2003b). 
125  The six areas referred to in the document are: 
 1. Reform of the EU agricultural policy (with particular regard for Mozambique’s  
     access to the EU’s sugar market, 
 2. WTO agricultural negotiations, 
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each area and then specifies the objectives of and the measures to be taken 
under the Dutch policy at national and international level with a view to 
improving policy coherence in each case. 
6.3.4 Information and analysis 
The efforts being made under the Dutch development policy to improve 
policy coherence are largely based on an analysis of coherence problems 
and on information work designed to raise the awareness of other depart-
ments and parliament and to influence political decisions at national and 
international level. Sound analysis and information are regarded as the 
necessary basis for the political advocacy of improved policy coherence. It 
is also pointed out, however: “Well researched cases and advocacy will 
fail without real political commitment.”126 
While Eveline Herfkens was still minister, the Foreign Ministry’s Direc-
torate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS), responsible for de-
velopment cooperation, began systematically analysing cases of incoher-
ence. Herfkens had initially to admit that the ministry did not have the 
necessary analytical capacity.127 In 2001 an ad hoc working party was set 
up to consider a number of coherence issues (agricultural policy, fisheries 
policy, TRIPS) and to draw up initial proposals for dealing with them. In 
May 2002 a permanent Policy Coherence Unit (PCU) was formed with a 
staff of five and a secretary. Its place in the institutional set-up and its 
tasks are described in Box 5. 
                                                                                                                         
 3. US and EU cotton subsidies, 
 4. Product standards and market access, 
 5. Developing countries’ access to medicines in the context of the WTO TRIPS agree- 
    ment 
 6. EU fisheries agreements with African countries (especially Mauritania). 
 Other aspects on which efforts to enhance coherence have focused in recent years have 
been human rights, small arms, migration, the Everything but Arms initiative and tax 
agreements with developing countries. See Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2003b). 
126  Genee (2003). See also Box 4. 
127  “The minister expressed her concern over the lack of an analytical capacity to maintain 
a more systematic identification of possible issues.” Thus the 2001 DAC review report 
on Dutch development cooperation. See OECD/DAC (2001c, I–27). 
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In the meantime, a number of “coherence dossiers” have been compiled on 
the initiative of the PCU (or its predecessor, the ad hoc working party) by 
interdepartmental teams of experts (inter alia on agricultural policy, 
TRIPS, product standards, fisheries policy). The paper on agricultural pol-
icy, Memorandum on Coherence between Agricultural Policy and Devel-
opment Policy, was jointly adopted by the Ministers for Development Co-
Box 5: Functions of the Policy Coherence Unit (PCU) in the Dutch  
Foreign Ministry 
1. Place in the institutional set-up 
• The PCU forms part of the Directorate-General for International Coop-
eration (DGIS). 
• The head of the PCU reports to the head of the DGIS, who reports to the 
Minister for Development Cooperation. 
• A PCU representative attends the weekly meetings of the interdepart-
mental Committee for European Affairs (committee of state secretaries), 
in which the Dutch position in the EU Councils of Ministers and com-
mittees is determined. 
2. Tasks 
• Monitoring other policies for possible incoherences 
• Coordination of the positions of the various departments on problems 
associated with policy coherence for development 
• Compilation of “coherence dossiers” by interdepartmental groups of ex-
perts on important coherence issues (the PCU initiates and monitors the 
process and organizes the use of the dossiers in efforts to enhance policy 
coherence at national and international level) 
• Agreement on the Dutch position and its introduction into international 
discussions and negotiations in the case of other coherence issues on 
which dossiers are not compiled 
• Organization of coherence-related information work and the mobiliza-
tion of political support for greater policy coherence by means, for ex-
ample, of approaches to parliamentary committees, seminars and coop-
eration with NGOs 
Source: Information provided by the head of the PCU during an interview on 
28 February 2003 
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operation and Agriculture, forwarded to parliament and published.128 It 
contains a detailed analysis of the coherence problem in various areas 
(rice, sugar, cotton, fruit and vegetables) and defines the objectives of the 
Dutch  policy on the improvement of policy coherence. The Memorandum 
is to be complemented by an action plan. According to the PCU, the dis-
cussions while the Memorandum was being drawn up were at times diffi-
cult (especially on the sugar chapter). On the other hand, the political con-
text had been favourable inasmuch as the Dutch Finance Minister, too, 
was an advocate of the reform of the European agricultural policy. 
What is remarkable about the coherence dossiers is that they emerge from 
an interdepartmental discussion process in which differing views are de-
bated at length and, when completed, represent common positions of the 
Netherlands Government, which are then presented in the EU and the 
OECD and at multilateral level. An example is two papers submitted by 
the Netherlands at the DAC Senior Level Meeting in 2002 on coherence 
between agricultural policy and development policy and on coherence 
problems in the cotton sector.129 The coherence dossiers are also used in 
Dutch development cooperation to some extent for “coherence diplo-
macy”, e.g. in support of West African countries at the WTO negotiations 
on the cotton problem. 
The PCU pleads at both national and international level for the mobiliza-
tion of research capacity to analyse coherence problems and for the more 
systematic study of  the effects of the industrialized countries’ policies on 
developing countries. It endorses, for example, the international research 
project on “The Development Impact of Rich Countries’ Policies” planned 
in the context of the Global Development Network.130 
6.3.5 Structure and process of policy coordination 
According to the most recent DAC review report on Dutch development 
cooperation, which was drawn up in 2001, it is particularly significant 
                                                          
128  See Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken / Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en 
Visserij (2003). 
129  Netherlands’ Delegation (2002a and 2002b). 
130  See Genee (2003). A meeting of experts was held in Paris in June 2003 to prepare the 
research project. See Ashoff (2003). 
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from the coherence viewpoint that development policy is represented in 
the cabinet by its own minister.131 
In 1996 a White Paper on the reform of the Dutch foreign policy led to the 
hitherto independent post of Development Cooperation Minister being 
integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), with the result that 
two (currently three) ministers have since headed the MFA.132 At the same 
time, sustainable poverty reduction was declared one of the five overriding 
objectives of Dutch foreign policy.133 Both measures underline the fact that 
development cooperation is seen as an essential part of foreign policy and 
that the latter is, in turn, explicitly committed to the development policy 
goal of poverty reduction. 
The DAC review report referred to above notes that the integration of po-
litical responsibility for development cooperation into the MFA has facili-
tated coherence between foreign policy and development policy,134 but 
also points out that, in practice, a great deal depends on there being a good 
understanding between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development 
Cooperation, since the two together are accountable to parliament and the 
public for the development cooperation objectives and strategy and for 
coherence between development cooperation and the rest of the foreign 
policy.135 It should be noted that, according to the DAC report, the integra-
tion of the post of Development Cooperation Minister into the Foreign 
                                                          
131  “(...) the importance of having a Minister for Development Cooperation in the national 
cabinet is critical in this respect.” OECD/DAC (2001c, I–10). 
132  The Dutch Foreign Ministry describes the leadership of the ministry on its homepage as 
follows: “The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for Dutch foreign policy and 
the Ministry's overall leadership. He is assisted by the Minister for Development Coop-
eration and the Minister for European Affairs. These three Government members are 
the Ministry's political leaders.” http://www.minbuza.nl. 
133  The five objectives are: “to promote (i) international order, (ii) peace, security and 
stability, (iii) European integration, (iv) sustainable poverty reduction, (v) bilateral re-
lations.” http://www.minbuza.nl. 
134  “Broadly speaking, the integration of development cooperation within MFA facilitates 
policy coherence between the foreign affairs and the development cooperation sides of 
the Dutch government.” OECD/DAC (2001c, I–27). 
135  See OECD/DAC (2001c, I–36). 
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Ministry has raised coordination problems despite the improvement in 
coherence.136 
The Development Cooperation Minister or the DGIS and PCU put forward 
their ideas on coherence for interdepartmental agreement, which, as usual, 
occurs at various levels: in the cabinet at the highest level, at the next 
lower level of, in particular, the state secretaries’ Committee for European 
Affairs, whose weekly meetings are attended by a PCU representative, and 
finally at desk-officer level. 
The interdepartmental working parties which have been formed to con-
sider current coherence issues and compile the coherence dossiers referred 
to above are important for coherence work. According to the PCU itself, 
by initiating and monitoring these working parties, it has played a major 
role, but it also emphasizes that the political commitment and openness of 
other departments to the discussion of the various coherence issues were 
an equally important prerequisite for the compilation of the coherence dos-
siers. It adds that the interdepartmental working parties had been formed 
without difficulty and had operated flexibly. Further institutional arrange-
ments had not been necessary. 
6.3.6 Supplementary comments 
Policy coherence is also an issue for Dutch NGOs. The Evert Vermeer 
Stichting, an independent foundation close to the social-democratic Labour 
Party, has set up a website, which includes a “Coherence Manual” (Hand-
boek Coherentie)  containing information on coherence issues and taking a 
                                                          
136  “However, the co-location of both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and that for Devel-
opment Cooperation in one organisational framework means that the Development Co-
operation Minister, while responsible for perhaps 80 % of the overall MFA budget, has 
less authority than the Minister of Foreign Affairs in critical operational areas such as 
personnel. This is similarly true in the field, where development cooperation is located 
in the Dutch embassy. The development cooperation portfolio usually represents the 
vast majority of overall Dutch funding in the recipient country, yet, the considerable au-
thorities that are delegated to the field remain with the ambassador, who may not nec-
essarily be a development professional. The operational ambiguities created by this un-
usual organisation, in which authority does not necessarily equal operational responsi-
bility, has the potential to generate management confusion within the Ministry.” 
OECD/DAC (2001c, I–33). 
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critical view of Dutch policy from the coherence viewpoint.137 The PCU 
sees this initiative as a political aid to its own work. 
6.4 Sweden 
In May 2003 the Swedish Government submitted to parliament a docu-
ment on basic principles entitled “Shared Responsibilities: Sweden’s Pol-
icy for Global Development”, which emphasizes that all the country’s 
policies share responsibility for the overriding objective of equitable and 
sustainable development, deriving from this an explicit demand for policy 
coherence and adding to the development policy’s tasks in the develop-
ment cooperation sphere the role of catalyst for progress in other areas of 
policy towards the achievement of the common overriding objective. The 
document is seen as the conceptual response to increasing globalization 
and, in particular, the Millennium Declaration and was approved by par-
liament in December 2003.138 
The document was drawn up by working parties together with other minis-
tries and government agencies under the overall responsibility of the For-
eign Ministry, which includes the Minister for Development Coopera-
tion,139 and was based on the extensive report of a commission (Globkom) 
that had been instructed by the government in December 1999 to examine 
Sweden’s policy for global development140 and submitted its findings un-
                                                          
137  http://www.coherentie.nl. 
138  See Regeringskansliet / Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2003). A summary can also be 
found in Morgenroth (2003). 
139  The Swedish development policy is the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, in which 
a separate minister of cabinet rank is politically responsible for development coopera-
tion. At the time the document was forwarded to parliament, the Development Minister 
was Jan O. Karlsson. Currently, there are three ministers of cabinet rank in the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry: the Foreign Minister, the Minister for Development Cooperation and 
the Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy. 
140  In December 1999 the government had instructed the then Minister for Development 
Cooperation, Maj-Inger Klingvall, to form a commission of representatives of all the 
parties with seats in parliament, who were then assisted in their work by experts from 
various ministries and government agencies and by other, external advisers. 
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der the title “A New Swedish Policy for Global Development” in March 
2002.141 
According to the head of the commission secretariat, the Globkom initia-
tive was due to various factors:142 
• the growing realization in government and parliamentary circles of 
the need for a conceptual response to issues relating to globalization, 
poverty reduction and the role of development cooperation and other 
policies in this context,143 
• the commitment of parliamentarians, especially members of the So-
cial Democratic Party, 
• the commitment of the Minister for Development Cooperation, which 
was given political weight by her cabinet rank, 
• the Prime Minister’s pronounced openness to questions of equitable 
and sustainable global development. 
While drawing up the report, Globkom had consulted not only all the min-
istries and government agencies concerned but also representatives of in-
terest groups in society and NGOs at some thirty hearings and conferences 
and, in addition, asked experts and academics for contributions. In the 
commission’s opinion, the broadly based process of the report’s evolution 
did a great deal to raise the various actors’ awareness of the objectives and 
requirements of the policy for global development. The means thus formed 
part of the end. Much the same can be said of the drawing up of the basic 
document “Shared Responsibilities”, during which many meetings and 
discussions were held with other ministries and government agencies. 
                                                          
141  This was the title of the summary; see Committee on Sweden’s Policy for Global De-
velopment (2002) and Morgenroth (2003). In “Shared Responsibilities” the title of the 
Globkom report is given as “A More Equitable World without Poverty”. See Rege-
ringskansliet / Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2003, 6). 
142  Telephone interview conducted by the author with Mia Horn af Rantzien on 27 January 
2004. 
143  The DAC review report on Sweden drawn up in 2000 refers to two other factors: opin-
ion polls, revealing aid fatigue and reduced expectations of the role of development co-
operation in poverty reduction, and competing objectives of various policies (such as 
the agricultural, trade, environment, security and migration policies) in the shaping of 
the foreign policy. See OECD/DAC (2000, I–14 f.). 
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As regards the improvement of policy coherence, the following declara-
tions of intent in “Shared Responsibilities” seem important: 
• The goal of equitable and sustainable development applies to all poli-
cies. 
• The basic document explicitly calls for a coherent policy for global 
development and defines this goal by setting fundamental objectives 
for eleven policy areas,144 but leaves the specification and operation-
alization of the objectives to future government work. The efforts to 
enhance policy coherence also apply to Sweden’s involvement at EU 
level. 
• The document does not refer to any conflicting objectives, but notes 
that they are to be identified, analysed and made the subject of care-
fully considered strategic decisions during the implementation of the 
policy for global development. 
• The government declares itself responsible for implementing, moni-
toring and evaluating the policy for global development on the basis 
of precise definitions of objectives and results-based management. 
The evaluation and ongoing analysis of all measures are regarded as 
essential components of coherence work. 
• Sweden supports the further development of the international Com-
mitment to Development Index and of international research on pol-
icy coherence issues. 
• Development cooperation is part of the policy for global develop-
ment, has as its main objective the reduction of poverty in accordance 
with the MDGs and also performs the function of encouraging pro-
gress in other areas of policy. 
• The government intends to inform parliament regularly in an annual 
report on the implementation of the policy for global development. 
• The government intends to cooperate closely with parliament, NGOs, 
the private sector and trade unions on the improvement of policy co-
herence. To encourage a broad public debate on the policy for global 
                                                          
144  Legal systems, security and defence policy, trade and investment policy, migration 
policy, social and health policy, economic and financial policy, education policy, agri-
cultural and fisheries policy, cultural policy, environment policy, industrial and em-
ployment policy. A summary of the objectives can be found in Morgenroth (2003). 
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development, it proposes a forum consisting of representatives of par-
liament, interest groups in society, the private sector, experts and gov-
ernment agencies and intends to increase its public relations work. 
• Apart from the points summarized above, “Shared Responsibilities” 
makes no references to the organizational implications of the policy 
for global development, but announces that they will be presented 
later.145 
The Expert Group on Development Issues (EGDI)146 is currently consider-
ing the coherence problem in four areas: (i) migration and economic de-
velopment, (ii) security and development, (iii) special and differentiated 
treatment of developing countries in the WTO and (iv) the multilateral 
development financing system.147 
6.5 DAC recommendations for improving policy 
coherence in other countries 
In the peer reviews the DAC examines the coherence of its member coun-
tries’ policies for development in terms of substance (analysis of incoher-
ent policies) and procedure (consideration of efforts to enhance coher-
ence). Where the latter aspect is concerned, the reviews conform roughly 
rather than fastidiously to the checklist on policy coherence in the DAC 
                                                          
145  The earlier Globkom report had proposed the establishment in the ministries of a coor-
dination unit for the policy for global development with the following tasks, which re-
semble the tasks of the Policy Coherence Unit in the Netherlands: 
• organizing and analysing the flow of information between the ministries for the im-
plementation of the policy for global development, 
• reporting to Parliament, 
• preparing background analyses, 
• initiating interdepartmental working parties, 
• identifying interdepartmental cross-cutting issues. 
146  The EGDI is a group of international and Swedish development experts and representa-
tives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry and Sida (Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency), having as its task the initiation of studies on current development 
issues. The EGDI’s chairman is the State Secretary for Development Cooperation in the 
Foreign Ministry. See http://www.egdi.gov.se 
147  See Holmgren (2003). 
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Guidelines on Poverty Reduction of May 2001.148 Box 6 below outlines 
the recommendations made in the DAC review reports in 2003 and 2002 
under main headings, indicating the countries addressed in each case. 
 
Box 6: DAC recommendations for enhancing policy coherence 
made in the peer reviews of development policies in 2002 
and 2003 
Area Countries* 
1. Political leadership of the centre and/or the develop-
ment cooperation agency 
• communicate political commitment (by the highest 
authorities) (Ireland, Denmark, USA, Greece) 
• DANIDA needs to play a stronger leadership role in 
analysing and promoting the developmental coher-
ence of policy decisions (Denmark) 
• USAID needs to play a stronger advocacy role vis-à-
vis other government agencies in the analysis and 
promotion of development policy coherence (USA) 
Ireland,  
Denmark,  
USA,  
Greece 
2. Strategic framework and priorities 
• need for an explicit government statement on policy 
coherence (Japan) 
• give more prominence to coherence in strategic docu-
ments (Denmark) 
• need for a clear statement that calls for policy coher-
ence (Finland) 
Japan,  
Denmark,  
Finland 
3. Information and analysis 
a) Enhance analytical capacity 
• enhance analytical capacity to deal with coherence is-
sues (by assigning adequate staff resources) (Ireland, 
Finland, Luxembourg, USA, Greece, Spain) 
• create a specialized unit responsible for assessing pol-
icy coherence / analysing the impact of non-aid poli-
cies on developing countries (Ireland, Denmark) 
• establish a system for monitoring the environmental, 
social and governance aspects of foreign direct in-
vestment (Japan) 
Ireland,  
Japan,  
Denmark,  
Finland,  
Luxembourg, 
USA,  
Canada,  
Greece, Spain 
 
 
                                                          
148  See OECD/DAC (2001a). 
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• creating monitoring mechanisms and reinforcing ex-
isting ones would enable the government to exercise 
enhanced oversight in areas that have a bearing on 
policy coherence (Canada) 
• staff will need skills and appropriate training to ana-
lyse non-aid policies from a development perspective 
and should remain in their posts long enough to form 
solid partnerships with other key government agen-
cies (Denmark) 
b) Conduct assessments 
• conduct assessments of the development impact of 
non-aid policies (Ireland, Japan, Denmark, Canada) 
• vet or review proposed legislation or documents sub-
mitted to cabinet (Denmark, USA, Canada) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ireland,  
Japan,  
Denmark, USA, 
Canada 
4. Policy coordination structures and processes 
• establish dedicated / formal consultation mechanisms 
(within, across and outside government agencies; on 
an on-going basis for key policy areas or as special 
task forces for emerging issues) (Ireland, Denmark, 
USA) 
• the mandate of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Development Cooperation could be extended to give 
it a more active role in promoting debate on policy 
coherence (Luxembourg) 
• the role of the Policy Coordinating Committee on De-
velopment and the contribution it can make should be 
clearly established (USA) 
• increase USAID’s political involvement (e.g. by a 
standing invitation to attend the meetings of the Na-
tional Security Council) (USA) 
• USAID needs to seek strong working relationships 
with policy coordinating groups such as the National 
Security Council (USA) 
• the roles and responsibilities of CIDA and DFAIT in 
promoting greater policy coherence for development 
may need to be further defined (Canada)** 
• the mandate of the Interministerial Committee and the 
Monitoring and Administrative Committee could be 
extended to include coordination for policy coherence 
(Greece) 
Ireland,  
Denmark,  
Luxembourg, 
USA, Canada, 
Greece, Spain 
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• the institutional coordination structures in place could 
be used to support a more systematic approach to ad-
dressing policy coherence issues (Spain) 
5. Parliamentary involvement 
• expand parliamentary involvement (Ireland) 
• the Foreign Affairs Committee could assess non-aid 
policies with substantial impact on developing coun-
tries; these assessments could be carried out jointly 
with the parliamentary committee concerned (Den-
mark) 
Ireland,  
Denmark 
* Countries are listed in the order of their reviews (the most recent first). 
** CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) reports to the Minis-
ter for International Cooperation; the DFAIT (Department of Foreign Af-
fairs and International Trade) reports to the Foreign Minister and the Minis-
ter for International Trade. 
Source: Compiled from OECD/DAC: The DAC Journal, Vol. 3, 2002, Nos 2, 
3, 4, and Vol. 4, 2003, Nos 2, 3; http://www.oecd.org/dac 
6.6 Conclusions 
The three countries presented, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, are making great efforts to improve policy coherence, with Swe-
den now in the process of implementing an ambitious programme. A com-
parison of the three cases reveals that efforts to enhance coherence are 
characterized by the following essential elements: 
• Political leadership: The ministers responsible for development pol-
icy (United Kingdom, Netherlands) or the government and parliament 
(Sweden) have both justified with political commitment and under-
pinned with concepts and strategies the need and will for enhanced 
policy coherence (see below). 
• Cabinet rank of development policy: In this, the fact that development 
policy is represented in the cabinets of the three countries by its own 
ministers has, according to the working units responsible for coher-
ence work or the DAC peer review reports, proved beneficial. 
• Strategic competence: The political will to enhance coherence has 
been conceptually justified in the detailed strategy documents ap-
proved by the governments and, in the case of various policy areas, 
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backed by an analysis of incoherences and the setting of objectives 
for coherent policy. 
• Understanding of development policy’s role: On the one hand, devel-
opment policy is regarded in the three countries as part of a policy for 
equitable and sustainable development and not as solely responsible 
for such development. On the other hand, it sees itself as responsible 
not only for development cooperation but also for raising other poli-
cies’ and departments’ awareness of the need for greater coherence 
for development. 
• Limited importance of formal responsibilities in the work on coher-
ence for development: In the three countries the formal responsibili-
ties for policies of importance in coherence terms (e.g. agricultural, 
fisheries, trade and migration policies) are largely distributed among 
government departments or ministers.149 Nonetheless, in none of the 
three countries is the transfer of further formal responsibilities to the 
ministries or ministers in charge of development cooperation re-
garded as a major precondition for the improvement of coherence. 
According to those interviewed, this is partly due to the aforemen-
tioned understanding of development policy’s role and the cabinet 
rank of the development cooperation ministers, which increases their 
influence on government work. 
• Proactive coherence work of the ministers or divisions responsible 
for development cooperation: In the three countries the government 
working units responsible for development cooperation have involved 
other departments and government agencies in an intensive coher-
ence-related dialogue: during the compilation of strategy papers 
(White Papers in the UK, various documents on basic principles in 
the Netherlands and Sweden), during the detailed analysis of incoher-
ences in various areas of policy (coherence dossiers) and, on this ba-
sis, during the elaboration of joint government positions, with a par-
ticular view to negotiations at EU and multilateral level. This coher-
ence work also includes initiatives at international level. In the Neth-
                                                          
149  An exception in some ways is Sweden, where the Foreign Ministry is responsible not 
only for development cooperation but also for a number of other areas of international 
policy. According to the latest organization chart (October 2003), these areas include 
export promotion and the EU internal market, strategic export controls, international 
trade policy, global security, migration and asylum policy. However, there are also  
shared responsibilities. A state secretary in the Ministry for Industry, Employment and 
Trade, for example, is responsible for foreign trade issues. 
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erlands proactive coherence work has found institutional expression 
in the formation of a separate working unit for coherence; in Sweden 
a unit of this kind has been proposed. 
• Interdepartmental networking and joint analysis of coherence issues, 
especially at desk-officer level: Coherence work in the three countries 
makes use of the usual formal coordination fora (at the highest level 
the cabinet, under it various permanent interdepartmental working 
parties or committees) and coordination mechanisms (such as co-
signing). However, intensive interdepartmental networking and the 
joint analysis of coherence issues at desk-officer level have proved 
particularly important: they have formed the substantive basis for 
sound political discussion and decision-making at a higher level. In-
terdepartmental working parties dealing with a given subject for a 
fixed period, to which appropriate staff have been temporarily sec-
onded, have been formed for this purpose. 
• Intensive analytical and information work: In all three countries the 
advocates of coherence work have mobilized analytical capacities and 
expertise from within and outside the government to examine the ef-
fects of other policies for possible incoherences or synergies and to 
draw up proposals for government action at national and international 
level. The findings have an impact as an information base on interde-
partmental analysis and coordination, but they are also used for dia-
logue with the public, interest groups and NGOs. 
This picture of the efforts of three pioneering countries in the coherence 
field is confirmed in virtual mirror-image fashion by the DAC recommen-
dations to nine other countries for the improvement of policy coherence, 
which are summarized in Box 6. The recommendations concern the fol-
lowing aspects in particular: 
• political commitment and strategy formulation, 
• a more proactive role for the government agencies responsible for 
development cooperation, 
• the use (or mandating) of existing interdepartmental coordination fora 
for coherence work,150 
                                                          
150  The creation of formal coordination fora for coherence issues has been recommended 
less frequently than the use of existing fora. 
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• the development of analytical capacities (most frequent recommenda-
tion, addressed to all countries), 
• the more systematic monitoring of other policies (including the re-
view of legislation proposed by the cabinet and other departments). 
7 Germany’s efforts to enhance policy coherence: 
progress in recent years and assessment by the DAC 
7.1 Progress in recent years 
7.1.1 Institutional changes 
During the last parliamentary term (1998–2002) the BMZ acquired addi-
tional responsibilities or participatory rights, some of which had already 
been announced in the coalition agreement of October 1998 with a refer-
ence to the objective of ensuring policy coherence for development.151 The 
following changes were made: 
• The BMZ’s inclusion in the Federal Security Council (Bundessicher-
heitsrat – BSR) in 1998: The BSR is a cabinet committee which coor-
dinates the Federal Government’s security and defence policies and is 
formally responsible for questions of principle relating to arms ex-
ports.152 As a result of its membership of the BSR the BMZ was di-
rectly involved in the amendment of the Federal Government’s arms 
export principles in 2000 and in the elaboration of its Comprehensive 
Concept on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-
                                                          
151  “The new Federal Government will ensure (…) policy coherence for development with 
other departments. The current fragmentation of development tasks of the previous Fed-
eral Government among different departments will be abolished, and those tasks will be 
concentrated in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ). The BMZ will assume overall responsibility in matters relating to EU develop-
ment policy with a view to promoting international structural policy. The BMZ will be-
come a member of the Federal Security Council.” See Koalitionsvereinbarung (1998), 
Chapter XI, section 1. 
152  The establishment of the BSR was decided by the cabinet in 1955. Its meetings are held 
in secret. It has nine members: the Federal Chancellor, who acts as chairman, the Head 
of the Chancellor’s Office and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Home Af-
fairs, Justice, Economic Affairs and Economic Cooperation and Development. See 
www.bundesregierung. de/artikel,-55726/Der-Bundessicherheitsrat.htm. 
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Conflict Peace-Building in the same year.153 As a member of the 
BSR, the BMZ is also represented on the Board of Trustees of the 
Federal College for Security Studies (Bundesakademie für Sicher-
heitspolitik – BAKS), which is Germany’s leading training institution 
for security policy issues and a national and international forum for 
discussion in this area.154 
• Overall responsibility in matters relating to the EU’s development 
policy since late 1998: Previously, responsibilities in this respect had 
been distributed among several ministries.155 With the transfer of 
overall responsibility to the BMZ, the latter also assumed responsibil-
ity for matters relating to trade issues under the Lomé IV Convention 
and the Cotonou Agreement. 
• Formal responsibility for the Transform Programme and for matters 
relating to “Working Table II” of the Stability Pact for South-East 
Europe since late 1998: Previously, the Transform Programme (con-
sultancy and technical cooperation with Eastern Europe and the CIS 
States) was jointly coordinated by the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs, the Foreign Office and the BMZ. “Working Table II” is con-
cerned with the areas of economic reconstruction, development and 
cooperation.156 
• Amendment of the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries 
(GGO), 26 July 2000: Since the amendment of the GGO the BMZ 
has had an extended right to scrutinize other departments’ draft legis-
lation for compliance with development policy. While under the old 
GGO the BMZ did not receive such drafts until late in the interde-
partmental coordination procedure, it is now involved at an early 
stage and itself considers whether development policy interests are 
                                                          
153  For further details see Chapter 7.1.2. 
154  The Board of Trustees is composed of the members of the Federal Security Council. 
155  For historical reasons overall responsibility for matters relating to the EU’s develop-
ment cooperation rested with the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs until 1998, 
whereas resources for the European Development Fund came (and continue to come) 
from the BMZ’s budget, and the BMZ represented the Federal Government in the EU 
Council of Development Ministers and in the various development committees at EU 
level. Finally, the Foreign Office acted on the Federal Government’s behalf during EU 
negotiations with developing countries (e.g. under the Lomé Convention). 
156  See BMZ (2001a, 93). 
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affected.157 In practice, this means a change in degree, in that more in-
formation is provided earlier, but not a change in principle, since the 
BMZ is, as a general rule, involved in the Federal Government’s law-
making  process, and was so even before the amendment of the 
GGO,158 and is usually informed at an early stage of the work of other 
departments on draft legislation, especially as the latter is in itself the 
condensed form of political decision-making that often begins a great 
deal earlier, at parliamentary party level, for example. 
The coalition agreement of 16 October 2002 concerning the present ruling 
coalition does not, unlike its 1998 predecessor,  provide for the transfer of 
further responsibilities to the BMZ. In preparation for the coalition nego-
tiations and to justify calls for further responsibilities, the BMZ had identi-
fied internally the “residual responsibilities” of other departments in the 
development sphere and the posts associated with them. 
7.1.2 Substantive progress 
Some considerable substantive progress has been made in the improve-
ment of policy coherence for development in recent years: 
• The Federal Government’s HIPC initiative in 1999: At the G8 sum-
mit held in Cologne in 1999 the Federal Government proposed a debt 
relief initiative for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), which 
was approved at the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank in 
September of the same year. The basic factors leading to the initiative 
included Germany’s presidency of the G8, the BMZ senior manage-
ment’s commitment, meticulous preparation by the BMZ together 
with the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) and, not least, the popu-
                                                          
157  This results from Annex 8 to the GGO as amended on 26 July 2000 (see BMI 2000). 
The annex lays down rules on the participation of the federal ministries in the law-
making process and makes a distinction between two groups of departments: those to be 
involved to examine whether aspects of their portfolios are affected (i.e. such ministries 
do the examining themselves) and those to be involved if their interests are affected (the 
preliminary decision on this being taken by the department which proposes the draft le-
gislation). The BMZ is now a member of the first group, which includes the Ministries 
of the Interior, Justice, Families and Women and the Environment, and had advocated 
this status by analogy with the Ministry for Families and Women. 
158  At the latest when draft legislation is forwarded before a decision is taken in the federal 
cabinet. 
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lar debt relief campaign run by many non-governmental organiza-
tions. 
• Amendment of the Federal Government’s Political Principles for the 
Export of War Arms and Other Armaments, 19 January 2000:159 In 
decisions on arms exports to countries which are not members of the 
EU or NATO or deemed equivalent to NATO members, the amended 
principles require that consideration also be given to the human rights 
situation and to the possibility of the sustainable development of the 
recipient countries being seriously impaired by disproportionate 
spending on armaments. 
• The Federal Government’s Comprehensive Concept on Civilian Cri-
sis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, 
7 April 2000:160 The concept was elaborated by the BSR and defines 
development policy as part the Federal Government’s overall strategy 
for civilian crisis and conflict management. It is based on the 
enlarged security concept mentioned above, in which development 
policy aspects are inherent.161 The strategy seeks to dovetail instru-
ments of the foreign, security, development, financial, economic, en-
vironment, cultural and legal policies. 
• The Federal Government’s Programme of Action 2015 for Poverty 
Reduction, 4 April 2001 (AP 2015):162 The AP 2015 originated from a 
BMZ initiative,163 was announced by the Federal Chancellor at the 
UN Millennium Summit in New York in September 2000, was sub-
sequently elaborated and was approved by the federal cabinet in April 
2001. It explains in detail that poverty reduction is not merely an ob-
ligation for development policy, but requires coherent contributions 
from other policies. As a result of this and the cabinet’s approval the 
programme has a major role to play in the BMZ’s efforts to enhance 
policy coherence. 
                                                          
159  See Deutscher Bundestag (2000). 
160  See Bundesregierung (2000). 
161  See footnote 32. 
162  See BMZ (2001b). 
163  The BMZ’s initiative was also influenced by the fact that it came at the time when the 
work on the DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, in which Germany had been heav-
ily involved and which focused on ways of achieving the objective of poverty reduction, 
was about to come to an end. 
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• Guidelines on the Consideration of Ecological, Social and Develop-
ment Aspects in the Allocation of Government Export Credit Insur-
ance, 26 April 2001:164 The interdepartmental Committee on Export 
Guarantees (Hermes Committee), on which the BMWA, BMF, For-
eign Office and BMZ are represented, adopted, with wide parliamen-
tary support, guidelines that provide for a screening procedure de-
signed to detect any ecological, social or development aspects and, 
where indications of such aspects are found, for a review procedure. 
• Commitment to increase the German ODA/GNI ratio to 0.33 % by 
2006: At the European Council in Barcelona on 15 March 2002 the 
Federal Chancellor endorsed the EU Member States’ commitment to 
increase official development aid as a proportion of GNI to 0.39 % in 
the EU as a whole and to at least 0.33 % in each Member State.165 In 
2001 and 2002 the German ODA/GNI ratio was still 0.27 %. 
• The Federal Government’s Sustainability Strategy for Germany, 17 
April 2002:166 This strategy defines poverty reduction and the promo-
tion of development as part of Germany’s global responsibility.167 
• The Federal Government’s Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Preven-
tion, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, 12 May 
2004:168 The Action Plan spells out and operationalizes the Compre-
hensive Concept on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution 
and Post-Conflict Peace-Building adopted in 2000 and defines nu-
merous actions in various areas of policy. It provides for the ap-
pointment in the departments involved of commissioners for civilian 
crisis prevention, who together form the Interdepartmental Civilian 
Crisis Prevention Task Force, which is chaired by a representative of 
the Foreign Office and held its constituent meeting on 20 September 
2004. 
                                                          
164  See Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG (2001). 
165  In taking their decision in Barcelona, the EU Member States were under pressure not 
only from the UN, development policy-makers and the public but also from the USA to 
undertake a specific commitment to increase development aid at the forthcoming UN 
Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (the USA had itself announced 
a significant increase). 
166  See Bundesregierung (2002). 
167  Chapter F, section I; see Bundesregierung (2002, 303). See also footnote 49. 
168  See Bundesregierung (2004). 
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7.2 The DAC’s assessment of Germany’s efforts to 
enhance policy coherence 
The DAC’s most recent review report on German development coopera-
tion, drawn up in 2001,169 took a close look at German efforts to enhance 
policy coherence, acknowledged progress in a number of areas and made 
various recommendations. Although the report no longer reflects the latest 
situation, it enables a comparison to be made with other donor countries 
since it forms part of the series of ongoing DAC peer reviews. 
Box 7 contains the most important statements in the report, breaks them 
down into positive assessments and recommendations and assigns them to 
important categories of the general frame of reference for the identification 
of approaches to improving policy coherence, as presented in Chapter 
5.3.170 
Box 7: Statements on Germany’s efforts to enhance policy coherence 
made in the DAC’s review report of 2001 
Positive assessments Recommendations 
1. Political leadership and commitment 
• A key feature of German development 
cooperation is its effort to attain coher-
ence between national development pol-
icy and the other national policies related 
to it. (II-43) 
• Policy coherence principles have been 
reaffirmed at the highest political levels, 
including Parliament, and special leader-
ship responsibilities have been given to 
BMZ. (II-43) 
• Germany is broadly supportive of the 
OECD and other international organiza-
 
 
• The BMZ frequently needs to 
argue its case with more power-
ful ministries within the Ger-
man system. (II-44) Because of 
the multiplicity of actors, pos-
sible domestic political con-
straints and the limited politi-
cal base of the BMZ, the im-
plementation of effective policy 
coherence will require a sus-
tained political commitment in 
the years to come. (II-43) 
                                                          
169  See OECD/DAC (2001d). The German development policy will again be reviewed by 
the DAC in 2005. 
170  One category not included in the general frame of reference (Box 3) is added: Political 
alliances and public advocacy. 
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tions which work together to deepen in-
ternational policy coherence. Coherence 
issues supported by Germany include 
work on international trade and direct in-
vestment, international finance, food and 
agriculture, natural environmental sus-
tainability, social issues, and governance 
and conflict. (II-45) 
• One of the first actions of the current 
government with regard to the interna-
tional agenda of coherence issues was its 
sponsorship of the "Enhanced HIPC Ini-
tiative" at the 1999 Cologne Summit. (II-
45) 
• German officials assert that their influ-
ence contributed significantly to the March 
2001 EC decision to free up LLDCs’ ac-
cess to the European market, especially in 
the area of agricultural products. (II-47) 
2. Strategic framework and priorities 
• The BMZ has regularly stressed the need 
for greater policy coherence in its official 
statements and documents. (II-43) 
• The political statement of vision [1998 
Coalition Agreement] has proven to be  
an important starting point for the series 
of subsequent actions that are building 
toward an operational framework for  
developing country policy coherence. 
(II-44) 
• The coherence of German government 
development policy was given a major 
boost with the cabinet approval of its new 
poverty strategy, the Programme of Ac-
tion 2015. (II-46)  
• The most remarkable feature of this pro-
gramme is the commitment by the Ger-
man Government to promote coherence 
in all national policies that relate to de-
veloping countries. (II-15) 
• The programme provides a better scope 
 
 
• The real challenge of this new 
approach [i.e. the Programme 
of Action 2015] now lies in 
the future. First, an implemen-
tation plan, which will have to 
be negotiated with other part-
ners within Germany, is ex-
pected early in 2002, follow-
ing which the best intentions 
of the government will need to 
be translated more operation-
ally into today’s realities. (II-
46) 
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for the BMZ in screening draft legislation 
for policy coherence, and in its participa-
tion in interministerial committees on ex-
port guarantees and arms exports. (II-9) 
• The German Government agreed in April 
2001 to new "Guiding Principles" [gov-
erning export guarantees]. These guide-
lines appear to provide a valid initial 
screening mechanism to ensure coherence 
between German Government-sponsored 
exports and development policy. (II-46) 
3. Information and analysis 
• As it progressively operationalizes its 
growing mandate for policy coherence, 
the BMZ […] also calls upon specialists 
from key aid implementing agencies (e.g. 
GTZ or GDI) to carry out specific policy 
analysis and support. 
 
• The BMZ has yet to suffi-
ciently develop the analytical 
capacity necessary to carry out 
its substantive mandate [in 
matters of coherence]. (II-44) 
• The BMZ's staffing level and 
skill mix will have to be sub-
stantially rethought given the 
conceptual and organizational 
changes [assignment of higher 
priority tasks, e.g. poverty 
leadership, screening of new 
laws for coherence]. (II-59) 
• Because of the large size of 
and the sensitivities surround-
ing export credit schemes, it 
would seem appropriate, as 
a further confidence-building 
measure, to undertake an in-
dependent analysis of the ex-
tent to which the new guide-
lines are actually applied. (II-
47) 
4. Policy coordination structures 
• Germany is one of the few DAC Member 
countries that has an independent devel-
opment cooperation ministry, which is 
the BMZ, headed by a cabinet minister.
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Germany thus has a permanent platform 
for advocacy of development coopera-
tion, both in the political and public 
arena. (II-15) 
• BMZ has been assigned the responsibility 
of leadership among actors in Germany 
and abroad for implementation of this 
strategy [Programme of Action 2015]. 
These actions will necessarily relate to 
numerous federal ministries. (II-56) 
• Since 1998, BMZ has also been playing a 
more important role in several interminis-
terial committees, such as on export guar-
antees and the Federal Security Council. 
(II-15 f.) 
5. Policy coordination processes 
• BMZ has taken on a variety of roles to 
ensure more systematic coherence, in-
cluding: 
– policy discussion within the cabinet 
by the minister, who is a full member, 
– the use of the new BMZ mandate to 
systematically review, for develop-
ment coherence, all new laws pro-
posed by the government. (II-44) 
 
6. Political alliances and public advocacy 
• The coherence issue has been a topic of 
periodic debate within  parliament over 
the last several years, but particularly 
since 1998. Parliament has periodically 
sought to further strengthen the BMZ po-
sition to influence overall government 
support for development policy coher-
ence. (II-43) 
• As it progressively operationalizes its 
growing mandate for policy coherence, 
the BMZ has already learned the impor-
tance of alliances with developmentally 
involved German actors such as the For-
eign Office, individual NGOs or NGO 
groups or specialized lobby groups. (II-44) 
 
• The DAC encourages Ger-
many to continue to use force-
fully all opportunities for pub-
lic advocacy of its development 
cause, particularly through the 
BMZ. (II-12) 
• Broad public understanding 
and support will be needed to 
implement the Programme of 
Action 2015. (II-19) 
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• The programme was drafted by several 
ministries and civil society, including 
NGOs, unions and academics. (II-15) 
The figures in brackets indicate the page numbers in the document cited. 
Source: OECD/DAC (2001d) 
 
In its 2001 report the DAC acknowledged in particular the following as-
pects: 
• the explicit political commitment not only by the BMZ but by the 
German Government as a whole to the need for improved policy co-
herence, 
• the justification and inclusion of the goal of enhancing policy coher-
ence for development in strategy documents and guidelines, espe-
cially the Programme of Action 2015 for Poverty Reduction, 
• Germany’s commitment at international level to the promotion of 
policy coherence (e.g. the HIPC initiative, liberalization of access to 
the EU market for LLDCs), 
• the fact that Germany has a separate development cooperation minis-
try and a development cooperation minister in the cabinet, 
• the BMZ’s increased involvement in the Hermes Export Guarantee 
Committee and (for the first time) in the Federal Security Council 
since 1998, 
• the BMZ’s awareness of the importance of political support from 
actors outside the government (e.g. NGOs) for the efforts to enhance 
coherence. 
However, the report also points out that, in view of divergent interests, 
influential interest groups, domestic constraints and the BMZ’s limited 
political base, the improvement of coherence is an ambitious task which 
will require sustained political commitment in the next few years. Besides 
the consistent implementation of the AP 2015, the DAC recommends: 
• development of the analytical capacity needed by the BMZ to carry 
out the mandate associated with the Programme of Action (including 
the provision and training of the staff required for this purpose), 
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• an independent evaluation to determine how far the guidelines on the 
granting of export guarantees, which were amended in 2001 inter alia 
to reflect development aspects, have actually been applied, 
• wide-ranging public relations work to generate the understanding and 
support needed for the implementation of the Programme of Action 
2015. 
Taken together, the positive features referred to in the DAC report and the 
recommendations it makes show Germany to be a donor country whose 
efforts to enhance policy coherence are clear-cut. The comparison with the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden and with the other nine 
DAC members considered in the previous chapter (see Box 6) reveals that 
Germany really does belong among the advanced countries with respect to 
efforts to enhance policy coherence. 
8 Conclusions and recommendations for German 
development cooperation 
8.1 Policy coherence as a complex management task 
As the improvement of policy coherence calls for various levels of action 
to be taken into account, a number of tasks are involved: 
• political: generation of political will and mobilization of political 
support in view of often differing objectives and conflicting interests, 
• conceptual-strategic: formulation and justification of a system of ob-
jectives as the basis for defining and demanding contributions from 
other policies to coherence, 
• substantive-analytical: identification of incoherences, indication of 
ways to improve coherence, indication of the cost or implications of 
continuing or unavoidable incoherences, 
• structural: distribution of formal responsibilities and participatory 
rights, organization of political and interdepartmental coordination 
and agreement, 
• procedural: practical shaping of political and interdepartmental coor-
dination and agreement, 
• administrative: provision of the manpower needed to perform the 
various coherence tasks. 
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Efforts to enhance policy coherence for development are subject to spe-
cific constraints, which should be taken into account from the outset: 
• limited influence of development policy compared to other policies, 
which receive far greater domestic attention and/or support; 
• incomplete information: development policy promotes development 
globally and in the partner countries in many areas which are influ-
enced, in some cases adversely, by numerous policies of the industri-
alized countries; this multiplicity calls for information on the effects 
of policies covering an unusual thematic range; 
• limited administrative capacities at times of scarcer manpower re-
sources while the range of the BMZ’s tasks increases. 
Work on the enhancement of policy coherence for development is thus a 
complex management task under conditions of particular constraints. As 
action needs to be taken at different levels, reducing efforts to enhance 
policy coherence to individual aspects is not enough. Although it is true to 
say that coherence issues are (largely) a question of power, they are re-
solved on the basis not only of formal responsibilities but also of political 
commitment, a strategic concept, sound analysis, the mobilization of po-
litical support and, in view of the constraints mentioned above, the priori-
tizing of coherence problems in order of urgency. 
8.2 Starting position for further steps to improve 
coherence 
The comparison with other donor countries, the DAC’s assessment of 
Germany’s efforts to enhance coherence and the positive experience re-
ferred to by those interviewed in the BMZ show that quite some progress 
has already been made in the work to enhance coherence for development. 
Despite the problems that exist, the starting conditions for further im-
provements are therefore, in principle, favourable. 
The favourable starting conditions include: the Federal Government’s rec-
ognition of the goal of enhancing coherence for development at national 
and international level, the existence of a separate BMZ represented at 
cabinet level, the awareness at the BMZ’s executive and working levels of 
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the need for improved policy coherence, a conceptual framework171 that 
sets the direction to be followed in enhancing coherence for development 
and explicitly refers to the shared responsibility of other policies, and prac-
tical experience of work to enhance coherence at the various levels. 
These starting conditions must be maintained and exploited in the efforts 
to further enhance coherence for development. In this, both the OECD’s 
general experience (see Chapter 5) and the specific efforts of other donor 
countries, whose experience is summarized in Chapter 6.6, may prove 
helpful. The following deliberations add further detail to this plea. They 
roughly follow the structure of Box 3. 
8.3 The importance of political will and leadership 
The experience of the forerunners in efforts to enhance coherence (the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden) and Germany’s experience 
in recent years show that progress towards coherence for development 
depends to a considerable extent on the strength of the member of the 
cabinet responsible for development policy, and this in two respects: 
• strength in the sense of political weight, which is, in turn, the out-
come of various factors (e.g. backing within the party, position in the 
party leadership, ability to mobilize political support in and outside 
the cabinet, closeness to the head of government), 
• strength in the sense of political commitment to development objec-
tives and of vigorous efforts to achieve progress towards coherence; 
“vigorous” in this context means demanding contributions to coher-
ence from other policies and not, for example, forgoing them in the 
hope that this will protect development policy against demands for 
coherence from other departments. 
If the political will needed for progress in enhancing coherence for devel-
opment is to be generated, the Federal Chancellor’s support must also be 
obtained when important issues with a tendency to be controversial arise. 
This requires both the right feel for situations in which such support seems 
promising and prudent political management which, for example, takes 
advantage of a favourable moment (such as a prominent international con-
                                                          
171  For further details see Chapter 8.7.1. 
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ference), wins allies in the cabinet and possibly at EU level and, not least, 
also makes it clear that the BMZ will actively support progress towards 
coherence. That this approach can be successful, but must be suited to the 
specific circumstances in each case, is evident from the two examples 
given above of the Federal Chancellor’s announcement of the AP 2015 at 
the UN Millennium Summit172 and his decision in favour of increasing 
Germany’s ODA/GNI ratio to 0.33 % by 2006 as agreed at EU level.173 
Another example is the appointment of the Parliamentary State Secretary 
in the BMZ as the Federal Chancellor’s Commissioner for Africa with the 
task of coordinating the German position for the G8 discussions on coop-
eration with Africa. 
The research community does not as a rule make any recommendations on 
details of the political management that is needed in practical situations to 
generate the necessary political will for progress towards coherence in a 
coalition government or the cabinet, let alone on the part of the Federal 
Chancellor. It is important, however, to emphasize the need for sufficient 
political will because, without it, efforts to enhance coherence at the other 
levels addressed in the following will have little success in the end. 
8.4 Increasing the political weight carried by development 
policy and improving policy coherence by means of a 
law on development policy? 
Like half the DAC members,174 Germany does not have a law on devel-
opment policy as such.175 It has repeatedly been urged to increase the po-
                                                          
172  According to the BMZ, Federal Minister Wieczorek-Zeul put the idea of a Federal Gov-
ernment Programme of Action for Poverty Reduction to the Federal Chancellor while 
they were on their way to the Millennium Summit in New York. 
173  An important factor in the Federal Chancellor’s agreement to increase the German 
ODA/GNI ratio despite the Federal Finance Minister’s reservations was that a general 
consensus on the subject had been reached at EU level. According to statements by in-
terviewees in the BMZ, however, such cases are the exception rather than the rule. 
174  Eleven of the 23 DAC members have a law of this kind (in brackets the year in which 
the current version was passed): Austria (2002), Belgium (1999), Denmark (1998), 
Greece (1999), Italy (1987), Luxembourg (1996), Portugal (2003), Spain (1998), Swit-
zerland (1976), United Kingdom (2002) and USA (1961). Although the EU does not 
have a specific law for its development cooperation, the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) 
and Amsterdam (1997) contain separate chapters on the EU’s development cooperation. 
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litical weight carried by development policy, which is rather weak domes-
tically, to expand its role as a cross-cutting task of all policies and thus to 
step up the call to enhance coherence for development by passing a sepa-
rate law on development policy.176 
The most practical proposal in this respect was a bill on the development 
policy of the Federal Republic of Germany tabled in the Bundestag by the 
SPD’s parliamentary party in 1994 and again in 1995, but rejected by the 
then coalition government of the CDU/CSU and FDP.177 It detailed the 
objectives of the development policy, demanded that the Federal Govern-
ment’s policy should not be inconsistent with those objectives178 and pro-
vided for all policies to undergo developmental impact assessment. 
Whether a specific law upgrades development policy in the political play 
of forces and facilitates the achievement of the goal of policy coherence 
for development very much depends on actual conditions. This was also 
                                                                                                                         
The other eleven DAC members do not have specific laws on development policy. The 
parliaments of some of these countries (e.g. Norway and Sweden) have debated and ap-
proved, i.e. endorsed, government documents on the basic principles of development 
policy, which do not, however, constitute laws. Almost all the DAC members, including 
those with specific laws, have government documents on the basic principles of devel-
opment policy. Source: DAC review reports of recent years. 
175  The legal basis for German development cooperation is formed by the annual budget 
laws and agreements governed by international law. 
176  The call for a law was voiced inter alia in the Memoranda on Development Policy 
submitted by groups of development experts before the 1994 and 1998 general elections 
(see Memorandum 1994, 1998), by the SPD’s parliamentary party, which tabled an ap-
propriate bill in the Bundestag in 1994 and 1995 (see SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 1995) 
and by the SPD Party Conference in Hanover in 1997 (see SPD-Parteitag Hannover 
1997). On the initiative of the SPD’s parliamentary party the Bundestag’s Committee on 
Economic Cooperation had held a hearing on its development policy bill in the spring of 
1994. 
177  See SPD-Bundestagsfraktion (1995). 
178  Section 21(1): “The policy of the Federal Government shall not be inconsistent with the 
objectives and standards enshrined in this Act.” The wording thus used to describe the 
goal of policy coherence for development is more concise than that used in paragraph 3 
of the preamble to the bill: “The Federal Republic of Germany shall (…) take account 
throughout its policy of the repercussions of its action for other countries and for the in-
ternational community.” The latter wording corresponds to the weaker wording of the 
requirement of coherence in the Treaty of Maastricht/Amsterdam (see Chapter 3.2). 
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noted by the DAC in a comparative analysis of its member countries’ de-
velopment policies (see Box 8). 
Development policy is strengthened by a law only if it does not otherwise 
have any long-term political protection and its fundamental objectives are 
in danger of being repeatedly altered or made subject to other objectives 
when governments change or coalitions are formed. A law, however, pre-
vents this only if it has the backing of a large parliamentary majority and, if 
possible, a cross-party consensus, because laws passed by a small majority 
can be quickly amended when parliamentary majorities change. 
A law may facilitate the assertion of demands for policy coherence for 
development if the cross-cutting nature of development policy and the 
responsibility shared by other policies for development in partner coun-
tries and at global level are not yet established politically elsewhere. This 
is, however, clearly the case in Germany, as pointed out in Chapter 3.1. 
Box 8: Advantages and disadvantages of specific laws on development pol-
icy: experience in the DAC member countries 
"Some DAC Members have legislation governing their development cooperation 
programme. Whether a basic law is necessary, the extent of its coverage and 
whether it would favour improved aid effectiveness is country specific and a 
matter for consideration and debate within each country. 
One value of having legislation is that parliamentarians must concentrate on 
development cooperation and provide a political stamp of approval for the pro-
gramme. Having a basic law provides a long-term foundation for development 
cooperation, which is beneficial, but it can also create rigidities which may be 
difficult to remove once they have been established by law. The legislative pro-
cess can become politicised and used to make development cooperation an arena 
for political contention. Thus, the flexibility of operating without a basic law, 
with development cooperation continually reviewed and approved by successive 
governments, may have some positive aspects. 
The existence of a basic law has the advantage of setting out a framework for 
funding and operations of the programme and demonstrates clearly the long-
term importance of development cooperation for a given country. But, obviously, 
some countries have achieved these goals through Cabinet decisions, White Pa-
pers and policy statements – which are not basic laws – and by relying on ap-
propriations legislation for the legal authority to implement their programmes." 
Source: OECD/DAC (1999, 26) 
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Although a law may even then reaffirm the goal of enhancing coherence 
for development and create an additional reference base, it cannot pre-
scribe implementation since that requires substantive reasoning and politi-
cal negotiation. A law certainly cannot declare development objectives to 
be overriding objectives to which all other policies are subordinated since, 
as mentioned in Chapters 2.4 and 2.5, other policies have competing 
claims at the level of overriding objectives. 
Conclusion: For achieving practical progress towards coherence a specific 
law on development policy would not bring a decisive additional benefit in 
the current situation in Germany and is not therefore a prerequisite.179 Ac-
tual implementation is more important. A law on development policy 
should not, moreover, make commitments which interfere with the Federal 
Chancellor’s or the Federal Government’s responsibility for defining the 
departmental remits180 or with the BMZ’s executive responsibility.181 
                                                          
179  Two points need to be made here: 
• This is not inconsistent with the statement in Chapter 3.2 that the Treaty of Maas-
tricht or Amsterdam represents an important reference base in that it enshrines in 
law the requirement of coherence for development. This is true because, as men-
tioned above, various policies are the responsibility of the EU, the processes of po-
litical negotiation at EU level are even more complicated than at national level and, 
in view of the changing composition of the EU Councils of Ministers due to changes 
of government in the Member States, enshrining the requirement of coherence in the 
EU Treaties gives a clear and continuing signal. 
• The new law on development policy in the United Kingdom referred to in Chapter 
6.2 is not necessarily a precedent for a law on development policy in Germany. In 
the United Kingdom regularly recurring government spending requires parliamen-
tary authorization in the form of a special law in addition to the budget law. See 
DFID (2002). The objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development laid 
down in the International Development Act had previously been programmatically 
justified in the two White Papers of 1997 and 2000 and politically endorsed by the 
government. It is interesting to note, however, that the law explicitly earmarks Brit-
ish ODA for “poverty reduction” and “sustainable development in one or more 
countries outside the United Kingdom”, which gives DFID an additional instrument 
against possible domestic pressure to use resources for something other than devel-
opment cooperation. 
180  Thus the 1998 Memorandum called for a number of responsibilities for development 
previously assigned to other ministries to be transferred to the BMZ and for the new di-
vision of tasks to be laid down in a framework law on development policy. See Memo-
randum (1998, point 2). The broad lines of the federal ministers’ portfolios are defined, 
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8.5 Increasing strategic competence and the capacity for 
active coherence work 
8.5.1 Further development of the development policy 
concept from the coherence viewpoint 
Progress towards coherence depends on a system of objectives as a frame 
of reference for the definition of coherence. As mentioned above and as 
acknowledged by the DAC,182 the German development policy has a con-
siderable conceptual framework for this purpose. 
Particular reference should be made to the understanding of development 
policy as part of global structural policy,183 the Federal Government’s Pro-
gramme of Action 2015 for Poverty Reduction184 and the Sustainability 
Strategy for Germany,185 and also to the amended Political Principles for 
Arms Exports186 and the revised Guidelines for the Granting of Export 
Guarantees.187 These are Federal Government concepts or prescriptions 
and, as such, important reference bases for demands for coherence. But 
mention should also be made of the BMZ’s many concepts, especially its 
sectoral, cross-sectoral, country and regional concepts. 
When these conceptual foundations are used for coherence work, however, 
three aspects should be borne in mind: 
                                                                                                                         
pursuant to section 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government, by the Federal 
Chancellor or, in the event of differences of opinion, by the Federal Government. 
181 Section 18(2) of the bill tabled by the SPD’s parliamentary party in 1995 provided: 
“Together with the budget lines for development cooperation in the federal budget, the 
Federal Government shall submit to the Bundestag each year for a decision a frame-
work plan with sectoral, regional and instrumental priorities and benchmark figures. 
Development cooperation decisions which greatly exceed those figures shall require the 
consent of the Bundestag.” SPD-Bundestagsfraktion (1995). 
182  See Box 7. 
183  Described in detail inter alia in the Eleventh Report on the Federal Government’s De-
velopment Policy, 2001. See BMZ (2001a). 
184  See BMZ (2001b). 
185  Chapter F, “Assuming global responsibility”; see Bundesregierung (2002, 202–216). 
186  See Deutscher Bundestag (2000). 
187  See Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG (2001). 
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• The conceptual framework is not static, but subject to changes, since 
there is a constant need for adjustment in the light of practical experi-
ence and the development debate in Germany and at international 
level,188 and this also changes the frame of reference for efforts to en-
hance coherence. Demands for coherence for development must be 
guided, as it were, by a moving system of objectives. Coherence work 
does not therefore begin with the monitoring of other policies in the 
light of a set frame of reference, but with the ongoing review of this 
frame of reference with a view to defining the substance of coher-
ence. A current example is the changing relationship and therefore 
the changing understanding of coherence between development pol-
icy and military actions.189 
• Although the Federal Government has acknowledged the goal of co-
herence for development on several occasions and explicitly included 
it in its concept, progress towards coherence depends not least on 
how this concept is fleshed out and where priorities are set through-
out its implementation. 
 – The Federal Government’s commitment to the MDGs requires a 
definition of the German contribution to their achievement.190 To 
elaborate an appropriate concept, a special unit for the Millen-
nium Development Goals has been set up in the BMZ. The MDG 
agenda concerns both development cooperation191 and other poli-
                                                          
188  The policy coordination of the donors in the DAC, the experience gained under the 
Poverty Reduction Strategies or the debate on the role of development policy in coun-
tries where conditions are difficult (failing states) should be considered in this context 
189  See Klingebiel / Roehder (2004). 
190  The Millennium Declaration (UN 2000) and the Road Map for its implementation (UN 
2001) do not indicate how most of the MDGs, and especially the main goal of reducing 
extreme poverty, are to be achieved, let alone set out any recommendations or obliga-
tions for individual developing and industrialized countries. Conversely, however, the 
latter cannot rely on the argument that they are already contributing to the achievement 
of the MDGs with their development cooperation and other policies: they are rather call-
ed upon to specify their contribution, because otherwise the coordination within the do-
nor community and with partner countries that is vital for the MDG project will be im-
possible. 
191  This concerns a number of issues, e.g. priorities for certain MDGs, conceptual ap-
proaches for the German contributions to individual MDGs, the sector- and/or country-
specific allocation of resources and cooperation with other donors. 
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cies192 and thus the coherence agenda, too. Depending on the pri-
orities specified by the Federal Government, conclusions will 
have to be drawn as to the coherent contributions to be made by 
other policies.193 
 – The AP 2015 defines ten areas of action, specifying a total of 75 
actions, which concern both development cooperation and other 
policies. A number of measures have already been taken, and 
some progress has also been made in enhancing coherence (e.g. in 
the trade and agricultural policies).194 The definition of the areas 
of action and planned actions in the course of the further imple-
mentation of the AP 2015 reveals grounds for demands for coher-
ence to be addressed to other policies in the dual sense of over-
coming incoherences and contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives set out in the AP 2015. The more concrete the terms in 
which the objectives pursued and the actions planned to this end 
are expressed, the more concrete the terms in which the contribu-
tions of other policies to coherence can be defined.195 
                                                          
192  Contributions from other policies, yet to be defined, will be required in particular to 
achieve the targets under MDG 8, “Develop a global partnership for development”. 
193  For example, research and health policy and patent protection rules in the case of MDG 
6, “Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases”, environment policy in the case of 
MDG 7 and technology policy in the case of MDG 8, target 18 of which concerns mod-
ern information and communication technologies. 
194  See the BMZ’s first interim report of June 2002 on the state of the implementation of 
the Programme of Action (BMZ 2002) and the second interim report presented on 10 
March 2004 (BMZ 2004). Although the BMZ’s first interim report was criticized by 
NGOs for being entirely action-oriented (list of measures) rather than outcome-oriented, 
the progress towards coherence made in the sphere of agricultural policy was explicitly 
acknowledged. See GKKE (2003b), 4. 
195  How far operationalization can go is evident from DFID’s Public Service Agreement 
(PSA) 2003-2006 on the British contribution to the achievement of the MDGs, which 
includes, as mentioned above, several joint targets of different government departments 
(see Chapters 6.2.2 and 6.2.5). Operationalizing the AP 2015 or the German contribu-
tion to the achievement of the MDGs through the setting of goals (e.g. reduction of ab-
solute poverty or of child mortality in a country or region) and of goal achievement in-
dicators and time horizons would have the advantage of enabling the intended outcome 
of the German contribution to be defined more clearly and for progress towards goal  
achievement to be measured. The problem is, however, that goal achievement does not 
depend solely or even primarily on the German contribution. This distinguishes the AP 
2015 from, say, the Sustainability Strategy for Germany (see Bundesregierung 2002), 
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• Conversely, coherence aspects should be included in existing con-
cepts that currently make no reference to them. 
 – This is true of the BMZ’s many sectoral and cross-sectoral con-
cepts that barely mention the demands for coherence for devel-
opment addressed to other policies even though they form an ex-
cellent framework for them. Based on pooled experience and 
knowledge of development cooperation, the concepts set out 
guidelines for development cooperation measures in sectors or ar-
eas on which other policies often have a far greater influence than 
development cooperation. However, the concepts do not make use 
of the knowledge condensed in them to reflect the influence of 
other policies from a development viewpoint and to provide indi-
cations for shaping them more coherently, i.e. in a more develop-
ment-friendly fashion.196 As the concepts, most of which date 
back to the 1980s and 1990s, have in any case to be adjusted from 
time to time, coherence aspects should be explicitly addressed 
when the concepts are updated. 
 – The BMZ’s country concepts, one of the main management in-
struments,197 similarly lack a section on coherence issues, despite 
their virulence in many partner countries. Where this is the case, 
the country concepts should not only refer to the coherence prob-
lems but also consider the conclusions to be drawn from them for 
                                                                                                                         
which includes 21 measurable objectives, the achievement of which lies entirely within 
Germany’s sphere of influence. As DFID can already look back on two PSAs 
(1999/2000-2001/2002 and 2001/2002-2003/2004), the BMZ should have in-depth dis-
cussions on experience in this regard with DFID. 
196  This concerns, for example, the sectoral concepts: “tropical forests” (which nonetheless 
refers to the important role of the trade and environment policies), “food aid and food 
security programmes” (agricultural policy), “fisheries and aquaculture” (fisheries pol-
icy), “refugee problems” (asylum policy), “vocational training” and “development co-
operation in the university sector” (Green Card initiative, immigration policy) and 
“combating narcotics” (drugs policy). 
197  “The country concept is a management instrument and the basis for the country-related 
achievement of the BMZ’s development objectives. It forms the basis for medium-term 
cooperation with the developing country concerned, for coordination with the other do-
nors and for the policy dialogue with the partner government, and it is meant to im-
prove the transparency of the BMZ’s country-related development decisions.” (underlin-
ing as in the original text) BMZ (1994). 
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the dialogue with the partners, for the shaping of development co-
operation and for donor coordination.198 The prescriptions for the 
elaboration of the BMZ’s country concepts should provide for the 
inclusion of a section on coherence, in which the coherence issue 
is outlined and the BMZ’s position in discussions both with other 
departments and with partner countries is briefly described. The 
EU is further advanced than the BMZ in this respect, the common 
framework for its country strategy papers containing a separate 
item entitled “Coherence”.199 
8.5.2 Definition of a priority coherence agenda 
Some coherence problems can be solved during the ongoing work between 
the BMZ and other departments. But where they are substantively more 
complex and/or politically more difficult to solve, greater efforts will be 
needed. 
As coherence issues do not all arise at the same time, since the dimensions 
of the problems and the time horizons for dealing with them differ, and as 
                                                          
198  Possible implications for the dialogue with the partners: support for efforts to change 
industrialized countries’ incoherent policies (e.g. subsidization of the export of agricul-
tural products; cf. the Netherlands’ “cotton diplomacy” to the benefit of West Africa or 
Federal Minister Wieczorek-Zeul’s latest discussions in Benin on the effects of the 
USA’s, Spain’s and Greece’s cotton subsidies) or the suggestion of countermeasures 
(e.g. higher tariffs on imports of subsidized agricultural products from industrialized 
countries). 
 Possible implications for development cooperation: If incoherences cannot be overcome 
in the short to medium term, development cooperation measures should be planned in 
such a way that their impact is not nullified by incoherent policies. 
 Possible implications for the donor dialogue: raising awareness of joint demands for 
changes to incoherent policies. 
199  The common framework includes a section on coherence in Chapter 5, which states 
inter alia that the principle of coherence with other measures and activities of the EU 
must be upheld and that that section must, if appropriate, consider the links between de-
velopment aid on the one hand and other Community activities – in such areas as fisher-
ies, agriculture, trade, conflict prevention, food security and migration – on the other. 
Europäische Kommission (2000). According to a progress report on the implementation 
of the 2000 common framework, however, the country strategy papers compiled in ac-
cordance with that principle did not contain any sound coherence analyses. See Europä-
ische Kommission (2002, 14, 20). 
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it is unlikely to be possible in either capacity or political terms to over-
come them all at once, the BMZ should draw up a priority coherence 
agenda and define the goal (outcome sought), the result (output) and the 
intended approach for each coherence item on the agenda. Box 9 presents 
a number of general, i.e. non-item-specific criteria or test questions as ex-
amples, which are not necessarily exhaustive. 
 
Box 9: Criteria for defining a priority coherence agenda 
1 Screening of current coherence issues 
• unresolved coherence issues arising from past and any future discussions on 
coherence between the BMZ and other departments (plus current checks with 
the units responsible for principles, institutions and sectors whether other co-
herence issues need to be discussed) 
• coherence issues arising from the continued implementation of the AP 2015, 
i.e. from the setting of priorities within areas of action and the spelling out of 
individual actions announced in the AP 2015 
• coherence issues arising from the concept for the German contribution to the 
achievement of the MDGs 
• coherence issues that become topical because of international negotiations or 
conferences or are introduced into the debate by NGOs on a grand scale 
2 Criteria for the prioritization of issues 
• relevance of issues to development policy  
• coherence issues for which there are objectively and politically prospects of 
change  
• coherence issues for which alliances can be formed and campaigns possibly 
conducted 
• temporal prioritization based on the chances of implementation (possibility 
of resolution in the short, medium or long term) and the development agenda 
(e.g. calendar of international negotiations) 
3 Definition of goal (outcome sought) and result (output) of efforts to  
enhance coherence 
• Precisely what substantive outcome is to be achieved? (what change to other, 
incoherent policies? what positive contribution to be made by other policies 
to the achievement of a given objective in the context of, say, the AP 2015 or 
the MDGs?) 
• What output is planned for the achievement of the goal? (e.g. “coherence 
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dossiers” as in the Netherlands; workshops, events good for publicity and/or 
appearances by the BMZ’s minister and her deputies to discuss coherence 
problems; joint position of the departments for impending negotiations at EU 
or international level; joint position to be adopted by the BMZ and the de-
partments responsible for development cooperation in other countries at in-
ternational negotiations) 
• What can the BMZ offer another department by way of analysis or sound 
arguments in order to make a positive contribution or to achieve a more co-
herent position? 
4 Specification of the approach 
• What expertise is needed? (clarification of any need for analysis) 
• Where is the required expertise to be obtained? (see Chapter 8.5.5) 
• How is the required expertise to be obtained? (see Chapter 8.5.5) 
• How are the results of the analyses and the information obtained to be used? 
(for what activities and what output?; see point 2) 
• How and at what level is the coherence issue to be addressed and handled in 
the various departments? (departmental meetings at desk-officer or higher 
level; handling by an interdepartmental working group or task force formed 
especially for the purpose) 
• What political support can be mobilized and how? (other departments; par-
liament; NGOs; international alliances) 
• What are the time horizons for each step? 
8.5.3 Monitoring other policies 
The screening of current coherence issues, as outlined in Box 9, gives the 
BMZ an extensive overview of the foreseeable coherence agenda, which it 
largely determines by prioritizing the issues to be considered and specify-
ing the approach to be adopted. 
It is not necessarily probable, but cannot be ruled out from the outset, that, 
regardless of this, completely new coherence issues will appear on the 
coherence agenda.200 Consequently, the goal of policy coherence for de-
                                                          
200  One example is the Federal Chancellor’s Green Card initiative, which did not spend 
long at the interdepartmental stage and has raised questions from a coherence view-
point. 
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velopment also requires the ongoing monitoring of other policies so that 
any incoherences may be identified early and, if necessary, included in the 
coherence agenda. 
In principle, the need for such monitoring is undeniable if the goal of pol-
icy coherence is taken seriously. Questions arise, however, as to how it is 
to be carried out. During the development debate there have been repeated 
calls for the introduction of the developmental impact assessment (DIA) of 
other policies,201 although statements have differed on precisely what is to 
be the subject and yardstick of DIA202 and who is to carry it out.203 No in-
dications of how DIA is to be undertaken are to be found. At best, parallels 
are drawn with statutory environmental impact assessments (EIAs)204 or 
with the practice of scrutinizing all measures adopted in the cabinet for 
their impact on the budget”.205 
However, these parallels arouse false expectations for several reasons:206 
• EIAs are essentially project-related procedures that concern, in par-
ticular, investment projects. The assessment of the ecological, social 
                                                          
201  See inter alia Memorandum (1994, points 2.1 and 3.2) and (1998, 7); SPD-
Bundestagsfraktion (1995, section 21); Schuster (1995, 25); SPD-Parteitag Hannover 
(1997, 35); Bundesfachausschuss Entwicklungspolitik der CDU (1997, point 9.c); Boh-
net (1998, 105). 
202  For example, the following are to be examined: “Measures of other departments for 
compliance with the development objectives to be set out in a law [on development pol-
icy]” (Memorandum 1994, point 2.1); “all projects [of the Federal Government] in the 
areas of financial, monetary, economic, agricultural, trade, environment and technol-
ogy policy for their economic, social and ecological effects on the developing countries” 
(SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 1995, section 21(2)); “To achieve coherence, the most impor-
tant development-related measures adopted by the cabinet to secure the global future 
should undergo a developmental impact assessment (…)” Bohnet (1998, 105). 
203  For example, the Federal Government (SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 1995, section 21(2)); 
“interdepartmental coordinating committee (chaired by the Federal Minister for Sus-
tainable Development – BMNE)” (SPD-Parteitag Hannover 1997, 35); “preparatory co-
ordinating body of the appropriate line ministers in the federal cabinet under the over-
all responsibility of the BMZ” (Bundesfachausschuss Entwicklungspolitik der CDU 
(1997, point 9 c)); in some cases the question as to who is to carry out the DIA is also 
left open. 
204  See Memorandum (1994, point 3.2). 
205  See Bohnet (1998, 105). 
206  For further details see Kürzinger (1996, 8–13). 
 Guido Ashoff 
 German Development Institute 102
and developmental impacts of applications for the granting of Hermes 
guarantees similarly concerns specifically definable projects (in this 
case, export transactions).207 The DIAs that have been called for, 
however, would concern other departments’ or public institutions’ 
policies or measures, which are not so clearly definable as equity proj-
ects, but have impacts over a far wider range that often defies accu-
rate definition. 
• For EIAs there are clear (if, in themselves, very complicated) lists of 
criteria. Despite all the difficulties associated with accurate forecast-
ing, even impacts on budgets can be determined with respect to a sin-
gle, measurable criterion (which happens to be probable costs). Simi-
larly unambiguous and operationalized lists of criteria are not, how-
ever, available for “developmental impact”, although the MDGs and 
the AP 2015, for example, do provide more definite indications, and 
this for three basic reasons: because of the multidimensionality of de-
velopment, because of the varied nature of ways to achieve develop-
ment objectives (e.g. reduction of absolute poverty) and because of 
the previously mentioned complexity of development processes, 
which makes precise statements on links between causes and effects 
difficult. 
• The introduction of EIAs in development cooperation has led to the 
creation of major administrative structures and operations for all bi- 
and multilateral donors. As a formalized procedure analogous to 
EIAs, DIAs would mean a hardly acceptable expense, since they 
would have to be applied to a very large number of very different 
policies and measures, whose impacts on developing countries and on 
global development can be determined, if at all, only with multidi-
mensional systems of criteria (in view of the multiple objectives of 
development) and with considerable analytical capacities. 
The coherence-related monitoring of other policies is therefore hardly 
conceivable as a formalized DIA procedure. A pragmatic, problem-orien-
ted procedure, the stages of which are described in Box 10, would seem 
more realistic. 
Box 10 begins by structuring only what, to some extent, is already being 
done in practice. It is important, however, to ensure information process-
                                                          
207  Where there are indications of problematical impacts, provision is made for a multi-
stage assessment procedure, which may be very extensive in certain cases. See Hermes 
Kreditvericherungs-AG (2001). 
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ing that is as efficient as possible, i.e. takes account of the workload of the 
substantively responsible units, and also effective, i.e. reveals relevant 
incoherences. For this three stages of information processing are proposed 
in Box 10. 
 
Box 10: Monitoring of other policies from the viewpoint of coherence  
for development 
• Object of the monitoring: Measures of the Federal Government and of the 
EU and international organizations in whose decision-making or supervisory 
bodies the Federal Government is represented (this includes not only EU 
policies, such as the common agricultural and fisheries policies, but also, for 
example, investment projects of the World Bank* and the IMF’s policy in the 
area of indebtedness). 
• Monitoring yardstick: Development objectives of the Federal Government or 
of the EU and international organizations in whose decision-making or su-
pervisory bodies the Federal Government is represented; these objectives are 
not, however, an operationalized list of criteria, but require an analysis and 
assessment of each specific case. 
• Who monitors and assesses? Mainly, but not only, the BMZ, where neces-
sary with the help of outside expertise (see below); the goal of coherence for 
development applies in principle to all departments, which should therefore 
take such development viewpoints as those set out in the AP 2015 into 
account in their decisions; however, this is, in fact, to assign the BMZ an 
awareness-raising function. 
• Federal Government as a source of information: Because of the cabinet prin-
ciple and pursuant to sections 15 and 16 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Federal Government (GO BReg)** and the Joint Rules of Procedure of the 
Federal Ministries (GGO),*** the BMZ is entitled to be informed of all mat-
ters which are considered and decided by the Federal Government and may 
concern the BMZ; to this extent there is no need for new legislation. The 
GGO as amended in 2001 signifies a procedural improvement in degree, but 
not in principle (see footnote 157). 
• Other sources of information: It is not only its own observations and the 
information provided by other departments which are available to the BMZ. 
Information on the effects of other policies may also come from third parties, 
such as implementing organizations in development cooperation, other do-
nors, NGOs, academic institutes and the media. 
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8.5.4 Prerequisites for effective coherence work in the BMZ 
On the one hand, conditions in the BMZ favour effective coherence work 
(key words: development policy conception, the BMZ’s own long experi-
• 1st stage of information processing: Forwarding of incoming information on 
effects of other policies to the substantively responsible divisions if it is not 
already available to them; if substantive responsibility cannot be clearly es-
tablished, the information is forwarded to the proposed policy coherence unit 
(see Chapter 8.5.6); information is not always sent directly to the responsible 
divisions but, because of the different sources, to the cabinet office, the divi-
sions responsible for basic principles, institutions, sectors and/or regions or to 
the minister and her deputies, for example. 
• 2nd stage of information processing: Cursory assessment of the information 
by the substantively responsible division for any incoherence; if any suspi-
cion of incoherence is then corroborated, discussion and specification of fur-
ther action in the division or directorate; if there is a need for further assess-
ment: involvement of the policy coherence unit to organize the necessary 
steps. 
• 3rd stage of information processing: If substantive responsibilities are not 
clear or there is a need for further assessment, the policy coherence unit 
should take over the matter and clarify the following points: what further in-
formation is needed for the assessment? Where is the information to be ob-
tained? Who should be instructed, if necessary, to analyse the suspected in- 
coherence (outside expert, working parties in the BMZ or between the BMZ 
and other departments, etc.)? When such analyses become available, discus-
sion of further action together with the substantively responsible division. 
* If provision has not already been made for project-related assessments. 
** Section 15(1): “All matters of general, domestic and foreign, economic, 
social, financial or cultural significance and in particular (a) all draft leg-
islation, (b) all drafts of Federal Government regulations (…), ( f) differ-
ences of opinion between Federal Ministers (...) shall be submitted to the 
Federal Government for discussion and decision”; section 16(1): “All mat-
ters submitted to the Federal Government shall be previously considered by 
the Federal Ministries concerned unless the urgency of a decision in a spe-
cific case necessitates an exception.” 
*** Section 19(1): “In matters affecting the remits of more than one Federal 
Ministry, those Ministries will work together to ensure that the Federal 
Government speaks and acts consistently. Prompt and comprehensive in-
volvement is the responsibility of the lead Federal Ministry. In simple 
cases, verbal involvement is sufficient, but must be recorded in the files.” 
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ence, experience and expertise of the numerous implementing institutions, 
networking with other donors and international organizations, instruments 
for the procurement of expertise such as “sectoral projects” [Sektorvorha-
ben], Central Evaluation Programme and Research Programme). On the 
other hand, coherence concerns complex issues, the analysis and assess-
ment of which make coherence work an ambitious task if any political 
decisions that may be necessary are to be taken. Coping with this task calls 
for: 
• professional competence of the responsible divisions to (i) identify 
coherence problems, (ii) conduct coherence-related dialogue with 
other departments and (iii) assess analyses of coherence issues under-
taken or obtained from elsewhere (e.g. from NGOs), 
• time for these tasks alongside “day-to-day business”, 
• staff continuity in the units so that the necessary competence and ex-
perience may be accumulated and also used, 
• sufficient staff capacity for the sound processing of coherence issues 
in the BMZ, where necessary by working parties of the BMZ and 
other departments, but also in the Permanent Mission of Germany to 
the EU, for example;208 this capacity can be mobilized in various 
ways (e.g. relieving units of other tasks, reinforcing them with tempo-
rary specialists, using or forming thematic groups), 
• coherence management to set and process the priority coherence 
agenda (Box 9) and to provide for the ongoing monitoring of other 
policies (Box 10). 
8.5.5 Mobilization of necessary expertise 
Coherence work calls for sound information on and analyses of the effects 
of other policies on development in the partner countries and on global 
                                                          
208  As a rule, the BMZ seconds one senior official to the Permanent Mission of Germany to 
the EU in Brussels; when Germany holds the EU Council presidency, he or she is as-
sisted by a second official. It should be considered whether one official is enough to  
cope adequately with work on three fronts: Commission work (especially attendance of 
the meetings of the various development committees at EU level), parliamentary work 
(contacts with the European Parliament and its committees) and coherence work (other 
EU Councils of Ministers). 
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development or the contributions of other policies to the achievement of 
certain development objectives. As such information and analyses are not 
always available in the BMZ, a conscious effort must be made to obtain 
them. The question in this context is both where and how they are ob-
tained: 
• Where: implementing organizations; GDI; the BMZ’s Scientific Ad-
visory Council; other departments’ scientific advisory councils;209 
other academic institutes at home and abroad; NGOs; other donors, 
some of whom have significant analyses.210 
• How: screening of available information and coherence analyses, 
including those already carried out by other donors; briefing of the 
BMZ by experts; working meetings with experts; workshops or con-
ferences to be attended by representatives of other departments, par-
liament, NGOs and academic institutes; tasks to be performed as part 
of the BMZ’s Research Programme, the BMZ’s Central Evaluation 
Programme or sectoral projects. 
An example of an analysis of suspected incoherence commissioned by the 
BMZ is a GDI study of the effects of EU export refunds on the beef sec-
tors of West African countries.211 The incoherence had initially been indi-
cated by the evaluation of an Ivorian-German development project. When 
development NGOs took up the subject, the BMZ decided to commission 
an analysis and, by involving the Agriculture Ministry, succeeded in hav-
ing the latter explicitly welcome the study.212 
                                                          
209  “Demanding payment of the ‘debt’ [of other departments as regards greater coherence] 
could be moved up the agenda by the discussion of coherence problems in the existing 
scientific advisory councils of the ministries concerned. Above all, it might be appropri-
ate to bring together the advisory councils of the lead departments (…) for a thematical-
ly limited, well prepared, structured and results-oriented discussion of certain issues 
(…). The BMZ’s Scientific Advisory Council might have a role to play here by taking the 
initiative.” Kürzinger (1996, 16). 
210  See the comments on the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden in Chapters 6.2 
to 6.4. 
211  See Brandt (1995). 
212  A letter from the Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forestry of 11 January 
1994 contains the following statement: “It is in the Federal Government’s particular 
political interest to have the complex effects of these imports on the African agricultural 
and development policies, on the African consumer and food security policies and on 
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The BMZ can also use the instrument of evaluation to examine aspects of 
coherence. The 2001 DAC peer review report on German development 
cooperation thus made the plausible recommendation that an evaluation be 
carried out to determine how far ecological, social and development as-
pects had been taken into account in the allocation of government export 
credit insurance, as had been decided in 2001 (see Box 7). Although the 
BMZ cannot decide to do this on its own, since overall responsibility rests 
with the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Employment, the rul-
ing parties did agree in the 2002 coalition agreement that decisions on ex-
port guarantees should be transparent.213 
8.5.6 Establishing a policy coherence unit for the systematic 
preparation, support and appraisal of coherence work 
The BMZ in fact already has various coherence commissioners and divi-
sions concerned with coherence issues (leaving aside the sectoral and insti-
tutional divisions substantively responsible for individual coherence is-
sues). Besides the heads of Directorates-General 2 and 3 and the official 
responsible for coherence in Division 03 (parliamentary and cabinet af-
fairs), they are Divisions 04 (principles, conception and political planning 
of development policy) and 300 (AP 2015, cross-divisional questions of 
principle). 
This capacity should be enough for an assessment of and a decision on 
coherence issues (possibly on the basis of a prior detailed analysis). It will 
not necessarily be enough, on the other hand, for efficient and effective 
management of coherence work. Management in this context means: 
• organizing the processing of information (see Box 10), 
• clarifying the objective and outcome of and approach to coherence 
work (see Box 9, points 3 and 4) together with the substantively re-
sponsible divisions, 
                                                                                                                         
German and European agriculture investigated by an objective and independent aca-
demic third party.” Quoted from Brandt (1995, IX). 
213  “In the promotion of foreign trade we will make decisions on guarantees transparent. 
World Bank standards will be maintained in decisions on guarantees, and violations of 
human rights will be investigated.” Koalitionsvertrag (2002, Chapter IX, 9). 
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• initiating, supporting organizationally and sustaining the coherence 
work thus defined, 
• organizing purposeful approaches to other departments, parliamen-
tarians, NGOs, the media and multipliers on coherence issues, 
• drawing up a detailed chapter on coherence for the periodic reports 
on the Federal Government’s development policy and for the interim 
reports on the implementation of the AP 2015 to inform the Federal 
Government, parliament and the public. 
It is proposed that a policy coherence unit consisting initially, for a trial 
period, of two persons should be set up to perform these tasks. It would 
not be responsible for substantive assessments but for the management 
tasks outlined above. It would act as a service unit for the substantively 
responsible divisions of the BMZ. It should also foster close exchanges 
with (i) comparable policy coherence units of other donors (e.g. the one in 
the Dutch Foreign Ministry214 and the EU Commission’s coherence advis-
ers), (ii) the OECD Secretariat’s coherence adviser215 and (iii) research 
institutes with a profound interest in coherence issues.216 
8.6 Arranging policy coordination and interdepartmental 
agreement 
8.6.1 Process- versus structure-oriented approaches to the 
improvement of policy coherence 
The establishment of a government policy that is as coherent as possible is 
very largely a task for policy coordination and interdepartmental agree-
ment. During the development debate it has repeatedly been proposed that 
coherence should be improved by means of new structures, i.e. through the 
creation of additional formalized coordinating fora and mechanisms. The 
                                                          
214  See the description of tasks in Box 5 and the proposals for a similar task force in Swe-
den in Chapter 6.4. 
215  Currently, Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval, Special Adviser on Policy Coherence for Devel-
opment, OECD Secretariat. 
216  For example, the OECD’s Development Centre, the Global Development Network, the 
Center for Global Development, Washington D.C. and the Expert Group on Develop-
ment Issues (EGDI), Stockholm. 
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most prominent proposal along these lines called for the formation of a 
development cabinet chaired by the Federal Chancellor,217 supplemented 
in some instances by an upstream coordinating body “for global develop-
ment tasks” chaired by the BMZ.218 
In contrast, the view here is that there is no lack of opportunities for inter-
departmental agreement and that it is a question of using them as effi-
ciently and effectively as possible for coherence, i.e. optimizing the pro-
cess of policy coordination and interdepartmental agreement. Only if 
structural obstacles are then encountered should thought turn to structural 
solutions. 
8.6.2 On the question of a development cabinet or a special 
state secretaries’ committee for global development 
tasks 
The expectation associated with a development cabinet is that it will im-
prove policy coherence for development by declaring global structural 
policy to be the Federal Chancellor’s responsibility. The proposal for a 
development cabinet is obviously prompted by the existence of other cabi-
net committees, while the idea of an upstream coordinating body “for 
global development” presumably follows the example of a number of state 
secretaries’ committees set up to consider specific issues. 
There are currently five cabinet committees.219 They are chaired by the 
Federal Chancellor, with the Vice-Chancellor acting as vice-chairman, and 
the lead minister becomes acting chairman only when the Chancellor and 
Vice-Chancellor are unable to attend. The proceedings are determined by 
                                                          
217  See inter alia Memorandum (1994) and (2002); Forum Eine Welt der SPD (1997, 7); 
Schleich (1998, 146); Köhler (2002, 181). 
218  See Forum Eine Welt der SPD (1997, 7); Bundesfachausschuss der CDU (1997, point 9 
c). 
219  Reorganized by cabinet decision of 22 October 2002: Federal Security Council, Cabinet 
Committee for the New Länder, Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs, Cabinet 
Committee for New Technologies and Cabinet Committee for the Environment and 
Health; see Busse (2003, 412). In practice, only the Federal Security Council is impor-
tant. It also meets fairly regularly, while the others are convened only rarely. 
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the Federal Chancellor’s Office.220 The cabinet committees must be distin-
guished from the state secretaries’ committees for specific issues (cur-
rently five in number), including the State Secretaries’ Committee for 
European Affairs (chaired by the Foreign Office) and the State Secretaries’ 
Committee for Sustainable Development (occasionally known as the 
“green cabinet”).221 
Whether a development cabinet or a special state secretaries’ committee 
would increase the chances of an improvement in policy coherence for 
development seems questionable for several reasons: 
• As a general rule, the decisive place for policy coordination is the 
cabinet, preceded by ongoing interdepartmental agreement at all lev-
els in accordance with the GO BReg and the GGO. Cabinet commit-
tees and state secretaries’ committees do not have the legal power to 
take decisions.222 As coherence issues often stem from divergent in-
terests and are therefore questions of power, a decision on them must 
ultimately be taken in the cabinet. 
• As demands for coherence for development may affect policies of 
virtually all government departments, a development cabinet or a 
special state secretaries’ committee would have to embrace either 
numerous departments or every other department concerned in a 
given case. As this already happens in the existing interdepartmental 
agreement processes, there would be a danger of added bureaucracy 
due to the creation of further committees.223 
                                                          
220  Laid down in section 1 of the Framework Rules of Procedure of the Federal Govern-
ment’s Cabinet Committees; see Busse (2001, 169). 
221  The other three are the State Secretaries’ Committees for Questions Relating to Secret 
Intelligence and Security, the New Länder and the Modern State – Modern Administra-
tion. See Busse (2001, 91f.). 
222  See Maunz / Dürig (1983, Article 64), paragraph 42, and Busse (2001, 90). “Cabinet 
committees are (…) not, under the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government or 
even in the practice of government, a necessary or merely a frequently used preliminary 
to decision-making in the cabinet as a whole.” Busse (1993, 417). 
223  “On the other hand, the importance of the cabinet committees must not be overrated. As 
a result of their (…) rules they are not, as coordinating instruments, as flexible as min-
isterial meetings convened on an ad hoc basis, where the preparation, participants and 
course of events need not be subject to set rules, but can be arranged to suit the occa-
sion.” Busse (1993, 417). 
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• Although a development cabinet would make development policy or 
global structural policy the Chancellor’s responsibility, this would not 
necessarily improve coherence for development since the debate in 
that committee would be essentially controlled by the Federal Chan-
cellor or the Chancellor’s Office. In the political process it may be 
more propitious to gain the Federal Chancellor’s support for a given 
aspect of development by political skill.224 
• What was special about the “green cabinet” sometimes cited as an 
example was that the state secretaries’ committee was set up to estab-
lish the Sustainability Strategy for Germany. The cabinet decision on 
the AP 2015, which is important for efforts to enhance policy coher-
ence for development, was, however, taken some years ago. 
• Besides the State Secretaries’ Committees for European Affairs and 
Sustainable Development, which also consider development issues, 
there are already regular meetings of the permanent state secretaries 
to prepare cabinet meetings and of the parliamentary state secretaries 
(both chaired by the Federal Chancellor’s Office). 
8.6.3 Optimizing the process of policy coordination and 
interdepartmental agreement 
Successful coherence work does not, in principle, require additional for-
malized institutional structures, but it does call for some optimization of 
the process through the active and flexible use of the existing opportunities 
for policy coordination and interdepartmental agreement. Important ele-
ments of process optimization are: 
• continuation of the BMZ’s talks with other departments on policy 
coherence, 
• definition by the BMZ of a priority agenda for coherence for devel-
opment, 
• ongoing monitoring of other policies from the viewpoint of coherence 
for development, 
                                                          
224  Examples of where this has succeeded are the AP 2015 and the increase in the German 
ODA/GNI ratio to 0.33 % by 2006, both announced by the Federal Chancellor. 
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• discussion with the departments concerned of coherence problems 
identified in the previous three steps with the aim of finding a solu-
tion which is as coherent with development policy as possible, 
• promotion of a culture of cooperation rather than insistence on strictly 
defined areas of competence (this concerns all departments), 
• use by the BMZ of the monitoring function of the Federal Chancel-
lor’s Office. 
The second and third steps (definition of the priority coherence agenda and 
ongoing monitoring of other policies) have already been explained. The 
other elements are briefly discussed below. 
8.6.4 Function of the coherence talks 
The coherence talks, as they have so far been conducted and may be con-
tinued, can achieve the following: 
• identification of current coherence issues as seen by the BMZ and the 
other departments concerned, 
• initial consideration of the coherence issues (with regard to both pro-
gress made and problems yet to be solved), 
• raising the other departments’ awareness of the BMZ’s interest in 
coherence and the BMZ’s awareness of the other side’s views, 
• agreement on action to be taken with respect to issues easily resolved, 
• recording of more complex coherence issues and problems for the 
future coherence agenda. 
The coherence talks thus have an exploratory, pre-clarification and initial 
awareness-raising function and are important in this respect, but where the 
issues are more complex or controversial, they cannot replace sound pro-
cessing that is geared to political decision-making and so more binding in 
dealings between the BMZ and other departments and ultimately in the 
cabinet. 
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8.6.5 Interdepartmental handling of coherence problems 
This concerns all levels, from desk-officer to minister and deputy minister 
level. According to those interviewed, the BMZ can make a major contri-
bution to progress towards coherence if it (i) acts competently,225 (ii) offers 
other government departments expertise and sound arguments, (iii) not 
only backs up but also actively emphasizes its concerns, (iv) has the sup-
port of the BMZ’s minister and her deputies in this, i.e. raises coherence 
issues at political level with commitment, and (v) where possible and nec-
essary, mobilizes political support. This assessment is confirmed by the 
experience of proactive coherence work in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. 
It is important to foster working contacts and networking. For the analysis 
of more complex coherence issues and, where appropriate, the establish-
ment of an agreed position for negotiations at EU or international level, it 
may be wise to form specific subject-related interdepartmental task forces, 
as has already happened on some occasions226 and has also been a com-
mon practice in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
8.6.6 Promotion of a culture of cooperation rather than 
insistence on strictly defined areas of competence 
Departmental areas of competence are essential if there are to be delimita-
tion of and respect for the political responsibility for the various areas of 
government action in the cabinet and outwardly and the responsibility for 
implementing the decisions taken. Formal responsibilities should not 
therefore be blurred (departmental principle). 
On the other hand, each department is part of the Federal Government and 
therefore committed to interaction with a view to pursuing a common, in 
principle coherent government policy (cabinet principle). This is particu-
                                                          
225  “Experience also shows (e.g. the technology debate in the context of the UNCED pro-
cess) that technically competent inputs and constant presence can, even in the absence 
of formal responsibility, bring about something of a shift of emphasis towards develop-
ment policy viewpoints and de facto (shared) responsibility.”  Kürzinger (1996), 15. 
226  Examples are the interdepartmental Task Force on Global Public Goods formed on the 
BMZ’s initiative and the Interdepartmental Group on Civil Crisis Prevention. 
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larly true of global structural policy, of which development policy is seen 
as forming part since it is very largely cross-cutting in nature and requires 
contributions from many other policies. 
This being the case, the improvement of coherence for development re-
quires, below the threshold of ultimate political negotiation and decision-
making as a question of power, a form of cooperation among government 
departments that takes seriously the goal of coherence for development 
recognized by the Federal Government as a joint commitment and is 
geared to joint problem-solving. What is important in this context is a cul-
ture of interdepartmental cooperation which recognizes that “only the 
common orientation of different policies and constructive interaction will 
lead on to the objective.”227 The form which a culture of cooperation of 
this kind may take in practice is evident from the cooperation between the 
BMZ and the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) (see Box 11). 
As emphasized by the OECD’s general recommendations for coherence,228 
a culture of cooperation of this nature can be promoted in different ways, 
examples being: 
• exchanges of staff between departments (this is already happening to 
some extent), 
• staff development planning geared to such exchanges, 
• describing the tasks of the various divisions and staffing them in such 
a way that there is time for close coherence-related cooperation (ex-
tending as far as special task forces) with other departments and staff 
exchanges are facilitated. 
As the BMZ as a whole is hardly likely to have any more staff available, 
ways of relieving the units of other tasks and involving implementing in-
stitutions in coherence work should be sought. The service function of the 
proposed policy coherence unit is also important. 
                                                          
227  Köhler (2002, 181). 
228  See the key words referred to in Box 3: “consultation-oriented culture”, “cooperative 
networking”, “interdisciplinary meetings” and “shared frameworks of understanding”. 
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8.6.7 The BMZ’s use of the monitoring and coordinating 
function of the Federal Chancellor’s Office 
The implementation of cabinet decisions is incumbent on the departments 
within the limits of their formal responsibilities. The Federal Chancellor’s 
Office has a monitoring and coordinating function in this context, one of 
its tasks being to inform the Federal Chancellor of the work being done in 
the federal ministries, to ensure the Federal Chancellor’s (and de facto the 
cabinet’s) decisions are implemented and to coordinate the activities of the 
federal ministries.229 
                                                          
229  Referring to the tasks of the Chancellor’s Office, the preface to the budget of the Fed-
eral Chancellor and the Chancellor’s Office (Departmental Budget 04) states: “The Fed-
Box 11: Functioning division of labour between the BMZ and the BMU 
Since the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 the BMU and BMZ have been 
able to agree on and to consolidate routines that facilitate coordination between 
the two departments and enable a joint approach to be adopted. These routines 
are based on each department’s explicit recognition of the other’s formal re-
sponsibility and professional competence. 
For the negotiation and implementation of the Rio and Johannesburg environ-
mental conventions, for example, it was agreed that responsibility should be 
shared, with the BMU generally taking formal responsibility for dealing with the 
substantive issues and the BMZ coordinating the financial aspects of implemen-
tation, i.e. support for the developing countries. The BMU is dependent on co-
operation with the BMZ if it is to perform its global implementing remit. To 
avoid incoherences, the BMZ introduces the development perspective wherever 
adjustments to the BMU’s position are necessary. 
This approach usually makes it possible to withstand the developing countries’ 
demands for further funds for the achievement of global environmental targets. 
These demands will continue to be problematical until the overall ceiling of the 
BMZ’s Departmental Budget 23 is raised significantly. 
The procedures for the planning of cooperation at bilateral level need to be im-
proved. The BMU has concluded 22 bilateral agreements, including some with 
larger developing countries, with which the BMZ for its part has agreed focal 
areas of cooperation. To enable synergies to be identified and exploited, this 
process should be preceded by an intensive exchange of information between 
the two departments. 
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This means that the Chancellor’s Office must ensure the implementation 
of the AP 2015 as adopted by the cabinet. As the AP 2015 explicitly pro-
vides for coherent contributions from various policies, the BMZ would be 
well advised to keep the Chancellor’s Office fully informed of the imple-
mentation of the AP 2015 and, where appropriate, of any coherence issues 
that are difficult to resolve. Although the Chancellor’s Office does not 
have any substantive responsibility and therefore no specific monitoring 
and coordinating function, its function being political, it must ensure the 
implementation of the AP 2015 in accordance with the objectives set by 
the cabinet and can therefore support the BMZ in its efforts to enhance 
coherence, where necessary. 
8.7 Mobilizing domestic support 
8.7.1 Parliament 
Parliament is not automatically an ally in efforts to enhance policy coher-
ence for development, since its Members, as “representatives of the whole 
people” (Article 38 of the Constitution), represent and articulate multiple 
interests as individuals, as members of parliamentary parties and in their 
totality, those interests being a major cause of policy incoherence. Parlia-
ment may, however, provide important political support if the significance 
of coherence for development as well as the consequences of incoherence 
can be made clear in parliament. 
A great deal of work has already been done in this respect. The Bundestag, 
for example, set up a Commission of Inquiry into the Globalization of the 
World Economy, whose final report, as previously mentioned, emphasized 
coherence as a major prerequisite for the shaping of globalization. Other 
examples are the last two reports to the Bundestag on the Federal Gov-
ernment’s development policy, which explained the goal of policy coher-
ence for development, and statements by the BMZ’s minister and her 
deputies in parliamentary debates. 
                                                                                                                         
eral Chancellor’s Office is required to inform the Federal Chancellor of current gen-
eral policy issues and of the work being done in the federal ministries. It is its task to 
prepare the Federal Chancellor’s decisions and to ensure their implementation. The 
Federal Chancellor’s Office also has the task of coordinating the activities of the feder-
al ministries.” 
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Raising parliament’s awareness of the need for coherence for development 
is, however, a continuing task. Important targets for efforts in this area, 
which may, conversely, influence the decision-making process in parlia-
ment to the advantage of greater coherence for development, are the 
Bundestag committees, and not only the Committee for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (AwZ) but also other committees whose area of 
policy is relevant from the coherence viewpoint or which are concerned 
with globalization,230 the parliamentary parties’ working groups on devel-
opment and, not least, the rapporteurs on Departmental Budget 23 of the 
federal budget (BMZ budget), to whom it cannot be a matter of indiffer-
ence if the effects of development cooperation are nullified by other poli-
cies. 
With the help of the implementing institutions, the BMZ can appeal to 
parliament, the bodies referred to above and also individual Members in 
many ways: at political level through the BMZ’s minister and her deputies, 
through the Federal Government’s report on development policy, through 
the interim reports on the implementation of the AP 2015, by inviting 
Members to discussion meetings, etc. Conversely, parliament, too, has 
opportunities to consider coherence issues (e.g. topical debates, discussion 
in the AwZ and other committees, questions to the Federal Government). 
8.7.2 Non-governmental organizations 
Experience shows that development NGOs can provide major support in 
coherence work since they are able (i) to concentrate energies on procur-
ing and disseminating information and on political education by focusing 
on one subject (“one-issue parties”), (ii) to obtain rapidly, through their 
international networks, information on the effects of a policy on develop-
ing countries and specific target groups in them and (iii) to attract, through 
their ability to conduct campaigns, political attention which a government 
cannot ignore. However, the work of NGOs is helpful in efforts to enhance 
coherence only if it is based on sound information, and even when this is 
                                                          
230  For example, the Foreign Committee’s Subcommittee on Globalization and Foreign 
Trade. 
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so, certain other conditions sometimes need to be satisfied if the involve-
ment of NGOs is to have the effect of improving policy coherence.231 
Where coherence issues are concerned, development NGOs have repeat-
edly voiced constructive criticism of the BMZ’s efforts to improve policy 
coherence.232 It is therefore important for the BMZ to examine and use the 
information provided by NGOs, to address coherence issues in the dia-
logue with NGOs and, not least, to use and support the significant role 
played by NGOs in public relations work in the development field by pro-
viding information (e.g. the BMZ’s participation in debates and discussion 
circles organized by NGOs). 
Cooperating with NGOs in this way does, however, have transaction costs, 
which must be borne in mind. They can be reduced by fostering the some-
times well-established cooperation with reputable NGOs, i.e. those with 
sound arguments, and by involving the proposed policy coherence unit in 
the management of NGO-related coherence work. 
                                                          
231  Two examples: 
 The EU’s reduction of beef export subsidies in the mid-1990s was due not only to the 
campaigns conducted by German and other European NGOs, which criticized the ad-
verse effects on West African countries in particular, but also to the GATT Uruguay 
Round negotiations and the reform of the EU agricultural policy initiated in 1992. In 
addition, the devaluation of the CFA franc depressed the West African countries’ im-
ports and therefore the distortions caused by the export subsidies. See Brandt (1995, 
VII). 
 Conversely, the criticism voiced publicly by NGOs (Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und 
Entwicklung – GKKE – and Transparency International) in the mid-1990s of the fact 
that bribes paid to foreign officials were tax-deductible was not enough on its own to 
force the Federal Government to amend the rules concerned: it was only when massive 
pressure was brought to bear by the USA and a number of other industrialized countries 
within the OECD on grounds of fair competition that the amendment was made. See 
Ashoff (1999, 144 ff.). 
232  Besides the beef export campaigns of German and other European NGOs in the mid-
1990s, there were, for example, the debt relief campaign conducted in the context of the 
Cologne G8 summit, the criticism levelled at the Federal Government’s arms export 
policy (see inter alia GKKE 2003a) and the GKKE’s comments on the implementation 
of the AP 2015 (GKKE 2003b), which, as has been mentioned, acknowledge the pro-
gress made towards coherence in the agricultural policy sphere. 
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8.7.3 Public relations work 
A great deal of coherence work consists of informing and convincing “in 
the political arena”, which does not begin where political decisions are 
taken, but where interests are articulated. Informing and educating the 
public about development and coherence issues is therefore an important 
aspect of the efforts to enhance coherence. 
The BMZ has already taken numerous steps in this direction, not least as 
part of the AP 2015 campaign (e.g. by setting up the 2015 Dialogue Fo-
rum).233 Similarly, if Germany is to contribute to the achievement of the 
MDGs, the public must be made more aware of them. In view of the im-
portance of the AP 2015, not least for coherence work, the experience 
gained from the AP 2015 campaign should be analysed in due course 
within the BMZ and if necessary, i.e. if the BMZ’s information is not 
enough for an assessment, by means of an evaluation. 
8.8 International cooperation 
A considerable amount of coherence work concerns policies and measures 
on which decisions are taken at EU or international level, where, in other 
words, the BMZ or the Federal Government is not the sole actor. Interna-
tional cooperation with like-minded countries is therefore important. The 
BMZ has already engaged in such cooperation on many occasions, some-
times with the support of implementing institutions, and should continue 
to do so at all levels: 
• at the level of the governments in EU Councils of Ministers or at in-
ternational negotiations (e.g. G8, UN, international financial institu-
tions, OECD), 
• at the level of the ministers responsible for development policy (EU, 
DAC High Level Meetings, Utstein Group),234 
                                                          
233  For further details see BMZ (2004). 
234  The Utstein Group is a loose discussion forum of the development ministers of Canada, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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• at the level of directors-general (EU, DAC Senior Level Meetings), 
deputy directors-general, division heads and desk officers (network-
ing), 
• at the level of coherence advisers, where they exist, 
• at the level of academic advisory groups and research institutes.235 
An interesting example of networking was the Franco-German Working 
Group on Globalization set up by Federal Chancellor Schröder and Presi-
dent Chirac, in which, on the German side, the Foreign Office, the BMWi, 
the BMU and the BMZ were represented and which elaborated joint views 
on various problem areas.236 The initiative was interesting because two key 
EU countries were endeavouring to adopt joint positions. However, the 
working group has been inactive since the change of government in France 
in June 2002. 
International cooperation also includes support for partner countries in 
their efforts to have the industrialized countries frame their policies more 
coherently. An example is the criticism voiced publicly by the Netherlands 
and, recently, by Federal Minister Wieczorek-Zeul of the cotton subsidies 
paid, in particular, by the USA, which have an adverse effect on West Af-
rican countries. 
                                                          
235  See footnote 209. 
236  See the document drawn up by the working group entitled “Global Governance in the 
21st Century. A Franco-German View of Globalization.” 
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